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ABSTRACT
Troudt, Melissa. Mathematicians’ Evolving Personal Arguments: Ideas That Move Proof
Constructions Forward. Published Doctor of Philosophy dissertation, University
of Northern Colorado, 2015.
This research is an investigation into the ideas professional mathematicians find
useful in developing mathematical proofs. Specifically, this research uses the construct
personal argument to describe the ideas and thoughts the individual deems relevant to
making progress in proving the statement. The research looked to describe the ideas that
mathematicians integrated into their personal arguments, the context surrounding the
development of these ideas in terms of Dewey’s theories of inquiry and instrumentalism,
and how the mathematicians used these ideas as their arguments evolved toward a
completed proof.
Three research mathematicians with multiple years of experience teaching real
analysis completed tasks in real analysis while thinking aloud in interview and
independent settings recorded with video and Livescribe technology. Follow-up
interviews were also conducted. Data were analyzed for ideas that participants found
useful. Toulmin argumentation diagrams were implemented to describe the evolving
arguments, and Dewey’s inquiry framework helped to describe the context surrounding
the development of the ideas. Descriptive stories were written for each participant’s work
on each task documenting the argument evolution. Open, iterative coding of each idea,
problem encountered, and tool was conducted. Patterns, categories, and themes across
participants and tasks were identified.
iii

The mathematicians developed ideas that moved their personal arguments
forward that were grouped into three categories according to their functionality: ideas that
focus and configure, ideas that connect and justify, and monitoring ideas. Within these
three categories were ideas in fifteen sub-types. The ideas emerged through the
mathematicians’ purposeful recognition of problems to be solved as well as reflective and
evaluative actions to solve them. This research implicates that using the full Toulmin
model for investigating the process of creating mathematical proof since the modal
qualifiers evolve to become absolute as the warrants shift to become based on deductive
reasoning. In the instruction of undergraduate students, this work supports teaching
content in conjunction with proof techniques and heuristic strategies for problem solving
and recommends engaging students in discourse situations that would motivate moving
their informal arguments into deductive proofs.
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CHAPTER I
INTRODUCTION
Background of the Problem
In many undergraduate mathematics courses, having students prove statements
and understand proofs of statements is a means of conveying information and analyzing
student understanding. Both the National Council of Teachers of Mathematics Standards
(NCTM; 2000) and the Common Core Standards for Mathematical Practice (National
Governors Association Center for Best Practices & Council of Chief State School
Officers, 2010) documents highlight the importance of the development of reasoning and
argumentation in students even prior to their enrollment at the university level. The
NCTM standards require students to develop and evaluate mathematical arguments and
proofs and select and use various types of reasoning methods and proofs. The Common
Core Standards for Mathematical Practice require that mathematically proficient students
“construct viable arguments and critique the reasoning of others” (p. 6). The ability to
construct and understand mathematical proof is instrumental to success in studying
mathematics. However, it is well documented that secondary students, undergraduate
mathematics majors, and pre-service and in-service mathematics teachers struggle with
understanding and constructing viable mathematical arguments (e.g., Balacheff, 1988;
Harel & Sowder, 1998; Healy & Hoyles, 2000; Knuth, 2002; Weber & Alcock, 2004).
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Undergraduate students learn mathematical proof construction within the context
of a mathematics content course or in an Introduction to Proofs course. In an
introduction to proofs course, students’ struggles with mathematical proof can be
complicated by their lack of content knowledge (Tall & Vinner, 1981; Weber, 2001). A
challenge for instructors in a content course is that students come into the course with
different levels of experience with proofs (Brandell, Hemmi, & Thunberg, 2008), and
instructors need to balance instruction in new mathematical content as well as instruction
in what mathematical proof is, techniques for constructing mathematical proof, and
developing students’ abilities to formulate mathematical arguments. More and more,
universities are offering an introduction to proofs course as a means of supporting
students in learning to construct and analyze proofs. Traditionally in these courses, the
instructor lectures about proving techniques and assigns proof construction tasks for
homework; the students take notes and try to recreate proofs based on the techniques
taught. These techniques may not be effective (Selden & Selden, 2008). Harel and
Sowder (2007) indicated that proof courses must also incorporate experiences that would
constitute an intellectual need for attending to definitions and other ways of thinking
associated with proof construction. Instructors may facilitate more of an inquiry-based
classroom, but they must be mindful of the types of scaffolding for their choices for
instructional interventions (Blanton, Stylianou, & David, 2009; Selden & Selden, 2008;
Smith, Nichols, Yoo, & Oehler, 2009). Harel and Sowder called for a more
comprehensive perspective on the learning of teaching of proofs that incorporates
mathematical, historical-epistemological, cognitive, sociological, and instructional
factors. They stated more research is needed to characterize instructional practices
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conducive to students formulating an understanding of proof that “is consistent with that
shared and practiced by mathematicians of today” (p. 47), indicating the importance of
understanding the practices of mathematicians--those who have great experience and
abilities in constructing mathematical proof.
Studying mathematicians to describe the practices of the mathematics community
(Inglis, Mejia-Ramos, & Simpson, 2007; Weber, 2008; Weber & Mejia-Ramos, 2011), to
understand the processes involved with certain mathematical activities, to describe the
experience of understanding mathematics (Sfard, 1994), to inform and construct
frameworks for use with analyzing student work (Engelke, 2007; Raman, 2003), and to
guide the design of effective instruction are common practices in the mathematics
education community. Previous researchers have observed that mathematicians and
graduate students in mathematics construct proof using both purely formal reasoning and
also constructions that are accompanied by informal reasoning (Alcock & Inglis, 2008;
Raman, 2003; Weber & Alcock, 2004). This informal reasoning may include the
exploration of examples, the rephrasing of the definition of a concept, or other
instantiations of concepts. Mathematicians have been shown to use examples for varying
but specific purposes including developing understanding, testing conjectures, generating
counterexamples and ideas for how to prove the statement (Alcock, 2004, 2008; Alcock
& Inglis, 2008). When mathematicians use informal reasoning, they are able to connect
their informal reasoning to the formal definitions and concepts, linking their private
arguments to a public articulation of an argument (Raman, 2003; Weber & Alcock,
2004). Tall et al. (2012) described that a proof for professional mathematicians as
“involves thinking about new situations, focusing on significant aspects, using previous

4
knowledge to put new ideas together in new ways, consider relationships, make
conjectures, formulate definitions as necessary and to build a valid argument” (p. 15).
While the term “proof” can describe the written product that serves as the
mathematician’s way to “display the mathematical machinery for solving problems and
to justify that a proposed solution to a problem is indeed a solution” (Rav, 1999, p. 13,
italics in original), the process of constructing a proof involves more than the writing of
logically valid deductions (Aberdein, 2009). The construction involves informal
arguments to find methods to attack the problem as well as incomplete proof sketches
(Aberdein, 2009). The construction process may proceed in non-linear stages including
the exploration of a problem, the estimation of the truth of the conjecture, and the
justification of the statement estimated to be true (Mejia-Ramos & Inglis, 2009). For
mathematicians, there is reflection, reorganization of ideas and reasoning that “fill in the
gaps” so a proof will emerge (Twomey Fosnot & Jacob, 2009).
I chose to focus on these emergences of proof with the view of the proving
process as an evolving argument. A personal argument is an evolving, graded (Lakoff,
1987) subset of one’s statement image (Selden & Selden, 1995) of the proof situation.
The argument is graded in that various elements such as pictures, theorems, statements,
algorithms, logical premises and deductions, and so forth may not exclusively be seen to
be pertinent to the argument or exterior to the argument; there is a gradation that depends
on the degree to which the individual anticipates the ideas do or can “do work” in moving
the argument forward. The idea may not be made explicit in the final write-up of the
mathematician’s proof, but it serves to help the prover get a handle on the mathematics or
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on how to communicate the mathematical ideas in a logical, mathematically acceptable
manner.
A prover determines if an idea moves an argument forward; he or she discerns if
an idea is functional as a means of resolving a certain situation. These ideas may include
those that convince the prover of the statement’s validity, provide insight as to why the
statement is true or cannot be true, give insight into ways to communicate a formal proof,
and others. While ideas may grant “aha” moments to the prover, they may also include
developing a sense of what the statement means, a sense of the implications of the
statements, an understanding of the structures, a sense that a line of inquiry will not be
fruitful, or a feeling that the actions taken are appropriate and fitting with the other
elements in the situation.
Aspects of the statement image such as pictures created and observations and
inferences drawn may prove to be more and less central to one’s personal argument as the
argument evolves. What was extraneous to the personal argument may become more
central, and what was once central to one’s personal argument may move to the
periphery. For example, certain pictures and examples may have been critical to the
prover’s self-conviction as to why the statement must be true, but it may be the case that
the prover abandons these informal representations and the insights gleaned from them
when moving to write a formal proof. He or she may instead produce an argument using
symbolic manipulations of a general, algebraic instantiation of the definition.
Some ideas that have an impact on the proving process have been identified with
varying degrees of specificity by mathematicians and mathematics education researchers.
For example, Byers (2007) speaks of the mathematical idea in generality as the answer to
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the question, “what’s really going on here?” Raman, Sandefur, Birky, Campbell, and
Somers (2009) observed critical moments in the proving process in which there were
opportunities for a proof to move forward. They identified three moments, the attainment
of a key idea (an idea that gives the prover a sense of structural relationship that indicates
why the statement is true), the discovery of some technical handles (ways of
manipulating or making use of the structural relationship that can support the
communication of the key idea), and the culmination of the argument into a correct proof
(Raman et al., 2009; Sandefur, Mason, Stylianides, & Watson, 2012). Raman et al. noted
that in a single proving episode a prover may attain multiple key ideas and that it may not
be possible to connect key ideas to a technical handle or to render a technical handle into
a formal proof. They maintained that mathematics faculty may prefer constructing proof
that connects their informal key ideas to a formal proof via a technical handle. Although
a proof construction process may not involve the attainment of a key idea or technical
handle, the work of Raman and colleagues provide empirical evidence that in the proving
process there is an attainment of ideas that can push the argument forward.
Statement of the Problem
Mathematicians and mathematics education researchers appear to agree that the
mathematician’s proving process includes an attainment of ideas that can motivate a
mathematical argument, and the construction of a proof involves a non-linear process of
understanding the statement, convincing oneself, convincing a friend, and convincing an
enemy (Tall et al., 2012). Students find difficulty differentiating arguments that convince
themselves from mathematical proof (Harel & Sowder, 1998; Healy & Hoyles, 2000;
Weber, 2010), and at times students do not seek to construct formal proofs that are
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connected to their informal understandings (Raman et al., 2009). Students have also been
shown to struggle with generating and using ideas that can move their arguments toward
a rigorous proof (Alcock, 2008; Alcock & Weber, 2010; Brandell et al., 2008).
Little research has been performed that would describe the context around the
formulation of the ideas that the prover finds useful and how these ideas influence the
development of the mathematical argument. A more thorough account of the state of the
literature is given in Chapter II. The phenomenon is not well-described for
mathematicians but resonates in authors’ accounts of doing mathematics. Looking at the
moments where these ideas develop through the perspective of Dewey’s (1938) theory of
inquiry may grant important information about the context of the generation of these
ideas and the purposes that they serve as the argument evolves. Understanding the
context surrounding the generation of these ideas may inform the development and
creation of experiences for students of mathematics (Harel & Sowder, 2007).
Framing Research in the Context of Dewey’s
Theory of Inquiry
This research sought to describe the context surrounding the generation of ideas
that can move an argument forward. I viewed ideas as tools for performing some sort of
work on the proof situation. Byers (2007) posited that ideas emerge from periods of
ambiguity. Dewey (1938) likewise described ideas as possible solutions to situations that
the individual deems tense and unresolved:
The possible solution presents itself, therefore, as an idea, just as the terms of the
problem (which are facts are instituted by observation). Ideas are anticipated
consequences (forecasts) of what will happen when certain operations are
executed under and with respect to observed conditions. (p. 109, emphasis in
original).
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The intentional process to resolve doubtful situations through the systematic invention,
development, and deployment of tools is inquiry (Hickman, 2011).
The process of active productive inquiry involves the repeating, cyclical pattern of
reflection, action, and evaluation. In reflection, the inquirer inspects the situation,
chooses a tool to apply to the situation, and thinks through a course of action. After this
initial reflection of what could happen, the inquirer performs an action (applies the tool).
Either during or after the fulfilling experience, the inquirer evaluates the appropriateness
of the selected application of the chosen tools (Hickman, 1990). The process and pattern
of inquiry will be described further in Chapter III, but I argue now that viewing the
situation surrounding mathematicians’ developing personal arguments through the
inquiry framework may be informative.
I chose to view personal arguments as progressing if the individual deemed that
he or she had incorporated ideas that were useful to achieving the purpose that he or she
defined. Similarly, Dewey (1938) defined a proposal, theorem, or course of action as a
“tool” if it does work in the inquirer’s eyes achieving some sort of purpose. Using the
framework, I was able to describe the actions performed by the participants noting if the
prover perceived a problem and what they perceived the problem to be. If the prover
perceived a problem, I sought to describe process of selecting a tool to apply to the
problem, the individual’s expected outcome of using the tool, and the individual’s
perspective of how the action affected the situation. These factors together provided an
organization for the context of the situation from the participant’s point of view.
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Purpose and Research Questions
The purpose of this research was to describe the evolution of the personal
argument in professional mathematicians’ proof constructions. I defined the personal
argument as progressing or moving forward when the prover generated ideas he or she
saw as functional in resolving certain problems encountered and chosen to be solved
throughout the proof construction process. Additionally, this research sought to describe
the situations surrounding the emergence of ideas through the lens of describing the
problem the mathematician endeavored to solve, the tools that he or she applied, and the
anticipated outcomes of enacting those tools. The research also described the process of
testing the ideas and how the emergence of the idea did or did not change the situation for
the mathematician. This research sought descriptive answers to the following questions:
Q1

Q2

What ideas move the argument forward as a prover’s personal argument
evolves?
Q1a

What problematic situation is the prover currently entered into
solving when one articulates and attains an idea that moves the
personal argument forward?

Q1b

What stage of the inquiry process do they appear to be in when one
articulates and attains an idea that moves the personal argument
forward? (Are they currently applying a tool, evaluating the
outcomes after applying a tool, or reflecting upon a current
problem?)

Q1c

What actions and tools influenced the attainment of the idea?

Q1d

What were their anticipated outcomes of enacting the tools that led
to the attainment of the idea?

How are the ideas that move the argument forward used subsequent to the
shifts in the personal argument?
Q2a

In what ways does the prover test the idea to ensure it indeed “does
work”?
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Q2b

As the argument evolves, how is the idea used? Specifically, how
are the ideas used as the participant views the situation as moving
from a problem to a more routine task?
Definitions of Key Terms

The following definitions are provided to ensure uniformity and understanding of
these terms. I developed all definitions not accompanied by a citation.
Argument. “An act of communication meant to lend support to a claim”
(Aberdein, 2009, p. 1).
Idea that moves the argument forward. An idea that the individual sees as
functional in resolving certain problems encountered throughout the proof construction
process.
Personal argument. The personal argument encompasses all thoughts that the
individual deems relevant to making progress in proving the statement. It is a subset of
the entire statement image (Selden & Selden, 1995) of a proof situation that the
individual views as central to his or her aims in developing the argument.
Problem. A situation that the individual recognizes as tense ore unresolved,
specifically a task or situation in which it is not clear to an individual which mathematical
actions should be applied that the individual has an interest and motivation to solve.
Problematic situation. A situation that the individual recognizes as tense or
unresolved, specifically a task or situation in which it is not clear to an individual which
mathematical actions should be applied.
Professional mathematician. A professional mathematician is defined to be an
individual holding a doctorate in mathematics that is currently teaching and doing
research in mathematics.
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Proof. A proof is a sub-type of argument that uses deductive-type warrants and
the modal qualifier is absolute (Inglis et al., 2007). It is the written end product of an
argument meant to convince another of a claim using the language accepted by the
mathematics community. It is the individual prover who decides if the argument is a
proof or not.
Statement image. The statement image is a construct proposed by Selden and
Selden (1995) to describe the mental structure one attaches to certain statements. For this
study, I am interested in the statement image of the task statement to be proven. The
image includes “all of the alternative statements, examples, nonexamples, visualizations,
properties, concepts, consequences, etc., that are associated with a statement” (Selden,
1995, p. 133).
Tool. A theory, proposal, action, or knowledge chosen to be applied to a situation
(Hickman, 1990).
Procedures
In order to answer the research questions, three participant mathematicians
worked on three or four mathematical proof tasks. The participants were mathematicians
who either did research in a field related to real analysis or who taught courses in real
analysis at the upper undergraduate or lower graduate level. The mathematicians chose
tasks that they found to be problematic, meaning, tasks for which they did not recall a
solution or for which they did not know a way to approach. Each participant participated
in task-based and follow-up interviews. In the first interview, participants chose tasks
and began work on the first task. The second interview consisted of a follow-up
interview regarding their work on the first task, and participants will began work on the

12
second and third task. The third interview was a follow-up interview regarding the
participant’s work on the second and third tasks.
Participants began their work individually in an interview setting that was audio
and video recorded using Livescribe technology to record their written work. If they did
not complete the tasks in the interview, they continued working on the task on their own,
recording their work with the Livescribe technology. I conducted preliminary analyses to
formulate questions and identify important moments in the video of the participant’s
work for use in the follow-up interviews. The follow-up interviews posed the questions
formulated in the analyses to clarify participant thinking while they were constructing the
proofs.
Data analysis occurred in two major phases: the preliminary analyses to prepare
for the follow-up interviews and the primary analyses of the entire data set. The
preliminary analyses occurred between interviews for each task for each participant. I
identified moments when new ideas seemed to be articulated which acted as markers on
the timeline of the argument evolution. Toulmin’s (2003) argumentation framework
(Toulmin, Rieke, & Janik 1979) informed analysis of the arguments before and after
these ideas emerge. This provided a structured description of the elements deemed useful
(i.e., objects doing work in the personal argument). I formed hypotheses about what the
participant perceived as problematic, the phase of the inquiry process that he or she
appeared to be in when articulating the idea, the tools used that influenced the generation
of the ideas, and the anticipated outcomes of using these influencing tools. These
hypotheses also included how the participant appeared to test the idea that he or she
viewed as moving the argument forward and how he or she used the idea throughout the
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rest of the argument. Finally, the hypotheses informed the formulation of questions and
the identification of what video/audio/Livescribe to play back for the follow-up
interviews.
The primary analysis began with writing a description of each idea that moved the
argument forward and the context surrounding the generation of that idea. I described the
argument’s evolving structure via Toulmin diagrams formulated in the preliminary
analysis and informed by the follow-up interviews. Descriptive stories of each
participant’s work on each task documented the argument evolution; the development of
new ideas that moved the argument forward acted as significant moments in the story. I
then conducted open iterative coding of each idea to organize, describe, and link the data.
After coding each participant’s work on each task, I looked for patterns, categories, and
themes across participants and tasks.
Limitations and Delimitations
Any research design can have potential weaknesses outside the researcher’s
control. In addition, the researcher makes choices about what will and will not be
included in the study. This study was limited by sample size and sampling methods, the
nature of interview studies and their ability to capture participant thinking, and the types
of tasks that participants were able to complete. This research was delimitated to the
mathematical proof constructions of mathematicians on real analysis tasks.
Generalizing the findings from this study is problematic as the sample of
participants was not large and random. Lincoln and Guba (1985) recommend sampling
until the data becomes redundant. In designing this study, I hypothesized that three
mathematicians working on three tasks, resulting in nine total tasks could achieve that
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goal and ended up with participant work on ten tasks. At the conclusion of analysis, it
was found that no new codes were needed and that saturation in the data was indeed
achieved.
Patton (2002) indicated that interview data has limitations that include “possibly
distorted responses” (p. 306), which in this study would be potentially due to personal
bias or the emotional state of the interviewee, recall error, or the reaction of the
interviewee to the interviewer. This research sought to make sense of the
mathematicians’ thinking. Internal thinking is not directly observable; I was limited to
what participants said in conjunction with what they wrote. To ameliorate this issue, the
study used a variety of sources (Patton, 2002) including the follow-up interviews that
drew not only upon the participant recollection but also the video, audio, and Livescribe
data viewed and interpreted by the participants to test my hypotheses.
The scope of the study was limited to mathematicians’ constructing proof on
“school-type” tasks, or tasks from textbooks or homework that had been previously
solved. This does not completely capture the work of the research mathematician as
mathematics research involves posing and investigating novel problems. Simply put,
there was not enough time to look at the practice of mathematicians while conducting
research in the kind of depth needed to answer the research questions as it would take
time for me (a non-expert in the field) to understand the specific field. Additionally, the
types of ideas that were the focus of this study may not have emerged in a short interview
setting. The ultimate design of this study was based on the assumption that
mathematicians could still engage in genuine problem solving on school-type tasks
provided they personally identified the task to be problematic.
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Mathematicians were specifically chosen based on the assumptions that
mathematicians are especially adept at constructing mathematical proof that learning
from what mathematicians do can inform teaching. Since mathematicians were the focus
of this study, the ideas that they generated may not be the same ideas generated by
members of other populations while constructing mathematical proofs. I chose to focus
on the subject of real analysis. Ideas generated in this field of mathematics may or may
not be indicative of the types of ideas generated in another field.
This study seeks to describe the ideas generated and the emergence of those ideas.
Characterizing the emergence involves describing the tools and ways of thinking that
participants utilized. However, it is beyond the scope of this study to fully describe all
affordances, limitations, and ways of applying the tools observed. The descriptions of the
tools used are limited to how they were used on the tasks that the participants chose to
complete in this study.
Organization of the Dissertation
This introduction chapter provided a description of the research problem giving
an overview of the literature that is expanded in the next chapter. I presented the research
purpose to describe how mathematicians’ personal arguments evolve in their
constructions of mathematical proof. I explained how the research was framed within
Dewey’s (1938) theory of inquiry and presented the research questions. In the following
chapter, there is a presentation of literature related to the research purpose and theoretical
framing of the study. The third chapter provides a description of the theoretical
perspective guiding this research and the methods for conducting the study. The fourth
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chapter presents the findings. In the final, fifth chapter, I discuss how the findings of this
study relate to the literature and conclusions from the findings.

CHAPTER II
REVIEW OF SELECTED LITERATURE
The purpose of this qualitative study was to describe the evolving personal
arguments of professional mathematicians in the construction of mathematical proofs.
This literature review along with the research purpose served to provide focus to the
theoretical perspective and methods of data collection and analysis (Patton, 2002). In this
chapter, I provide an overview of previous research and theoretical conceptions related to
mathematical proof constructions, mathematical argumentation, and problem solving,
focusing specifically on the practices of professional mathematicians. The first section
includes the areas of research on the practices of mathematical professionals. The
sections that follow focus on proof construction literature that specifically relates to
moving the argument forward including identified difficulties students have in
constructing proof, the relationships between informal arguments and formal arguments,
and practices that have been identified as useful in the construction of ideas that can
move the personal argument forward. Conceptions of relationships between
argumentations and mathematical proof in the next section lead to an overview of how
past research has used mathematical proof construction as a type of argumentation.
Finally, as the formulation of new ideas to solve a mathematical proof task can be
conceived as a special type of mathematical problem solving, I describe the identified
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components in the problem solving process and empirical studies that have related
mathematical proof construction to problem solving.
Past Inquiries into Mathematical Professionals
Inquiring into the mathematical practices of professional mathematicians is a
long-standing endeavor in the mathematics education research community (e.g., Engelke,
2007; Raman, 2003; Sfard, 1994; Weber, 2008). By studying professionals, research
may be better able to describe habits of thinking and reasoning that may be termed
successful in order to perhaps characterize what is missing when students are
unsuccessful.
In order to describe the experience of understanding mathematics, Sfard (1994)
chose to interview working mathematicians. She felt professionals’ reflections would
provide her with insights that could transcend professional understanding. Researchers
have analyzed the mathematics produced by mathematics professionals to inform and
construct frameworks for use with analyzing student work or describing mathematical
processes (Carlson & Bloom, 2005; Engelke, 2007; Raman, 2003).
More specifically, researchers have sought to describe meanings and practices of
proof for research mathematicians. Weber and Alcock (2004) compared undergraduate
student and graduate student attempts to prove or disprove two groups are isomorphic;
they also compared undergraduates’ abilities to instantiate groups to the abilities of
professional algebraists. Inglis et al. (2007) analyzed mathematical arguments produced
by mathematics postgraduate students using Toulmin’s use of arguments and found
frequent use of non-deductive warrants to deduce non-absolute conclusions. Savic
(2012) studied mathematicians solving mathematical proof tasks outside an interview
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setting and described their strategies when coming to impasses. Some research has been
also conducted into how research mathematicians read and validate mathematical proofs,
and these studies have found that the standards for validating proof depend on the
authority of the author (Inglis & Mejia-Ramos, 2009; Weber, 2008). Weber (2008) also
found that mathematicians’ validation standards and strategies can vary and depend on
how familiar they are with the mathematical domain in question.
Research has also been conducted in how mathematicians solve problems of other
kinds (Carlson & Bloom, 1995; DeFranco, 1996; Stylianou, 2002); however, these
problems were not proof tasks. Selden and Selden (2013) point out, “It would be very
informative to have research on how advanced university mathematics students or
mathematicians actually construct proofs in real time, but such a study has not yet been
conducted” (p. 314). This study will contribute to addressing this gap by focusing on the
ideas that mathematicians’ find useful in moving their arguments forward while
constructing mathematical proof. Describing the process of developing, testing,
connecting, and utilizing ideas to construct mathematical proof for professionals may be
useful for practitioners when finding ways to address student difficulties in developing
and using ideas successfully. As elaborated in the next section, two categories of ideas
that can be useful in the development of a proof are those that support informal or
intuitive arguments and those that support more formal deductive arguments. The next
section elaborates on research into the use of informal and formal reasoning in proof
construction.
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Informal and Formal Arguments
Weber and Alcock (2004) noted that a necessary skill for students to develop is
the ability to translate informal intuitions into formal arguments. Selden and Selden
(2008) further identified knowledge of and the ability to appropriately use various
symbolic representations and an understanding of the logical structure of mathematics as
necessary for students to produce proof. Possessing the above attributes contributes to an
individual’s ability to render informal ideas communicable (Raman & Weber, 2006).
The relationships between informal and formal arguments, and the process of moving
from the former to the latter have been discussed with varying areas of focus including
comparing how professionals navigate between formal and informal reasoning to what
novices do when constructing proofs (Raman, 2003; Weber & Alcock, 2004), the
identification of reasoning practices that can help students connect these two ideas
(Alcock, 2008; Boero, Garuti, Lemut, & Mariotti, 1996), and the identification of salient
features of informal and formal arguments (Raman et al., 2009). In this section, I outline
how the dichotomy of informal and formal reasoning or arguments in proof construction
and writing has been discussed in the literature, the reasoning techniques that have been
identified as useful in connecting the formal and informal, and lead into the next section
where I discuss how formal mathematical proof has been related to the process of
argumentation. Informal understandings, arguments, or reasoning as discussed in the
next few paragraphs are understandings grounded in empirical data or represented by a
picture. These arguments may or may not directly lead to a formal proof, but may be
connected to one.
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In a series of investigations, Weber and colleagues (Weber, 2005, 2009; Weber &
Alcock, 2004) worked to analyze how individuals with successful experience in
mathematical proof and more novice students navigated between formal and informal
ways of reasoning. They termed syntactic reasoning as thinking based on formalism and
logic; the reasoning process involves one starting with definitions and axioms and then
using logical deductions to make inferences in a proof production. Semantic reasoning is
a way of thinking about justifying a statement that considers informal and intuitive
representations such as graphs, examples, gestures, and diagrams (Weber, 2009). Weber
and Alcock (2004) presented both undergraduates and mathematics graduate students
with the task of proving that two groups were not isomorphic. Undergraduate students
relied upon the definitions of isomorphism attempting to prove the statement
syntactically. The graduate students, on the other hand, applied their rich instantiations
of group and isomorphism using reasoning outside the formal system and then were able
to connect their informal reasoning back to the formal system. While semantic proof
productions often convey the prover has a richer understanding, successful proofs can be
produced using purely syntactic reasoning (Weber, 2009). Later research found that even
when students attempt to use informal reasoning practices to develop ideas to inform the
construction of proof, they are sometimes unable to translate their ideas into a formal
proof (Alcock & Weber, 2010).
Raman (2003) investigated the views of proof held by mathematicians, students,
and teachers. She identified two aspects of proof construction, the private and the public.
The private argument is “an argument that engenders understanding” (p. 320), and a
public argument is one “with sufficient rigor for a particular mathematical community”
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(p. 320). In earlier work, Raman (2001) found that university mathematicians and
students thought about the public aspects and private aspects of proof in different ways.
Mathematicians held the view that there is potential for their private arguments to be
connected to a public argument although they could choose to develop a public argument
that did not use the ideas from their private argument. Students, in contrast, viewed the
public and private aspects of mathematics as separate. To further describe this difference
between those experienced with mathematics and novices, Raman (2003) characterized
three types of ideas involved in the production of a proof: heuristic ideas, procedural
ideas, and key ideas. A heuristic idea is an idea based on informal understandings and is
linked to the private aspect of proof. A procedural idea is “based on logic and formal
manipulations” (p. 322); it gives a sense of conviction but not necessarily understanding.
A proof based on a procedural idea would be an example of Weber and Alcock’s (2004)
conception of a syntactic proof production. Because it gives a formal proof, the
procedural idea lies in the public domain. Raman (2003) identified a third idea, a key
idea, as a heuristic idea that can be mapped to a formal proof; it is thought to link
together the private and public aspects of a proof. A complete proof that utilizes a key
idea would be reminiscent of a successful proof that utilizes semantic reasoning (Weber
& Alcock, 2004). Raman (2003) found that faculty members were more likely than
students to construct proofs involving key ideas because students did not have the key
idea and because they did not view proof as about key ideas.
Connecting privately held intuitions to a formal proof may be desirable especially
as students may at times view the two as disconnected or do not see the differences
between them. Harel and Sowder (1998), in characterizing what students view as
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personally convincing arguments, described a transformational proof scheme as
arguments based on a fully developed understanding of the concepts. A transformational
proof scheme includes “(a) consideration of the generality aspects of the conjecture, (b)
application of mental operations that are goal oriented and anticipatory, and (c)
transformations of images as part of a deduction process” (p. 261). Harel and Sowder
(2007) advocated for student understanding of proof in line with the transformational
proof scheme. Proofs constructed in this manner transform the personal argument into a
public one. How this transformation occurs or evolves has not fully been described.
However, Raman and colleagues (2009) identified two key moments in the proof
construction process, the formulations of key ideas (or critical insights) and technical
handles, that may give insight to how this transformation could occur.
Key Idea and Technical Handle
In their observations of proofs that students construct, Raman et al. (2009) found
that there were moments that were critical: the moment when students attained a key idea
(later termed conceptual insight; Sandefur et al., 2012), the moment when students gained
a technical handle for communicating a key idea, and the culmination of the argument
into a standard form. A conceptual insight is an idea that gives a sense of why the
statement is true. A technical handle is an idea or a proof procedure that can render the
ideas behind the proof communicable. The technical handle may or may not be directly
tied to the original conceptual insight that gave an ‘aha’ feeling. It may be tied to some
sort of unformed thoughts or intuition.
Students may be limited in their proof writing abilities because they lack a key
idea or because they do not possess tools to link an idea to a formal proof which may be a
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form of technical handle (Raman, 2003). In their research practice, Raman et al. (2009)
“tentatively” distinguished a technical handle in terms of its potential to lead to a correct
proof rather than an actual student realization of “now I can prove it.” They
acknowledged that it may not always be possible to connect key ideas to a technical
handle but found that mathematicians are conscious of the possibility of such a
connection and may be more likely than students to search for the connection to a
technical handle (Raman et al., 2009). Technical handles seemed to be disconnected
from key ideas in the minds of students. If student reached a key idea, they appeared to
start a discussion about how to do a more “formal” proof, often discussing in syntactic
terms and apparently ignoring the key idea formerly reached. Making connections
between the ideas that engender understanding of the key concepts and the ideas that can
help one to construct a formal proof is difficult for students. Researchers have identified
actions that may provide instructors with tools to aid in supporting students’ learning to
construct proofs. The next section describes some of these identified actions and
behaviors, specifically those that can support the development and effective
implementation of useful ideas for developing arguments.
Actions That Support the Formulation of Useful Ideas
The Modes of Thinking
Alcock (2008) conducted interviews with four mathematician instructors of an
introduction to proofs course. The instructors identified characteristics, practices, and
habits that they desired for their students to exhibit when engaging in proof construction.
Alcock categorized these into four modes of thinking: Instantiating, Creative Thinking,
Structural Thinking, and Critical Thinking.
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Alcock (2008) described instantiating as an attempt to meaningfully understand a
mathematical object by thinking about the objects to which it applies. This is similar to
“exploring an example space” or drawing on a rich concept image. Instantiating can
involve thinking about known or developed examples of a mathematical idea or object.
Instantiating can also mean drawing upon other conceptions of mathematical ideas. For
example, picturing a function as shooting the elements of one set to another set (Alcock,
2008) is an act of instantiating. Instantiating is a broad term that encompasses thinking
about generic examples and specific objects as well. The actual behaviors may be
creating examples with desired properties or listing already known examples and then
reasoning about and manipulating them. The utility of example-use in building concept
image and facilitating proof construction has been given considerable attention in the
literature in the last decade; I elaborate on findings in the next section.
Creative thinking entails examining instantiations to identify a property or set of
manipulations that can form the key idea of a proof. This is similar to using examples to
look for an insight. Creative thinking is a tool with the end-in-view of looking for
properties that give insight into the proof. Instantiation supports creative thinking in that
it generates the objects. The purpose of the creative thinking may be to gain a critical
insight, to illustrate the structure of the mathematical objects, to show that the result is
true in a specific case, or to search for a reason why one could not find a counterexample.
Structural thinking uses the form of the mathematics to deduce a proof. This is
not directly related to using examples, but perhaps the exploration of examples can guide
the prover to a place to begin thinking about appropriate and applicable theorems.
Structural thinking employs syntactic reasoning (Weber & Alcock, 2004). The tools used
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in structural thinking will most likely be known properties and theorems and the logical
structure of mathematics. Additionally, Alcock (2004) notes how structural thinking may
inform instantiating and creative and critical thinking. One must know what to
instantiate, what the consequences are of certain manipulations, and be able to articulate
the results of creative thinking in precise language.
Critical thinking has the goal of checking the correctness of assertions made in
the proof. This may occur either syntactically or semantically. Alcock (2008) stated that
it is possible to construct viable, rigorous proof without engaging in this mode of thought,
but it is a habit that instructors would hope to foster in their students. The instructors in
the study described a way of checking one’s work- looking for preserved or implied
properties. Alcock hypothesized that this would require a more sophisticated knowledge
base than just checking examples.
Exploring Examples
Watson and Mason (2005) defined an example as a particular case of any larger
class about which students generalize and reason, and they defined exemplification as
using something specific to represent a general class with which the learner is to become
familiar. Other characterizations of ‘examples’ include illustrations or specific cases of
mathematical objects, not to be confused with a worked example of a procedure as
desired by students (Alcock & Inglis, 2008). Exploring examples has been shown to be a
potential source for new ideas in problem solving and proof construction (Alcock &
Inglis, 2008; Alcock & Weber, 2010; Sandefur et al, 2012).
Past research has found that exploring example spaces may serve to create
instantiations of concepts and develop concept image (Alcock, 2004; Dahlberg &
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Housman, 1997; Mason & Watson, 2008; Watson & Shipman, 2008; Weber, Porter, &
Housman, 2008). Possessing or creating examples may not be enough (Iannone, Inglis,
Meija-Ramos, Simpson, & Weber, 2011). The purposes of examples, the ways examples
are generated, and the assumptions and deductions behind them may contribute to how
much example generation aids learner understanding and proof construction (Edwards &
Alcock, 2010).
Various purposes for using examples in doing mathematical work by both those
experienced in mathematics and novices have been discussed in the literature. Notably,
Lockwood, Ellis, Dogan, Williams, and Knuth (2012) surveyed mathematicians to
determine what kinds of examples they used, how they used them, and for what purposes.
Exemplification has been shown to be useful in the construction and communication of
mathematical proof in the following ways:
•

To understand a statement, definition, object, etc. (Alcock, 2004; Alcock &
Weber, 2010; Lockwood et al., 2012; Sandefur et al., 2012)
o

Indicate what is included and what is excluded by a condition in a
definition or theorem (Watson & Mason, 2005)

o

Build a sense of what’s going on (Lockwood et al., 2012; Michener,
1978)

•

Explore behavior and illustrate structure (Sandefur et al., 2012; Watson &
Mason, 2005)

•

Evaluate the truth of a statement or conjecture by checking inferences
(Alcock & Inglis, 2008; Alcock & Weber, 2010; Lockwood et al., 2012)
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•

To generate arguments
o

“Directly” and “indirectly” (Alcock, 2008; Alcock & Inglis, 2008)


Directly by trying to show that a result is true in a specific case
hoping the same argument or manipulations will work in
general



Indirectly by searching for a reason why one could not find a
counterexample to the statement

o

To give insight into proving (Lockwood et al., 2012; Sandefur et al.,
2012)

o

To understand why the assertion should be true (Alcock & Weber,
2010)

o

Use a specific object to indicate the significance of a particular
condition in a definition or theorem (Watson & Mason, 2005)

o



Highlighting the condition’s role in the proof



Showing how the proof fails in the absence of that condition

To generate counterexamples (Alcock, 2008; Alcock & Inglis, 2008;
Lockwood et al., 2012)

o

To generalize (Lockwood et al., 2012)

•

To aid in explaining an argument to another (Alcock & Inglis, 2008)

•

To indicate a dimension of variation implied by a generalization (Watson &
Mason, 2005)

•

To indicate something that remains invariant while some other features
change (Watson & Mason, 2005)

29
The list above demonstrates ways in which application of the tool of exploring examples
can be useful in developing ideas that an individual may deem as useful in moving the
argument forward.
Antonini (2006) classified the types of examples generated by mathematicians
and mathematics research students when they were specifically asked to create examples.
The three classifications were trial and error, transformation, and analysis. The trial and
error strategy involved searching a collection of recalled examples from a broader
category and testing each example to see if it met the desired criteria. Individuals
utilizing the transformation strategy modified examples that they viewed as satisfying
some of the criteria until they satisfied all of them. The analysis strategy occurred when
the individual identified properties that the desired object would have, and then recalled
or constructed an object with the desired properties. Undergraduates have been found to
almost exclusively use the trial and error strategy (Edwards & Alcock, 2010; Iannone et
al., 2011).
Teaching students about generic proof production, using well-chosen examples to
construct proofs (Mason & Pimm, 1984), may aid in students’ development of ideas that
can move the proof along. By showing a given statement holds for an arbitrary object
from a class of objects may help students to see the structure of the argument (Weber et
al., 2008). This reasoning then may be abstracted into a more general, formal proof.
When considering students and the use of examples, Watson and Shipman (2008) found
that learner-generated examples served as an effective way to introduce mathematical
lessons while Iannone et al. (2011) claimed that example generation is not yet well
enough understood to be a viable pedagogical recommendation.
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Iannone et al. (2011) found that the practice of generating examples did not
contribute to valid proof production in real analysis tasks and suspect its contribution
from the fact that most students used trial and error. This poses the question that if most
undergraduate students use trial and error, is there a gradation in these types of examples
into ones that contribute to proof construction and ones that do not? Past work may offer
some insight into this question. Edwards and Alcock (2010) suggested mathematical
assumptions and deductions within a chosen strategy may be important to consider as
there is a dimension of variation from incorrect deductions or assumptions. Weber
(2009) cited differences in the purposes of examples, i.e., as a primary strategy versus a
last resort for difficult concepts. Sandefur and colleagues (2012) indicated that students
found utility in exploring examples during proof construction with a specific purpose in
mind. However, Alcock and Weber (2010) found that while students used examples for
specific purposes consistent with those described by mathematicians, they could
sometimes use examples ineffectively due to an inability to generate examples that satisfy
the necessary conditions or the inability to connect their reasoning from examples to the
language of formal proof.
When one is developing a mathematical proof, exploring examples, instantiating,
and creative, structural, and critical thinking reside within the definition of informal logic
or argumentation (Dove, 2009) which is discussed in the next section. These informal
arguments may later be conducted to more formal proofs (Raman et al., 2009). When a
prover is able to use make these connections, the overall argument is said to have
cognitive unity. Boero et al. (1996) described a teaching experiment where eighth grade
students dynamically explored a situation, made conjectures, and generated proofs of the
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conjectures. They described cognitive unity as the phenomenon where an individual is
able to use the ideas that motivated their conjectures directly in the proofs they construct.
During the production of the conjecture the student progressively works out
his/her statement through an intensive argumentative activity functionally
intermingling with the justification of the plausibility of his/her choices. During
the subsequent statement proving stage the student links up with this process in a
coherent way, organizing some of the justifications (‘arguments’) produced
during the construction of the statements according to a logical chain. (Boero et
al., 1996, pp. 119-120)
The generation of the conjectures was viewed as an argumentative activity.
Pedemonte (2007) discussed the relationship between argumentation and proof. She
defined proof as a particular argumentation and described argumentation in the tradition
of Toulmin’s argumentation and used Toulmin’s (2003) model to compare the structure
of students’ arguments and the structure of their proofs when investigating topics in
geometry. She found that students’ participation in argumentation activity aided in the
construction of proof. She extended the conception of cognitive unity:
Nevertheless, cognitive unity as defined by Boero et al. (1996) does not cover all
the aspects of the relationship between argumentative conjecturing, proving and
proof (as product). The paper has shown the importance of analysing the entire
resolution process and not only the conjecturing and proving phases. (p. 39)
In her analyses, she conceived of proof as the end product of an argumentation. The
relationship between mathematical proof and the acts of argumentation have been
characterized to some extent in the literature.
Proof and Argumentation
This study seeks to conceptualize the process of constructing mathematical proof
as a process in which the individual’s personal argument evolves from first encountering
the task statement to producing a written proof to convince others. With this conception
of proof as an end result of argumentation, I elaborate how argument and argumentation
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have been defined, how they have been related to mathematical proof, and findings of
empirical studies that have conceptualized proof as argumentation.
Definitions of Argument
and Argumentation
The definitions of an argument can be categorized into two groups: (a) the more
narrow conception of argument as a sequence of logical deductions, and (b) the broad
conceptualization of argument that encompasses both formal and informal logic. Here
are a few definitions of argument presented in the literature. The first two are examples
for the first category and the last encompass informal reasoning practices to various
degrees in the definitions and are examples of the second category.
Those of us weaned on formal logic may think this debate is a non-starter because
there is a perfectly acceptable definition of argument which is synonymous with
the definition of derivation available in any textbook on formal logic: an
argument is a sequence of statements/sentences/propositions/formulas such that
each is either a premise or the consequence of (some set of) previous lines, and
the last of which is the conclusion. (Dove, 2009, p. 138)
An argument in the logician’s sense is any group of propositions of which one is
claimed to follow from the others, which are regarded as providing support or
grounds for the truth of that one. (Copi & Cohen, 1994, p. 5, as quoted in Dove,
2009, p. 139)
The simplest possible argument consists of a single premise, which is asserted as
true, and a single conclusion, which is asserted as following from the premises,
and hence also to be true. The function of the argument is to persuade you that
since the premise is true, you must also accept the conclusion. (Scriven, 1972, p.
55, as quoted in Dove, 2009, p. 139)
An argument is a type of discourse or text—the distillate of the practice of
argumentation—in which the arguer seeks to persuade the Other(s) of the truth of
a thesis by producing reasons that support it. In addition to this illative core, an
argument possesses a dialectical tier in which the arguer discharges his dialectical
obligations. (Johnson, 2000, p. 168, as quoted in Dove, 2009, p. 139)
Argumentation is a verbal, social and rational activity aimed at convincing a
reasonable critic of the acceptability of a standpoint [read: conclusion] by putting
forward a constellation of propositions justifying or refuting the proposition
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expressed in the standpoint. (Grootendorst & van Eemeren, 2003, p. 1, as quoted
in Dove, 2009, p. 139)
[Define] informal logic as the formulation, testing, systematization, and
application of concepts and principles for the interpretation, evaluation, and
practice of argumentation or reasoning. (Finocchiaro 1996, p. 93, as quoted in
Dove, 2009, p. 138)
Now arguments are produced for a variety of purposes. Not every argument is set
out in formal defense of an outright assertion. But this particular function of
arguments will claim most of our attention […]: we shall be interested in
justificatory arguments brought forward in support of assertions, in the structures
they may be expected to have, the merits they can claim and the ways in which
we set about grading assessing and criticizing them. It could, I think, be argued
that this was in fact the primary function of arguments, and that the other uses, the
other functions which arguments have for us, are in a sense secondary and
parasitic upon this primary justificatory use. (Toulmin, 2003, p. 12)
An act of communication intended to lend support to a claim. (Aberdein, 2009, p.
2)
While the definitions of argument above differ in whether they include activities
that are not formal deductive statements, argumentation theory is a study of argument that
emphasizes the aspects that are not prone to deductive formalization. Informal reasoning,
deductive logic, and critical thinking are thought to be subfields of argumentation theory
(Aberdein, 2009). However, some have stated that there is a clear distinction between
argumentative reasoning and deductive reasoning (Balacheff, 1988); while others have
not distinguished argumentations and proofs. For example, in their seminal work
discussing the proof schemes held by students, Harel and Sowder (1998) conceptualized
“proof” as encompassing both deductive and empirical arguments. It may be that
argumentation is the pathway between informal conceptions and formal proof. Tall
(2004) identified three origins of what he terms warrants for truth: (a) the embodied
world--through perception and action in the physical world, (b) the proceptual world-through correct calculation or symbolic manipulation, and (c) the formal world--from a
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set of axioms and basic definitions. According to Mejia-Ramos and Tall (2005), true
mathematical proof lives in the formal world. The concept of informal logic has been
utilized as a means of conceptualizing the pathways by which one reasons outside formal
logic.
In Aberdein’s (2009) conception of argument as an act of communication meant
to lend support to a claim, proof fits within the definition of argument. He characterizes a
species of alleged proof, ‘proof*’. These are arguments that either have no consensus on
whether they are proof, or they have broad consensus that they are proof. These proofs*
include picture proofs*, probabilistic proofs*, computer-assisted proofs*, and so forth.
He indicated steps in the process of proving that may require informal argumentation,
such as, choosing the problem, choosing the methods to tackle the problem, applying the
method to the problem, the review process when the proof is submitted for publication,
and the dialectic between the author and the reader of the proof once it is published as
mathematicians may “seek to generalize it, extend it, transpose it to a different field,
simplify it, or manipulate it in some other way” (p. 2).
Lakatos (1976) raised the question, to what extent is mathematics dialectical? He
provided a ‘rational reconstruction’ of the successive proofs of the Decartes-Euler
Conjecture showing that there is continuity between argumentation as a process of
statement production and the construction of its proof (relationship between constructing
and modifying conjecture and performing trials to prove the statement). Lakatos
indicated that argumentation and proof are developed when someone wants to convince
oneself or others about the truth of a statement. He gave the indication that math, for
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mathematicians, is not a formal mathematical system. Math is about humans making
arguments and being presented with counter arguments.
In keeping with this conception of mathematics, Dove (2009) argued that proof is
more than a finite list of deductive statements citing how mathematicians use evidentiary
or non-deductive methods (computer-assisted proofs, probabilistic sieves, partial proofs,
abduction) using informal logic. He defined informal logic as the application of concepts
and principles for the interpretation and evaluation of argumentation and reasoning. He
stated informal logic is the logic of mathematical reasoning and that mathematicians use
it when they assess mathematical reasoning that is not a proof. It would appear that the
construction of mathematical proof requires a combination of informal and formal logic.
In the next section, I describe empirical studies that have utilized the argumentation
conception of proof construction in their analyses as well as a description of how
mathematics and argumentation philosophers have utilized the conception to broaden the
definition of proof.
Explorations of Proof
as Argument
Aberdein (2009) stated that the study of mathematics practice needs an account of
argument and it has largely been unexplored. One framework, specifically, has been a
means of analyzing mathematical proof in terms of argument. In 1958, Stephen Toulmin
introduced a means of studying non-formal arguments by providing a structure that
analyzes the argument into the six components of claim (the assertion that is being
argued), data (the foundations for the argument), warrant (that which justifies the link
between the data and the claim), backing (explains the permissibility of the warrant),
qualifier (the degree of confidence in the claim), and rebuttal (the conditions under which
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the claim would not hold). A more detailed description of these components is given in
the theoretical perspective in the third chapter.
The Toulmin layout has been used across disciplines in the study of arguments
and how learning progresses in the classroom (Cole et al., 2012; Krummheurer, 1995).
Often these studies use only a condensed version of the full model that only categorizes
statements as data, warrants, and claims. In recent years, it has been used frequently to
analyze mathematical arguments inside and outside the realm of proof construction. I
describe the findings of recent empirical studies that have used Toulmin analyses for
mathematical arguments and justifications.
Pedemonte (2007) used the condensed version of Toulmin’s model (only data,
warrant, and claim) to compare and analyze the structure of arguments associated with
French and Italian 12th and 13th grade students’ conjectures and the structure of their
written proofs. She found that often structural continuity existed between the
argumentations, meaning students used the same properties and theorems in the
argumentation and the proof. However, there also was structural distance between the
two. Specifically, at times, abductive argumentation transformed into a deductive proof,
and inductive argumentation transformed to a mathematical inductive proof. She
recommended analyzing the entire solution process, not just the conjecturing and
proving.
Inglis et al. (2007) found mathematics graduate students used warrants based on
inductive reasoning, intuitive observations about or experiments with some kind of
mental structure, and formal mathematical justifications when evaluating conjectures
about a novel number theory topic. The graduate students provided arguments meant to
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convince themselves whether or not the conjectures were valid. Inglis and colleagues
categorized the warrant-types developed by the participants in terms of their respective
backing. Inductive warrants described ways of connecting the hypothesis to the claim
that were based on empirical evidence. Structural-intuitive warrants was reasoning based
on observations or experiments with some sort of structure. Deductive warrants
described reasoning based on formal mathematical justifications. Inglis and colleagues
warned against the use of the smaller (data, warrant, claim) version of the Toulmin model
emphasizing the importance of considering the modal qualifier because the type of
warrant used would affect to what degree the graduate students were convinced that their
claims implied the conclusions. Inductive warrants were paired with an appropriate
modal qualifier meaning that the graduate students were not certain that a conjecture was
true by the use of examples. Structural-intuitive warrants gave the individuals direction
and reduced uncertainty but at times supported incorrect conclusions. Deductive
warrants that included mathematical properties and justifications were the only warrants
that gave the participants certainty. This points to the possibility that when constructing
mathematical proof, professionals may engage in argumentation that is not formal proof.
Fukawa-Connelly (2014) analyzed an instructor’s proof presentation in abstract
algebra. He noted that the proof of a statement may involve subproofs or proofs of
lemmas. He termed the proofs of the lemmas as local arguments which layer for the
global argument of the entire proof. He classified the instructor’s spoken statements as
data, warrant, backing, qualifier, or conclusion. He described the standards of evidence
for coding the instructor’s statements. For example, “A statement was classified as a
warrant when it linked the data and conclusion in a way that explained how the data
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supported the conclusion by drawing upon previously demonstrated facts or facts stated
as part of the hypothesis” (p. 80).
Fukawa-Connelly (2014) found that the instructor frequently wrote the data and
conclusions of the argument, but wrote the warrants, backing, and qualifiers less
frequently or not at all. Qualifiers were never written possibly because the instructor
only presented completely correct statements. He found that Toulmin analyses were
useful for the purposes of making sense of the instructor’s writing and dialogue, but the
analyses were insufficient in explaining all aspects of the instructor’s modeling of proof
writing. He called for more research into the teaching of proof writing and the
development of theoretical lenses that link the actions of lecture-based teaching to aspects
of student mathematical proficiency.
Wawro (2011) coded arguments within whole class discussions of an inquiryoriented linear algebra classroom. She found the original Toulmin scheme to be
insufficient to capture the complexity of some of the arguments observed. Consequently,
she developed the expanded schemes of
1.

Embedded structure: data or warrants for a claim had minor, embedded
arguments within them;

2.

Proof by cases structure: claims were justified using cases within the data
and/or warrants;

3.

Linked structure: data or warrants for a claim had more than one aspect that
were linked by words such as ‘and’ or ‘also; and

4.

Sequential structure: data for a claim contained an embedded string of ifthen statements.
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The studies summarized above provide insights into this proposed study, both
methodologically and conceptually. I utilized the full Toulmin model as recommended
by Inglis et al. (2007). Fukawa-Connelly’s (2014) standards of evidence for coding each
statement proved helpful in analysis. Pedemonte (2007) provided insight into how the
structure of the arguments may change when an individual is moving from an informal
argument to a formal written proof. The conception of proof construction as
argumentation has shown to be useful in analyzing the process. In addition to conceiving
of mathematical proof as an argumentative activity, past research has also conceived of
creating mathematical proof as a special type of mathematical problem solving (Weber,
2005).
Problem Solving
An individual may enter a proof task without knowing the ideas that warrant the
statement’s validity or invalidity, or they may not know how to put their ideas together to
write the argument in a formal, logical format. In this sense, construction of the
mathematical proof can be viewed as a mathematical problem; the formulation of these
ideas requires problem solving. A review of the literature related to mathematical
problem solving specifically focused on proof problems is warranted.
Definition of Problem
Tasks or situations for which an individual does not recall a solution are often
defined as problems in the literature (Dewey, 1938; Mason, Burton, & Stacey,
1982/2010; Schoenfeld, 1985). This research is concerned with tasks of the type very
non-routine problems (tasks that “may involve considerable insight, the consideration of
several sub-problems or constructions and the use of Schoenfeld’s (1985) behavioral
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problem-solving characteristics” (Selden & Selden, 2013, p. 305) that the individual has a
motivation or interest in entering into solving. Past writings have endeavored to describe
the individual’s approach to attacking mathematical problems both philosophically and
empirically.
Necessary Knowledge for
Problem Solving
Schoenfeld (1985, 1992) interviewed mathematicians solving problems and
identified four important aspects necessary for success in problem solving: (a) Resources
(knowledge of mathematical facts and procedures), (b) heuristics (problem solving
strategies); (c) control (having to do with self-monitoring and metacognition); and (d)
beliefs (about both mathematics and one’s role within mathematics). Schoenfeld argued
that thorough descriptions of these categories of problem solving activities are necessary
and sufficient for the analysis of an individual’s success or failure at solving a problem.
He noted that mathematicians exhibited greater control skills than students in problem
solving; professionals navigated among the phases of activity without getting bogged
down in explorations. The categories of heuristics, control, and affective beliefs resound
in other literature surrounding problem solving.
Heuristics include problem solving strategies that may delineate necessary
activities or phases of activities relevant in solving problems as well as strategies within
each of these activities. Past frameworks have endeavored to describe the phases of
solving problems. Dewey (1938) proffered a theory of inquiry, the cyclical process by
which an individual identifies a problem, chooses to enter the problem, reflects on the
situation, chooses a tool to apply to the situation, evaluates the effect of the tool’s
application including reflection on the situation after the tool’s application to determine if
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the problem situation has changed, and if more tools should be applied. This framework
is used and discussed in detail in the theoretical perspective in the next chapter.
Pólya (1945/1957) presented a model for solving a problem that involved the
steps of (a) understanding the problem; (b) developing a plan; (c) carrying out the plan;
and (d) looking back. There has been some debate as to whether these steps provide a
description of or prescription for solving a problem. While Dewey’s (1938) description
is cyclical, Pólya’s is more linear (Carlson & Bloom, 2005). Other phases of activity in
problem solving have been noted and utilized both in analysis and in instruction. A few
are read, analyze, explore, plan, verify (Schoenfeld, 1985); entry, attack, review (Mason
et al., 1982/2010); problem scoping, designing alternative solutions, and project
realization (Atman et al., 2007). Problem solving strategies that may be applied while an
individual is working within each of these activities or phases may include instantiating
objects, manipulating objects to get a sense of a pattern, working backwards, exploiting a
related problem, etc. (Burton, 1984; Mason et al., 1982/2010). Authors have noted that
students may be limited in their abilities to apply heuristics effectively or to navigate
amongst the activities or phases of problem solving. This may be symptomatic of
students’ difficulty self-regulating, monitoring, and exhibiting control (Schoenfeld,
1992).
Self-regulation, monitoring, and control in mathematical thinking have been noted
as crucial. This would include an individual asking themselves questions like “Is this
approach working?” or “How does this help me?” (Carlson & Bloom, 2005). Schoenfeld
(1992) found that students at times may choose one approach to solve the problem and
continue with that approach even if they are not making progress. Carlson and Bloom
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(2005) found that mathematicians engaged in metacognition during every phase of the
problem solving process and these behaviors appeared to move the mathematicians’
thinking and products forward in the solution process. This may imply that identifying
ideas that move the argument forward is a metacognitive activity.
Research has repeatedly noted that affective aspects such as belief, attitudes, and
feelings play a role in an individual’s ability to successfully solve problems and in how
the solving process plays out (e.g., Carlson & Bloom, 2005; McLeod, 1992; Selden,
McKee, & Selden, 2010). Affective dimensions may cause mental actions and arise from
them (Selden et al., 2010). For example, once a problem is recognized, choosing to enter
into a problem is an affective choice of the individual (Garrison, 2009; Glassman, 2001;
Mason et al., 1982/2010). Carlson and Bloom (2005) noted that while mathematicians
experienced negative emotional responses when solving problems, they were able to
control them, which contributed to the mathematicians’ success. In addition to emotions,
beliefs about mathematics play a nontrivial role as they “shape mathematical behavior”
(Schoenfeld, 1992). The work of Carlson and Bloom has served to describe how the
stages of problem solving relate to the deemed necessary components of resources,
heuristics, control, and affective beliefs.
The Multidimensionality of
Problem Solving
Carlson and Bloom (2005) built upon the large body of problem solving literature
and frameworks working to describe the problem solving behaviors of twelve
mathematicians. They conducted personal, task-based interviews with mathematicians
solving mathematical problems which they audio recorded. The tasks were chosen to be
based on mere foundational content knowledge, challenging enough to engage research
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Figure 1. Carlson and Bloom's (2005) multidimensional problem solving framework, p. 67.
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mathematicians, allow for multiple solution paths, and sufficiently complex to lead to
impasses and affective responses. They cite their audio-recordings and observations of
the participants during the interviews as critical for analyzing participants’ affective
behaviors. From their analyses, emerged a description of the interplay between the
phases of problem-solving, cycling, and problem-solving attributes. They discerned four
phases of problem solving (orientation, planning, executing, and checking). Within the
planning phase was a subcycle of conjecturing, imagining, and evaluating. In this
planning subcycle, the mathematicians hypothetically played out and evaluated proposed
solution approaches. The mathematicians would rarely solve a problem by working
through the phases linearly. The planning cycle would repeat until the mathematician
found a solution approach that could be effective, and participants would cycle through
the plan-execute-check phases multiple times within a single problem. Carlson and
Bloom noted the resources, heuristics, affective behaviors, and monitoring behaviors
exhibited during each phase of the problem-solving cycle that are summarized in a twodimensional table displayed as Figure 1.
Proof as a Particular Type of
Problem Solving
Selden and Selden (2013) considered two aspects of a final written proof: the
formal-rhetorical part, the part that depends on unpacking and using the logical structure
of the statement, associated definitions, and earlier results, and the problem-centered
part, that depends on genuine mathematical problem solving, intuition, and a deeper
understanding of the concepts. They maintain there is a close relationship between
problem solving and proof, but having good ideas for how to solve the problem-centered
part of the proof is not sufficient for having a proof. They cite two kinds of problem
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solving that can occur in proof construction: solving the mathematical problems and
converting an informal solution to a formal mathematical form.
Weber (2005) considered proof from the perspective as a problem solving task,
defining a mathematical problem as a “task in which it is not clear to the individual which
mathematical actions should be applied, either because the situation does not immediately
bring to mind the appropriate mathematical action(s) required to complete the task or
because there are several plausible mathematical actions that the individual believes
could be useful” (pp. 351-352). With this lens, Weber was able to describe three
qualitatively different types of proof productions: procedural proof productions, syntactic
proof productions, and semantic proof productions. He went on to describe learning
opportunities afforded by each type of proof production.
Focusing in on the impasses, incubation, and insight that may occur when one is
solving proof problems in mathematics, Savic (2012) described what mathematicians do
when they reach an impasse in a proving task. These impasses or points of getting stuck
are opportunities for incubation and the generation of new ideas (Byers, 2007). By
having mathematicians work on mathematical proofs on their own utilizing Livescribe,
Savic was able to observe his participants taking breaks from their work which could be
considered incubation periods to recover from impasses. He noted that mathematicians
used methods that occurred earlier in the session, used prior knowledge from their own
research, used a data base of proving techniques, did other problems from the problem set
and came back, and generated examples or counterexamples to recover from impasses.
Additionally, they did other mathematics unrelated to the present task, walked around,
did tasks unrelated to mathematics, went to lunch, and slept to recover from their
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impasses. Savic’s findings suggest that observing mathematicians’ moments of creativity
may require data collection outside the traditional clinical interview setting.
Building from the impasse study, Savic (2013) sought to determine if Carlson and
Bloom’s (2005) Multidimensional Problem-Solving Framework could be used to
describe the proving process. He analyzed the Livescribe proof constructions of a
professional mathematician and a graduate student. Savic found that for most portions of
the transcripts the framework could be used to code and describe the proving process.
However, he found some differences including the mathematician cycling back to
orienting after a period of incubation to reorient himself to reconsider all of the given
information and the graduate student not completing the full cycle of planning, executing,
and checking. He suggested the four phases of Carlson and Bloom’s framework were
important for the proving process. He hypothesized additional problem solving phases
could be added to the framework including incubation and re-orientation noting further
research as needed.
In the above section, I described the current knowledge of mathematical problem
solving because the proof tasks that the participants were asked to complete were genuine
problems for the participant as described by Weber (2005). It is within working on these
problems that new insights and creativity occur which are the primary interest of this
proposed study. The presented frameworks for problem solving agree that problem
solving occurs in stages (Carlson & Bloom, 2005; Pólya, 1954) in a more or less cyclical
nature (Carlson & Bloom, 2005; Dewey, 1938). It is possible that the solution process
for proof construction problems may play out in a slightly different fashion than the
phases already identified (Savic, 2013). However, the individual’s access to resources
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and heuristics, their abilities to exhibit self-monitoring, and their attitudes, beliefs, and
emotions will play a role in their ability to complete the proof tasks (Savic, 2013;
Schoenfeld, 1985, 1992; Selden et al., 2010; Selden & Selden, 2013). While past
empirical studies have conceived of proof construction as a particular type of problem
solving task, much more is yet to be known. Selden and Selden (2013) identified some
areas related to proof as problem solving that could use more research:
These are: how informal arguments are converted into acceptable mathematical
form; how representation choice influences an individual’s problem-solving and
proving behavior and success; how students’ and mathematicians’ prove theorems
in real time (especially when working alone); how various kinds of affect,
including beliefs, attitudes, emotions, and feelings, are interwoven with cognition
during problem solving; which characteristics make a problem non-routine (for an
individual or a class), that is, what are the various dimensions contributing to nonroutineness; and how one might foster mathematical “exploration” and
“brainstorming” as an aid to problem solving. (pp. 329-330)
This research sought to add insight to one of these areas, namely how
mathematicians prove theorems in real time. Since this research endeavored to describe
how personal arguments evolve paying special attention to the tools utilized when new
ideas are formed, I hypothesized that this research could also provide insights into how
informal arguments are converted into acceptable mathematical form. Such insights may
be useful for practitioners because, as described in an earlier section, students have been
shown to struggle utilizing their ideas in constructing proof. Students are less likely than
those experienced with constructing proof to look for ways to use their informal
understandings to develop ideas for how to prove a statement and are at times
unsuccessful in identifying the ideas that could potentially be useful in developing an
argument and often struggle to connect their informal understandings to their formal
proof constructions (Alcock & Weber, 2010; Raman, 2003; Raman et al., 2009).

CHAPTER III
METHODOLOGY
This research sought to describe the evolution of mathematicians’ personal arguments
as they construct mathematical proof. The following research questions guided the
research:
Q1

Q2

What ideas move the argument forward as a prover’s personal argument
evolves?
Q1a

What problematic situation is the prover currently entered into
solving when one articulates and attains an idea that moves the
personal argument forward?

Q1b

What stage of the inquiry process do they appear to be in when one
articulates and attains an idea that moves the personal argument
forward? (Are they currently applying a tool, evaluating the
outcomes after applying a tool, or reflecting upon a current
problem?)

Q1c

What actions and tools influenced the attainment of the idea?

Q1d

What were their anticipated outcomes of enacting the tools that led
to the attainment of the idea?

How are the ideas that move the argument forward used subsequent to the
shifts in the personal argument?
Q2a

In what ways does the prover test the idea to ensure it indeed “does
work”?

Q2b

As the argument evolves, how is the idea used? Specifically, how
are the ideas used as the participant views the situation as moving
from a problem to a more routine task?
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This chapter describes the theoretical perspective and framing of the study and the
methods utilized to collect and analyze data.
Research Strategy
Crotty (1998) indicated four elements composing one’s research framework:
epistemology, theoretical perspective, methodology, and methods. The researcher’s
epistemological stance indicates the researcher’s assumptions about the nature of
knowledge and how we come to know what we know. This research was guided by the
epistemology of constructionism because the research focuses not only on the activities
involved with making meaning (building personal mathematical arguments) but also
activities involved with communicating meaning to others (writing proofs). As Crotty
indicated, the focus of constructionism “includes the collective generation [and
transmission] of meaning” (p. 58). Constructionism emphasizes how culture influences
our views of the world. Professional mathematicians work within the culture of the
mathematics community. While their ways of making meaning of problems is an activity
of the individual mind, it is shaped and influenced by the mathematics community.
Moreover, the activity of proof writing involves making public one’s own arguments, and
a valid proof must be acceptable to the mathematics community at large. I believe we
construct knowledge through our interactions with our environments and experiences and
these constructions were negotiated in our interactions with society and the community at
large.
Since this research was intended to explore how individuals develop mathematical
proof under the constructionism epistemology, interpretivism (Crotty, 1998) was the
theoretical perspective for this study. Interpretivism was appropriate because this
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research sought descriptions of the meaning of mathematicians’ behavior situated
historically and culturally within the mathematics community. My means of enacting the
interpretivism perspective was based on John Dewey’s (1938) theories of inquiry and
instrumentalism (Hickman, 1990) integrated with Toulmin’s argumentation theory and a
perspective on creative mathematical thinking. The theoretical framework is described in
more detail in the next section.
Because the goal of this research was to understand multiple individuals’ common
experiences of constructing mathematical proofs, the methodology that best framed this
research was phenomenology (Creswell, 2007) which “describes the meaning for several
individuals of their lived experiences of a concept or a phenomenon” (p. 57). The
phenomenon of interest here is the development and incorporation of new ideas to move
a personal argument forward. In this study, I sought to understand mathematicians’
personal arguments in proof construction. These personal arguments are embodiments of
how the mathematician understands the situation encompassing the ideas he or she sees
as pertinent to proving or developing a proof of the statement. The data were collected
through interviews, observations, and document analysis of written work. The methods
will be further elaborated in this chapter.
Theoretical Perspective
The theoretical perspective that framed this research was interpretivism,
specifically based on John Dewey’s (1938) theories of inquiry and instrumentalism
(Hickman, 1990) integrated with Toulmin’s argumentation theory and a perspective on
creative mathematical thinking.
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Theory of Inquiry
John Dewey’s (1938) theory of inquiry gives us a means of understanding how
knowledge is created and how it is perceived useful in problem-solving situations. In
periods of inquiry, one is actively engaged in reflecting on problem situations, applying
tools to these situations, and evaluating the effectiveness of the tools. Knowledge in the
“honorific sense” (Dewey, 1938) is the outcome of active, productive inquiry (Hickman,
1990). The purpose of this research was to understand how ideas emerge in the proof
construction process; ideas that move the proof along can be viewed as a certain kind of
tool to be applied to the problem situation of developing the mathematical proof.
Hickman (1990), citing Dewey (1938), described how individuals’ experiences
fall into two categories: everyday experiences and inquirential experiences. In noncognitive, everyday experiences, our actions and responses to stimuli are immediate
because we do not sense a problem. There is engagement in the experience but no
reflection (Hickman, 1990). These everyday experiences do not require a conscious
recognition of the relationship between actions and their consequences (Glassman, 2001).
Everyday experiences may be “technological” in the sense that the individual
applies tools to the situation but not inquirential. For example, a master electrician will
apply tools to repairing a broken light switch but choosing which tools to apply and
evaluating the effectiveness of the applied tool is not necessary since the actions have
become so habitual (Hickman, 1990). As a more educational example of noninquirential tool-use, Mason and colleagues (1982/2010) indicate that it is possible for
students to engage in a certain mathematical exercises and only have the “appearance of
thinking” because they merely apply certain rules or techniques given by the teacher.
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However, during these non-cognitive experiences (everyday life), problematic
situations may occur. There may be a gap, tension, or unexpected outcome. There is an
intuitive realization of a pervasive quality that at first we can describe as a problematic
situation, but the individual may not be able to describe or acknowledge the existence of
a problem. Circumstances provide problematic situations, but the individual makes
problems. If these intense and unresolved (Hickman, 1990) situations have been deemed
a problem and the individual expresses interest in some objects of the situation, the
process of inquiry, the second type of experience, begins. There needs to be a
construction and an affective element of interest in actually solving the problem and
entry for a problematic situation to become a problem to be solved (Garrison, 2009;
Glassman, 2001; Mason et al., 1982/2010).
Inquiry is the intentional process to resolve doubtful situations, the systematic
invention, development, and deployment of tools (Hickman, 2011). These doubtful
situations are the purposes to which tools are applied. Throughout the entire process, the
individual has an “end-in-view” or a desired outcome (Garrision, 2009; Glassman, 2001;
Hickman, 2009). These ends-in-view provide tentative consequences for which the
inquirer must seek the means (tools and ways to apply tools) to attain them. As inquiry
proceeds, the inquirer may modify their ends-in-view. In this framework, I refer to these
“ends-in-view” as the purposes to which tools are applied.
The process of active productive inquiry involves reflection, action, and
evaluation. Reflection is the dominant trait. The inquirer must inspect the situation,
choose a tool to apply to the situation, and think through a course of action. Garrison
(2009) described that “a collection of data is the first product in the process of inquiry”
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(p. 92). The data are the means or clues to and of something to be attained. The
inspection of the traits of the situation involves reflection, a “going outside” the situation
to something else to gain leverage for understanding the situation (Hickman, 1990).
After the data are collected, a hypothesis or proposition may be formed about what will
happen when certain operations or tools are applied to the situation. These propositions
are themselves tools (Hickman, 2011). After this initial reflection of what could happen,
the inquirer performs an action, applies the tool. Dewey sometimes refers to these
actions as “fulfilling experiences” (Prawat & Floden, 1994). Either during or after the
fulfilling experience, the inquirer evaluates the appropriateness of the chosen application
of the chosen tools (Hickman, 1990). Tools, applications of tools, and evaluation are
further described in later sections.
Dewey (1938) describes knowledge in the “honorific sense” as an outcome of
inquiry. Knowledge in the “honorific sense” is described as the satisfactory resolution of
a problematic situation that yields a warranted assertion (Hickman, 2011). This
knowledge may be the construction and understanding of tools or the construction of
new problems. At the conclusion of an inquiry, an inquirer may enter and enjoy “nonreflective” experience of the first kind. However, these periods of non-reflection tend to
mature when new problematic situations are encountered, and the entire process begins
again (Hickman, 1990). The cyclic nature of the inquiry process is represented in Figure
2. Inquiry begins by reflecting on a situation. The cloud refers to considering the
perceived problem. Based on the observations, one considers possible tools to apply to
the problem and imagines applying the tools to the situation. The cycle is repeated until
a tool is chosen. In Action, the individual actually applies the tool to the situation, and
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evaluates the effectiveness of the tool. The individual returns to reflection as he or she
must reflect on the situation after the tool is applied. If the problem is still unsolved or a
new problem is perceived, the process begins again.

Figure 1. A representation of the cyclic phases of Dewey’s theory of inquiry.

The assumptions and conceptions of the inquirer will play a role in determining if
situations are identified as problems and how the inquiry plays out. For example, if a
student has an empirical proof scheme (where one is convinced by an empirical
argument; Harel & Sowder, 1998), he or she may engage in inquiry in determining if a
statement is true by actively looking for examples to apply, and inquiry process may be
complete from the student’s perspective. The student may then present these examples
as proof of the statement’s validity. The proof may not be correct or sufficient in the
eyes of the student’s teacher or the mathematics community, but the student has not seen
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her solution as a problem or her application of presenting a worked example as an
inappropriate tool for the situation. Successful inquiry may have occurred in generating
these tools (the used examples), but inquiry did not occur in the generation of proof for
the statement.
As researchers, we will need to account for an affective dimension in the
participants’ thought processes. The participant must acknowledge the problem and
choose to enter into it (Burton, 1984; Dewey, 1938; Glassman, 2001; Mason et al.,
1982/2010). Additionally, personal affect throughout the inquiry process may be
noteworthy (Carlson & Bloom, 2005). We may find that even if a participant identifies
an aspect of the proof as a problem, or as incomplete, he or she may still choose not to
engage in the process of solving the problem. It is probable that engaging in proving will
have moments of both non-cognitive and inquirential experiences. Professionals, for
example, may engage in habitual practices. It still could be fruitful to describe the
application of tools by the professional.
What are tools? A tool is a theory, proposal, action, or knowledge chosen to be
applied to a problematic situation. An inquirer reflects on the problem and chooses an
appropriate tool to apply to it. During this reflection, the inquirer may contemplate the
feasibility of using a tool before applying it to a situation. Even if a tool is chosen and
applied, it remains an experiment in the inquiry process (Hickman, 1990) as it may be
modified and is evaluated. At times the tool itself may be deemed problematic, i.e., the
inquirer may have troubles applying the chosen tool or the tool may not perform in the
expected manner. Therefore, the tool must be reflected upon and new tools must be
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chosen and applied to resolve what is problematic about the tool. Dewey describes how
tools (or means to an end) can be successful.
Present actual means are the result of past conditions and past activities. They
operate successfully, or ‘rightly’ in (1) the degree in which existing environing
conditions are very similar to those which contributed in the past to formation of
the habits, and (2) in the degree in which habits retain enough flexibility to
readapt themselves easily to new conditions. (Dewey, 1938, p. 39)
Tools may be used in ways that are not inquirential in situations that are habitual
and routine. For example, professional mathematicians solving a routine problem, such
as proving two algebraic groups are not isomorphic, may apply ideas, theorems, and
strategies methodically without needing to reflect on what actions to take in order to
solve the problem.
Certain tools or actions may be applied to certain situations without the individual
reflecting upon the situation or even needing to identify the situation as a problem. For
example, experienced mathematicians may immediately try to instantiate a new definition
as a means of trying to understand it (Alcock, 2004). The choice of tool used to bring
about understanding is immediate. What follows may require reflection and inquiry. The
actual act of instantiating a particular object may or may not be difficult for the
mathematician, and after instantiating the mathematician may or may not understand the
definition better. However, the initial action of trying to instantiate an object to get a
better sense of the definition is second nature.
Habits may result from previous, repeated practice of the individual, or they may
come from learning from the experiences of others. In the context of mathematics
education, students may be taught that particular procedures must be applied to certain
contexts. Therefore, when seeing such a problem, they immediately may apply the given
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procedure. Students themselves may not have engaged in active productive inquiry to
gain such knowledge.
Tools may be inappropriate for the situation but forced on the situation anyway
(Hickman, 1990). This can occur in two situations: (a) The individual may not be
engaged in inquiry but just applying tools to the situation without first reflecting upon
their appropriateness and (b) the individual may be engaging in inquiry but has limited
experience with the situation.
In order to be considered a tool, an object must be used to do some sort of work.
An object may be a tool in certain situations but not a tool in others; technology is
context dependent (Hickman, 1990, 2011). Consider the study conducted by Iannone et
al. (2011). Two groups of students were introduced to a novel concept in real analysis.
One group read through a series of twelve examples of the concept, and the other group
was asked to complete twelve example generation tasks involving variations of the
concept. All students were then asked to complete four proof tasks related to the same
concept; the proof constructions of both groups were given a correctness score by the
researchers. According to a statistical analysis, there was no significant difference
between the example generation group and the reading group on scores on the four proof
tasks. The authors speculated that one explanation for why generating examples did not
contribute to valid proof production in real analysis tasks was that most students
generated their examples by trial and error (Antonini, 2006) and therefore were not
connecting the example generation to the following proof constructions. In their
research, Iannone and company introduced students to the strategy of example
generation, but the example generation was not performed with the purpose of “doing
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work” in the context of the problem of proving the given statement. In this sense, for the
individual inquirers, example generation was not used as a tool to compete the proof
tasks.
In Dewey’s (1938) view, intellectual tools derive from the individual’s social
history (Glassman, 2001). The tools are products of past inquiries of the individual or
from the discourse community in which the inquiry resides. For the mathematician, the
tools come from the mathematics community at large. For the student in the mathematics
classroom, the tools come from past classroom experiences. Sandefur et al. (2012) cited
the quality of having the “experience of utility of examples in proving” (p. 15) as an
aspect that contributed to students’ use of examples in proving; in their past classroom
experiences, students learned that generating examples can be helpful in constructing
proof. One may not yet be an expert in using a tool, but by performing inquiry on the
tool itself, one becomes more adept. He or she can gain knowledge about how to apply
the tool and to what situations the tool should be applied.
The environment plays a role in that the limits of the environment are considered
in the period of reflection when the inquirer thinks through which tools to apply. For
example, if opening a bottle, I may want to use a bottle opener, but I realize that I do not
have one, and I would have to drive to the store to go purchase one; so instead, I choose
to search for some other tool to do the job. I am aware of the existence of a bottle opener
from my past experiences so the tool is available for me to reflect on, but I realize it is
unfeasible to apply a bottle opener in this situation. The interview environment may play
a role in the tools the individual chooses to use. For example, in the exploratory study,
Dr. Kellems first mentioned a theorem would be potentially useful to apply to the linear
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algebra task. However, Dr. Kellems judged it as inappropriate due to its obscurity and it
likely that a proof task posed by two graduate students could be solved by simple means.
Tools utilized in proof construction. The ideas that the mathematician perceives
as moving the argument forward are “tools” in that the mathematician sees them as useful
in “doing work” in achieving some outcome.
The possible solution presents itself, therefore, as an idea, just as the terms of the
problem (which are facts are instituted by observation). Ideas are anticipated
consequences (forecasts) of what will happen when certain operations are
executed under and with respect to observed conditions. (Dewey, 1938, p. 39)
These ideas as tools were the primary focus of the investigation in this study, but the
mathematicians drew upon other tools in developing and utilizing the ideas. For instance,
studies have identified certain abilities and knowledge as necessary for students to
produce proof: knowledge of and the ability to appropriately use various symbolic
representations (Selden & Selden, 2008), the ability to convert between intuitive
understandings and formal logical reasoning (Weber & Alcock, 2004), and an
understanding of the logical structure of mathematics (Selden & Selden, 2008). The
above may be considered tools in that they may facilitate the generation and
implementation of ideas perceived to be useful for the construction of the proof.
Purposes of tools’ application. As noted earlier, in inquiry, tools are applied
with an “end-in-view” or for an intended purpose. According to Dewey, actions
performed are a means of ontological change (Prawat & Floden, 1994). There is a
situation that the inquirer deems problematic. The tool is applied to reorganize the
situation to relieve the tension that the problem caused. Purposes may be nested within
each other as there may be problems within problems. For instance, one may choose to
apply a computation to an example (Tool A) to get a sense of why the statement works
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(Purpose A). If there is an error in the computation, one may choose to try to fix the
computation error (Purpose B) and would have to apply other tools to fix the error. The
same tool may be applied to different purposes, and various tools may be applied to a
single purpose. Planning a course of action, gaining understanding, attaining new
insights, and formalizing an argument are possible purposes in proof construction.
How can tools be applied? The application of a tool indicates how a tool is
used. One tool can be applied in multiple ways. Choosing how to apply a tool occurs
during periods of reflection in a similar way to how a tool is chosen. The application is
an experiment that is evaluated and may be modified. At times a prover refers to “going
down a path”, in terms of the methods or heuristics chosen to prove a statement. We can
think of the “paths” chosen or proposed as an application of tools, in that in each
application they may employ various tools in certain ways depending on the path and also
the purpose. The paths are evaluated as being useful or not.
As earlier indicated, a tool may be applied unskillfully or inappropriately. In this
case, the tool or the application of the tool may itself become a problematic situation
subject to further inquiry and reflection. Else, the inquiry may not be brought to a
productive close; inquiry may be postponed for a period due to frustration (Hickman,
1990). There is the possibility of the failure of artifacts to do their work (to be
meaningful). A possible cause of this failure is the neglect on the part of the inquirer to
continue to connect the means and the ends; meaning the inquirer is just applying facts
and tools with no real purpose or end in view.
As an illustration of how one tool can be applied in different ways, consider the
tool of instantiation. Example-use is a tool, but there are different applications of
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examples. Alcock and Inglis (2008) described four ways that examples may be used in
evaluating and proving that have been identified in the literature: (a) generic examples
(reasoning with an example that can be generalized to a particular class of mathematical
objects), (b) crucial experiments (checking a conjecture against an example that has no
special properties), (c) naïve empiricism (justifying a conjecture by checking it against a
small number of examples), and (d) using counterexamples to refute conjectures. One
may instantiate an example and may manipulate it, use the example to test a conjecture,
use examples and non-examples to discern and expose properties of the mathematical
objects, or use an example to pilot a proposed manipulation.
Evaluation of tools. Systematic inquiry features periods of evaluation either after
the application of the tool or while the tool is being applied (Prawat & Floden, 1994).
Tools are tested against the circumstances, and the circumstances are tested against the
tools (Hickman, 1990). For instance, a certain tool may not be appropriate for a given
circumstance, or the tool may provide additional insight into the traits of the
circumstance. Carlson and Bloom (2005) characterize similar mental actions of
“reflecting on the effectiveness of the problem-solving process and products” (p. 48) and
call it “monitoring”.
Instances of evaluation can occur before applying a tool, while the tool is being
applied, and after the tool has been applied. Before applying a tool, an inquirer considers
if applying a tool is feasible or will be useful; he or she thinks through possible plans of
attack. While the tool is being applied or after it is applied, “the worth of the meanings,
or cognitive ideas, is critically inspected in light of their fulfillment” (Prawat & Floden,
1994, p. 44).
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The criteria used to evaluate tools and applications are products of the discourse
community (Prawat & Floden, 1994); the decisions made in an evaluation may vary
depending on the community in which the prover participates. The criteria can be revised
and are subject to change. Certain tools and ideas may be accepted or rejected based on
the values the prover possesses (Dewey, 1938).
As Hickman (2011) indicated, technology is context dependent; this means the
conditions the prover is in will play a role in the evaluation of the inquiry at hand. For
example, it is likely that the same mathematician’s proving process will vary depending
on his or her audience, time constraints, etc. What the prover deems as useful or resolved
will vary if she is proving just to convince herself, to convince a colleague, or to convince
a classroom full of students. These situations in fact may entail wholly different
problems for the inquirer.
It must also be noted that evaluation is in fact a value judgment (Dewey, 1938).
Two tools may be equally effective, but an individual may choose one over the other due
to personal preference. It has been noted that some individuals use examples in proof
construction more than others (Alcock & Inglis, 2008; Alcock & Simpson, 2005). This
may be due to personal values, styles, and preferences.
What are the consequences after the tool is applied for the prover? After
applying a tool, the prover evaluates the effectiveness and usefulness of the tool and reinspects the situation. Regardless of the outcome of the application of the tool, the prover
will have gained new information. It makes sense that three possible outcomes of an
evaluation are the problem has found to be unresolved, the problem has been resolved, or
the problem has changed.
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If the prover has deemed that the situation is not yet resolved, he or she must
reflect again on the problem in light of the new information and may choose a different
tool, attempt to apply a tool in a different way, or modify the predicted outcome
(proposition) of applying such tool. The prover may not change the chosen tool or
application, but may deem that the tool itself is problematic and engage in inquiry into
the chosen tool or its application.
In evaluating, the prover may find that the current problem is resolved. Dewey
(1938; Hickman, 1990) indicates that knowledge or judgments are consequences of
successful inquiry which may be the knowledge of if the statement is or is not true,
knowledge of how the given statement may relate to other objects and statements in the
previously known mathematical structure, a more formulated concept image, a greater
proficiency in applying various tools, and so forth. Dewey (Hickman, 1990) indicates
there is an enriched period or a feeling of satisfaction from a completed inquiry. These
enriched periods mature and then may become unstable, and therefore the inquiry process
may begin again.
Upon evaluation, the prover may have deemed that the application of the tool
changed the situation. In this case, the prover may not consider the situation as
problematic and therefore go back to “everyday” experience where the situation may
become problematic. The prover may be aware of the problem but choose not to enter
inquiry in the sense of a moral judgment (Dewey, 1938). The prover may enter the
problem, beginning a new cycle of inquiry in which the tools, and the knowledge
constructed in previous inquiries are available if deemed useful.
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I have attempted to give a description of Dewey’s (1938) theory of inquiry,
working to specifically apply it to the problems of constructing mathematical proof. The
next section describes how this research took the perspective that the process of
constructing mathematical proof consists of more than writing formal deductive
statements but also includes informal argumentation. Toulmin’s theory of argumentation
is used to describe an arguments structure, and I cite other literature that outlines the
relationship between argumentation and mathematical proof. Lastly, there is a
description of how these theories have led to the decision to include the term “personal
argument” as a descriptor for the prover’s concept image of the problem of constructing a
mathematical proof.
Argumentation in Proving
This research is interested in the development and implementations of ideas that
the prover deems useful during the process of constructing mathematical proof. It is
understood that when the proof problem is unfamiliar, the process involves more than the
writing of the logical statements that form the proof product. There is a process and it
includes “thinking about new situations, focusing on significant aspects, using previous
knowledge to put new ideas together in new ways, consider relationships, make
conjectures, formulate definitions as necessary and to build a valid argument” (Tall et al.,
2012, p. 15). The proof construction process can be seen as involving the practice of
argumentation (Aberdein, 2009; Inglis et al., 2007; Lakatos, 1976; Pedemonte, 2007).
Argumentation has been defined in a variety of ways.
The whole activity of making claims, challenging, them, backing them up by
producing reasons, criticizing those reasons, rebutting those criticisms, and so on.
(Toulmin, Rieke, & Janik, 1979, p. 13)
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An act of communication intended to lend support to a claim. (Aberdein, 2009, p.
1)
Argumentation is a verbal, social and rational activity aimed at convincing a
reasonable critic of the acceptability of a standpoint by putting forward a
constellation of propositions justifying or refuting the proposition expressed in the
standpoint. (Grootendorst & van Eeemeren, 2003, p. 1)
Argumentation can be thought of as the activity of supporting claims to convince oneself,
convince a friend, and convince a skeptic (Mason et al., 1982/2010). Mathematicians
have developed an internal skeptic in that they not only seek to convince others of the
statement but to make sense of the mathematics itself (Tall et al., 2012).
Theory of argumentation. Toulmin (1958; Toulmin et al., 1979) developed an
approach to analyzing arguments that focuses on the semantic content and structure. For
Toulmin, reasoning refers to “the central activity of presenting the reasons in support of a
claim” (Toulmin et al., 1979, p. 13). His view of argument includes more that the
practice of logical deduction.
Toulmin’s scheme classifies statements of an argument into six different
categories. The claim (C) is the statement that an assertor wishes to argue to their
audience. The grounds (G) (at times termed “data” (Inglis et al., 2007; Pedemonte, 2007)
are the foundations on which the argument is based. The warrant (W) is the justification
that the grounds really do support the claim. Backing (B) presents further evidence that
the warrant appropriately justifies that the data support the claim. The modal qualifiers
(Q) are statements that indicate the degree of certainty that the arguer believes that the
warrant justifies the claims. The rebuttals (R) are statements that present the
circumstances under which the claim would not hold. This structure is illustrated in the
diagram in Figure 3.
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Figure 2. Toulmin argumentation structure.
The diagram in Figure 4 is an example of an argument that Oakland is a shoo-in
for the Super Bowl (C) (Toulmin et al., 1979, p. 88). Oakland has the strongest and
most-balanced offensive and defensive squads (G), and only a team that is strong in both
offense and defense can be tipped for the Super Bowl (W) according to past records (B).
One presumes (Q) that Oakland is a shoo-in for the Super Bowl (C) unless Oakland is
plagued by injuries or the other teams do some quick and costly talent buying or there is a
general upset of the form book (R). This sports example shows us that an argument
outside formal logic can be mapped to this structure.
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Oakland has the strongest
and best-balanced
combination of offensive
and defensive squads in
the professional leagues
today, while all their chief
rivals are relatively weak
in one squad or the other.

G

Unless Oakland is plagued by injuries or
the other teams do some quick and
costly talent buying or there is a general
upset of the form book

So,
presumably,

Oakland is a shoo-in
for the Super Bowl.

Q

Only a team that is really strong
in both offense and defense can
really be tipped for the Super
Bowl.

The Past Records of form in the
field of pro football indicate that

R

C

W

B

Figure 3. Example of Toulmin layout.

The Toulmin argumentation structure gives us language that can be used to
describe how the mathematicians progress in their arguments. Researchers have made
use of this structure (Inglis et al., 2007; Pedemonte, 2007) to determine how
mathematicians and students use warrants and qualifiers in their arguments, to describe a
relationship between proof and argument, and to determine the degree to which they find
arguments convincing. The diagram in Figure 5 illustrates an example in which this
argumentation structure is implemented to analyze a mathematics graduate’s argument
against the conjecture, “If p1 and p2 are prime, then the product p1p2 is abundant” (Inglis
et al., 2007, p. 6).
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Figure 4. Toulmin analysis of mathematical argument (Inglis et al., 2007, p. 8).

I made use of Toulmin’s structure to describe the roles that various aspects played
for the mathematicians in their evolving arguments and to give structural descriptions of
in what ways the individual’s personal argument evolved. Inglis et al. (2007) emphasized
the importance of considering the modal qualifier because the type of warrant used would
affect to what degree the arguer would be convinced that their claims implied the
conclusions. This points to the possibility that when constructing mathematical proof,
professional mathematicians may engage in argumentation that is not formal proof. For
this reason, this research made use of Toulmin’s full model.
Personal argument. Aberdein (2009) used the term argument to mean an act of
communication intended to lend support to a claim. Aberdein stated that proofs fit within
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this definition but provided for mathematical practices in the process of proving that go
beyond the product that may also be considered argument. Aberdein included choosing
research problems, choosing methods to tackle problems, incomplete proof sketches in
applying these methods, and the dialectic between readers of the proof and the author.
Thurston (1994) noted that in addition to logic and deduction, human thinking includes
human language, vision, spatial sense, kinesthetic sense, intuition, association, and
metaphor. Formal proof is a subset of argumentation. The informal arguments that lead
to formulating a conjecture may be used in the construction of the proof (Boero et al.,
1996; Lakatos, 1976; Pedemonte, 2007).
Since argument has been described as encompassing both informal and formal
arguments and also arguments to convince oneself or another, this research seeks to
describe the proving process as an evolving personal argument. This research adopts
Aberdein’s (2009) definition of argument as any act of communication meant to lend
support to a claim. The argument evolves in that new ideas are incorporated and utilized.
I use proof to denote the written end-product meant for an “other”. A proof is a sub-type
of argument that uses deductive-type warrants and the modal qualifier is absolute (Inglis
et al., 2007). The personal argument encompasses all thoughts that the individual deems
relevant to making progress in proving the statement. It is a subset of the entire concept
image of a proof situation.
Tall and Vinner (1981) described a concept image as the total cognitive structure
that is associated with the concept. It can include mental pictures, instantiations of
concepts, and personal definitions. The concept image is built up through experiences,
and it is not always coherent, different stimuli can activate different aspects of the
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concept image. Tall and Vinner term the evoked concept image the portion of the
concept image that is activated at a particular time. An individual may evoke conflicting
concept images, but only when conflicting aspects are evoked simultaneously may there
be any sense of confusion. Tall and Vinner describe the concept definition as the form of
words used to specify that concept. The personal concept definition is the individual’s
reconstruction of a definition, and the formal concept definition is the one accepted by
the mathematical community at large. Professionals in a given mathematical field may
have multiple personal concept definitions that are consistent with the formal concept
definition (Alcock, 2008). As an extension of the construct of concept image, John and
Annie Selden (1995) conceived of a statement image, a rich mental structure that includes
concepts, examples, visualizations, and so forth that one associates with a statement.
The statement image involves the individual’s total cognitive structure associated
with the proof situation. There may be aspects of the statement image that are evoked at
particular times. There are also aspects of the statement image that the individual may
perceive to be more or less central to his or her aims in moving the argument forward.
The personal argument is the particular subset of the statement image which the
individual views as central to his or her aims in developing the argument. The focus of
this study is to describe how mathematicians’ personal arguments evolve in that we are
looking to see how they incorporate and use new ideas that they view as better enabling
their arguments forward.
The personal argument is a subset of the entire statement image, but its boundary
may be fuzzy. The individual may determine as some aspects of the statement image as
central to the personal argument, but there may be aspects that lie on the periphery.
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George Lakoff (1987) promoted the idea that “human categorization is essentially a
matter of both human experience and imagination-of perception, motor activity, and
culture on the one hand, and of metaphor metonymy, and mental imagery on the other”
(p. 8). Lakoff observed that some categories do not have gradations of membership while
others do. For example, some men are neither clearly tall nor clearly short; they are tall
to some degree. Categories that have somewhat fuzzy boundaries are termed graded
categories. In these categories, there are central members whose are deemed to fully
belong to the category.
Taking these ideas from Lakoff (1987), a personal argument is a graded category.
The individual is the one who categorizes certain ideas and aspects of the concept image
of the proof situation as relevant or useful to him or her in developing the argument. The
category is graded in that there may be different degrees to which the individual
incorporates ideas. Some ideas may be peripheral and others more central; as the
argument develops an ideas degree of centrality to the argument may change. This study
seeks to describe this evolution of the personal argument.
Mathematical Creative Thinking
I believe that the development, testing, and implementation of new ideas that
serve the individual’s aims in producing mathematical arguments are acts of
mathematical creativity. These moments where creative thought happens are worth
studying and describing with empirical evidence. Indeed mathematicians (Byers, 2007)
and mathematics educators (Lithner, 2008) have written about what it means for one to
think creatively in mathematics and what aspects of mathematics are creative. Defining
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creativity can be challenging (Haylock, 1997), but there are characteristics of
mathematically creative thought that can be defined and identified.
Lithner (2008) posed a framework distinguishing creative from imitative
reasoning. In this framework, reasoning is the way of thinking adopted to produce
assertions and reach conclusions. Creative reasoning must fulfill the conditions of
novelty, flexibility, plausibility, and mathematical foundation. Creative reasoning is used
in non-routine problem solving or novel tasks. It can only be observed if the individual is
encountering a situation that he or she deems challenging. Creative reasoning must have
flexibility in that it admits different approaches and adaptations to the situation. Creative
reasoning is shown to be plausible because arguments are included to support the strategy
choice and why conclusions are true. Creative reasoning is founded on mathematical
properties.
Byers (2007), a mathematician, wrote that ideas were the organizing principles of
mathematical thought and that
The creative in mathematics is expressed through the birth of new ideas. These
ideas may consist of a new way of thinking about a familiar concept or they may
involve the development of an entirely novel concept. An idea is usually at the
heart of a mathematical argument but an idea may even entail a new way of
looking at a whole area of mathematics. Creativity in mathematics is inseparable
from ideas. (p. 191)
Byers illustrated his meaning of mathematical ideas using the idea of a “pattern”. One
may grasp a pattern and have some intuition that there is something systematic going on
– this is still a preliminary stage. An individual may move on to express the pattern
explicitly, giving precision to the intuition. Later, one may need to also determine if the
pattern can be generalized to an object. This verifying the validity of the pattern requires
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another idea that convinces the individual why the pattern is valid. Byers stated that the
pattern is an idea but also there is an idea in the verification.
An idea is both the feeling that something is going on and the feeling of “now I
understand what’s going on.” Grasping an idea means looking at things in a certain way.
Certainly, one will have difficulty grasping the idea of the Fundamental Theorem of
𝑥

Calculus if he or she does not see 𝐹(𝑥) = ∫𝑎 𝑓(𝑡)𝑑𝑑 as a function of x. These ideas
emerge from moments of ambiguity.

Dewey’s (1938) theory of inquiry (Hickman, 1990) advances the thought that
knowledge in the honorific sense is a product of active, productive inquiry into
problematic situations. Similarly, Byers (2007) emphasized that there is a relationship
between ambiguity and idea. The idea overcomes the barrier that is the ambiguity, but
the ambiguity persists in the resolution in that the idea is a product of the ambiguity.
After an idea is brought to bear, there is still mathematical work to be done to tease out
and make explicit the mathematics contained in an idea. The logical deduction needed to
convey the formal written proof is another idea.
Alcock (2008) also gave a description of creativity; she described creative
thinking as one of four modes of thinking that students could use in constructing
mathematical proof. Alcock interviewed mathematician instructors of introduction to
proof courses that indicated reasoning abilities that they desired their students to develop
and utilizing in proving statements. She divided this reasoning into four modes of
thinking, one of which was creative thinking. The purpose of the creative thinking mode
is “to examine instantiations of mathematical objects in order to identify a property or set
of manipulations that can form the crux of a proof” (p. 78). In this mode, one
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investigates an example with the goal of finding an argument or sequence of
manipulations that will generalize to a proof or one tries to create a counterexample and
attempts to identify a reason why it cannot be done. One works with an instantiation with
the goal of finding some tools that will enable him or her to get a handle on the argument.
According to Lithner (2008), Byers (2007), and Alcock, looking for and formulating
mathematical ideas that can be used to solve some sort of mathematical problem are
activities of creative mathematical thinking. In other words, creative thinking is looking
for ideas. In this research, I take the view that generation of ideas that are used to move
the proof forward are moments of mathematical creativity brought into fruition in the
proving process.
In summary, this research viewed the generation of new ideas used to solve
problems as acts of mathematical creativity. In order for these ideas to be created, an
individual must be encountering some sort of ambiguity within a problem. When
analyzing an individual’s navigation through a problem, I utilized Dewey’s (1938) theory
of inquiry to conceptualize and frame the process. The specific problems that the
individuals encountered were the formulation of mathematical proof; therefore, this
research utilized argumentation theory.
The above theoretical perspective was the lens through which I viewed the data in
analysis (Patton, 2002). My previous experiences and position also played a role in data
collection and analysis as the data were filtered through my experiences and my role as
the primary instrument of data collection.
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Researcher’s Role
At the outset of this research and throughout the inquiry process, I endeavored to
consider how my position and past experiences factored into the research. I entered this
research with knowledge of the literature on mathematical proof and the theoretical
perspective described in an earlier section. In collecting and analyzing data, the data
were filtered through my experiences and theoretical viewpoints. Awareness of these
biases is critical as is looking for and including data that support opposing viewpoints
(Merriam, 2009). In the paragraphs below, I describe my own struggles and experiences
with learning mathematical proof and my position within this research.
As an undergraduate mathematics major, I had little trouble in performing
calculations and exhibiting understanding of the mathematics at play in my first few
mathematics courses. However, when I entered my first proof-based course, linear
algebra, I struggled. I did not fully comprehend how to structure a formal argument, and
one of my errors was to reverse assumptions and conclusions (Harel & Sowder, 1998).
After learning how to construct a proof successfully, my proof constructions often
consisted of solely symbolic language. I felt the mathematical sophistication of my proof
was inversely correlated to the number of actual words used. I viewed the use of pictures
and written explanations as sub-par since pictures were neither generalizable nor
mathematically precise, and written explanations had no symbols or equations so could
not be viewed as math. Even at the beginning of my graduate career, I would not feel
comfortable with a proof if I could not translate it to symbolic language. For example, in
a master’s level topology class, I was trying to prove the existence of a function with
given properties. I knew what the function would do and could draw a picture of it, but I
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could not write out the algebraic formula. The professor of that course made it clear to
me that trying to come up with the formula would be a waste of time. That began a
turning point in how I thought about mathematical proof. Instead of relying so much on
symbols, I have found that I am better served if I think about the structure of the
mathematics as it would relate to the structure of the proof. I now feel more comfortable
when my arguments include paragraphs of explanation as opposed to purely using
symbols and implication arrows. I have worked on my ability to construct pictures and
diagrams that are general enough to serve as a rigorous argument. I can see now how
mathematical sophistication has nothing to do with symbolization. My struggles with
proof and the ontological shift in my perception of proof made me believe that other
novice mathematicians may have similar experiences. Delving into the literature shows
that in fact my experiences have indeed been shared by others (Harel & Sowder, 1998;
Weber & Alcock, 2004).
Setting and Participants
The choice to study professional mathematicians was made in order to make
explicit the context surrounding the generation of ideas that can move the argument
forward. Mathematical philosophers have written that the formulation of ideas is a real
part of what mathematicians do (Byers, 2007; Tall et al., 2012). The evolution of
mathematical arguments as moments of creativity is a phenomenon that may resonate
with the mathematician. Students may struggle with other issues such as content
knowledge and understanding of logic (Selden & Selden, 2008) and may not make use of
tools in a way conducive to the formulation of ideas (Alcock & Weber, 2010). Better
understanding what professional mathematicians do may help inform designing
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experiences for students to better be able to develop, recognize, and utilize ideas when
constructing proof.
The settings of this study were offices of mathematicians employed in
mathematics departments at four-year universities in the Rocky Mountain Region. I
solicited participation from individuals employed at various universities because
departments vary in size. Participants in this study were professional mathematicians in
the field of real analysis. For the purposes of this study, a professional mathematician
was defined to be an individual holding a doctorate in mathematics that was currently
teaching and doing research in mathematics. Specifically, the mathematicians conducted
research in real analysis or a closely related field or had experience teaching an upper
undergraduate or graduate course in the subject of real analysis.
To find participants, I contacted representatives at university mathematics
departments and accessed department websites to identify mathematicians who either
taught real analysis courses or whose field of research was closely related to real analysis.
Email (see Appendix A) served as the initial means of contact with prospective
participants. This initial contact email informed the participants that the purpose of the
study was to observe and describe their processes in solving mathematical proof
problems in real analysis. I explained the data collection procedures and time
commitment and requested their participation. I initially contacted ten mathematicians
across four universities. While five mathematicians agreed to participate, I selected three
based on their schedules. Three mathematicians were the entire sample size because it
was hypothesized that three participants completing three tasks would be sufficient to
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find saturation in the codes and data observed. This hypothesis proved correct as the last
few tasks analyzed did not necessitate generating new codes.
For the three mathematicians that agreed to participate, I scheduled an initial
interview and then subsequent interviews at each meeting. At my request, the
participants provided demographic and personal information including the number of
years’ experience in teaching and conducting mathematics research and the participant’s
primary field of research. The three participants’ pseudonyms are Dr. A, Dr. B, and Dr.
C. Table 1 summarizes demographic and professional information about the participants.

Table 1
Participant Pseudonyms, Years of Experience, and Research Areas

Dr. A

Years teaching or doing
research in real analysis
post PhD
20+ years

Dr. B

5 years

Applied probability theory

Dr. C

20+ years

Functional analysis

Pseudonym

Primary research areas
Queuing theory;
evolutionary game theory

79
Data Collection
Data were collected from three interviews and participants’ work on mathematical
proof tasks. All three interviews were audio- and video-recorded, and participant work
was recorded via Livescribe notebook technology. It was necessary for participants to
solve tasks that were genuine problems in order to observe them formulating new ideas. I
defined a situation as a “problematic” if it was unclear to the individual how to proceed.
I defined a situation as a “problem” if the situation was problematic and the individual
constructed an affective element of interest and entered into the situation with the
intention of resolving it (Garrison, 2009; Glassman, 2001; Mason et. al, 1982/2010). As
described in the theoretical perspective, only the individual can determine if a situation is
indeed a problem for him. Indeed, in the exploratory, pilot study (see Appendices B, C,
and D), for each of the three mathematicians, at least one of the tasks was not problematic
for them. For this reason, this research had the mathematicians choose their own tasks to
solve.
The three participants worked on three or four tasks each. The study examined
the work on seven total tasks. Each individual chose one task that he or she saw as a
challenge or a genuine problem and also chose one task that he or she anticipated another
mathematician in his or her field would find difficult or challenging. In the first
interview, the participant solved the task he or she found personally challenging. In the
second interview, the participants solved the two tasks chosen by another participant as
potentially problematic for a peer. Dr. B solved a fourth task on his own with the
Livescribe notebook between the second and third interviews.
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Dr. A and Dr. C worked on three tasks, and Dr. B worked on four tasks. Each
task is included in Table 2. Dr. A’s individual task (Individual A) involved applications
of the Lagrange Remainder Theorem. Dr. B’s individual task (Individual B) required
relating limits of sequences to limit points. Dr. C’s individual task (Individual C) asked
to determine and justify where a given function was continuous. I call the tasks that the
participants identified as challenging for a colleague peer tasks. Dr. A presented the
Uniform Continuity peer task. Dr. B worked on the Uniform Continuity peer task. Dr. C
read the task but did not work on it recognizing it as a routine exercise. Dr. B presented
me with formulation 1 of the “additive implies continuous” peer task. Dr. A worked on
formulation 1, and Dr. C worked on formulation 2. Dr. C provided the “Extended Mean
Value Theorem for Integrals” as a peer task and sent me documents with two different
versions of the task (formulation 1 and formulation 2). I chose to give the participants
the statement of Theorem 1 as it is required to prove Theorem 2, but I did not want not
recalling or knowing the theorem to impede the participants’ progress. Dr. A worked on
formulation 1 of the extended MVT task which came from one of the resources that Dr. C
provided, but Dr. A found a limitation to its formulation. I modified the formulation
given to Dr. B (formulation 2) based on the second version provided by Dr. C and the
issues found by Dr. A.
I chose the Own Inverse task as a backup task. This task was used for the pilot
study after performing rounds of task analyses. Dr. B worked on the Own Inverse task
after recognizing an inability to complete the extended MVT for integrals task. When Dr.
C declared that the Uniform Continuity task would be a routine exercise, I provided the
Own Inverse task to solve.
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Table 2
Tasks by Participant
Task Name

Chosen by

Additive implies
continuous
(Linear)

Dr. B

Extended Mean
Value Theorem
for Integrals
(MVT)

Dr. C

Worked on
by
Dr. A

Task

Dr. C

Formulation 2: Let f be a function on the real
numbers where for every x and y in the real
numbers, 𝑓(𝑥 + 𝑦) = 𝑓(𝑥) + 𝑓(𝑦). Prove or
disprove that f is continuous on the real
numbers if and only if it is continuous at 0.

Dr. A

Formulation 1:
Given Theorem 1: MVT for Integrals: If f and
g are both continuous on [a,b] and 𝑔(𝑡) ≥ 0
for all t in [a,b], then there exists a c in (a,b)
𝑎
𝑏
such that∫𝑏 𝑓(𝑡)𝑔(𝑡)𝑑𝑑 = 𝑓(𝑐) ∫𝑎 𝑔(𝑡)𝑑𝑑.
Prove Theorem 2: Extended MVT for
Integrals: Suppose that g is continuous on
[a,b], 𝑔′(𝑡) exists for every t in (a,b), and
𝑔(𝑎) = 0. If f is a continuous function on
[a,b] that does not change sign at any point of
(a,b), then there exists a d in (a,b) such that
𝑏
𝑏
∫𝑎 𝑔(𝑡)𝑓(𝑡)𝑑𝑑 = 𝑔′(𝑑) ∫𝑎 (𝑡 − 𝑎)𝑓(𝑡)𝑑𝑑.

Dr. B

Own Inverse

Researcher

Dr. B
Dr. C

Formulation 1: Define f as linear if for every
x and y, 𝑓(𝑥 + 𝑦) = 𝑓(𝑥) + 𝑓(𝑦). Let f be a
function on the reals. Prove or disprove that if
f is linear, then it is continuous.

Formulation 2:
Given Theorem 1: MVT for Integrals: If f and
g are both continuous on [a,b] and 𝑔(𝑡) ≥ 0
for all t in [a,b], then there exists a c in (a,b)
𝑎
𝑏
such that∫𝑏 𝑓(𝑡)𝑔(𝑡)𝑑𝑑 = 𝑓(𝑐) ∫𝑎 𝑔(𝑡)𝑑𝑑.
Prove Theorem 2: Extended MVT for
Integrals: Suppose that g is continuous on
[a,b], 𝑔′(𝑡) exists for every t in [a,b], and
𝑔(𝑎) = 0. If f is a continuous function on
[a,b] that does not change sign at any point of
(a,b), then there exists a d in (a,b) such that
𝑏
𝑏
∫𝑎 𝑔(𝑡)𝑓(𝑡)𝑑𝑑 = 𝑔′(𝑑) ∫𝑎 (𝑡 − 𝑎)𝑓(𝑡)𝑑𝑑.
Let f be a continuous function defined on
I=[a,b], f maps I onto I, f is one-to-one, and f
is its own inverse. Show that except for one
possibility, f must be monotonically
decreasing on I.
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Table 2 continued
Task Name

Chosen by

Uniform
Continuity

Dr. A

Worked on
by
Dr. B

Individual A
(Lagrange
Remainder
Theorem)

Dr. A

Dr. A

Task
Let f be continuous on the real numbers, and
suppose lim𝑛→−∞ 𝛼 and lim𝑛→∞ 𝛽. Show f is
uniformly continuous.

Let I be a neighborhood of the point 𝑥0 and
suppose that the function 𝑓: 𝐼 → 𝑅 has a
continuous third derivative with 𝑓 ′′′ (𝑥) > 0
for all x in I.
a) Prove that if 𝑥0 + ℎ ≠ 𝑥0 is in I, there is
a unique number 𝜃 = 𝜃(ℎ) in the interval
(0, 1) such that 𝑓(𝑥0 + ℎ) = 𝑓(𝑥0 ) +
𝑓 ′ (𝑥0 )ℎ + 𝑓 ′′ (𝑥0 + 𝜃ℎ)

Individual B
(Sequences and
Limit points)

Dr. B

Dr. B

Individual
C(Determine
continuity)

Dr. C

Dr. C

ℎ2
2

.

1

b) Prove that limℎ→0 𝜃(ℎ) = .
3
c)
Let E be contained in the real numbers, then E
is closed if it contains all limits of sequences
{𝑥𝑛 } with 𝑥𝑛 ∈ 𝐸 for each n.
Discuss the continuity of the function.
𝑓(𝑥, 𝑦) = �

𝑥 2 −𝑦 2
𝑥−𝑦

𝑥−𝑦

𝑖𝑖 𝑥 ≠ 𝑦
𝑖𝑖 𝑥 = 𝑦

�

The data collection phase occurred in cycles for each participant. Participants
worked on a task or tasks in an interview setting, continued to work on the task on their
own, turned in their at home work that was captured via Livescribe technology (which is
described below), participated in a stimulated recall interview of their work, and repeated
with new tasks in the next interview. The sequence of interviews and tasks is given in
Table 3.
Participants worked on the task on their own for a period of three to six days if
they did not complete the proof task to their satisfaction in the interview. Between
participant interviews, I conducted preliminary analyses of their completed work both in
the interview setting and of their “at home” work to prepare for the follow-up interviews.
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Table 3
Sequence of Interviews and Tasks
Participant

Interview 1

Interview 2

Interview 3

Participant A

Choose personal task A
and peer task A
Work on personal task
A

Stimulated recall of
personal task A. Work on
peer tasks B and C.

Stimulated recall of peer
tasks B and C.

Participant B

Choose personal task B
and peer task B
Work on personal task
B

Stimulated recall of
personal task B. Work on
peer tasks A and C.

Stimulated recall of peer
task A and C.

Participant C

Choose personal task C
and peer task C
Work on personal task
C

Stimulated recall of
personal task C. Work on
peer tasks A and B.

Stimulated recall of peer
task A and B.

The Livescribe technology consists of a pen and notebook pair. The camera at the
base of the pen captures both the real-time writings and audio. When one turns on the
pen and taps the record button on the associated notebook, the pen begins recording audio
and will record writings in that notebook. These recordings may be uploaded to a
computer through Livescribe software. The Livescribe technology has been utilized to
capture the work of participants both within and outside the interview setting when
collecting data (e.g., Savic, 2012, 2013).
Interview One
The first interview will consist of two aspects, choosing the tasks and working to
solve the tasks. I asked the participant to identify two tasks: one that was personally
challenging and one that would be challenging for a colleague. These tasks originated
from the textbook that the participant used in teaching courses in real analysis, their
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recollection of problems that they had assigned in the past, and their knowledge of related
tasks that others would find challenging. The protocol used is in Appendix E.
The selection of tasks aspect of the interview was semi-structured. I implemented
follow-up instructions and questions to restate directions to the participant or to clarify
utterances made by the participant. While the participants were selecting tasks, they may
have spent time thinking about the tasks which may be interpreted as beginning to enter
the task (Mason et al., 1982/2010) but did not begin attacking the problem until they have
chosen the tasks. Twenty minutes were allotted for task selection. After the participants
chose the two tasks, the interview transitioned to the second section.
In the second section of the interview, the participant worked to solve the task
found to be personally challenging. The entire interview was video and audio recorded.
The participant used a Livescribe pen and notebook while working on solving the
selected task. A video camera was placed to face the participant and his writing. The
Livescribe set up captured writing in real time synced with audio recordings.
Prior to beginning the task, I explained that I would like the participant to think
aloud. Additionally, I asked the participant to make note of when his perception of the
task changed with the anticipation that this may occur when the participant saw the
solution and the task was no longer a problem, or the perceived problem changed.
Participants worked on the tasks in the interview setting for up until the end of the onehour interview. If the participant did not come to a solution that he or she deemed
satisfying at the end of the allotted time, then the participant continued to work on the
tasks alone, outside the interview setting.
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I took pictures of the work that each participant created in the notebook and
supplied the participant with a Livescribe pen and notebook to continue the work at
home. Participants had the Livescribe notebook for up to six days. I provided both
written and oral instructions for how the participant should proceed in this “at home”
work (see Appendix E). Anticipating that participants could end up thinking about the
tasks on their own time, like while waiting in line for lunch (Savic, 2013), the participants
received instructions to return to the notebook to write down and audio record their
accounts. This concluded the first interview.
Between the first and second interviews, up to nine days elapsed. I transcribed
the video data and reviewed the video recordings along with the Livescribe recordings
from the interviews as well as the later collected “at home” work. I conducted
preliminary analyses and generated hypotheses and questions for the second interview.
The procedures for these analyses are described in the section describing data analysis.
Interview Two
The second interview consisted of two parts: a follow-up interview of the
previous interview and work on two additional tasks. The third interview involved
follow-up questions for each task from the second interview.
A goal of this study was to understand the mathematicians’ thinking processes
while solving a proof-task without disrupting the process itself. An interview technique
that has been used to get at what participants “think about the problem not after they have
finished working on it, but what their thoughts are as they think their way through the
problem for the first time (Pirie, 1996, p.7, emphasis in original)” is stimulated recall
(Calderhead, 1981; Lyle, 2003; Rowe, 2009). In the stimulated recall interview,
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videotaped passages of behavior are replayed to individuals to stimulate recall of their
concurrent cognitive activity. The typical procedure includes a series of open-ended
questions posed to the participant as soon as possible after, or during the viewing of a
segment. The questions focus on description of the segment, the participant’s thinking,
or alternative behaviors the participant could have chosen (Lyle, 2003).
The second interview was scheduled within ten days of the first interview (Lyle,
2003; Pirie, 1996). The interview was video and audio recorded, and participants wrote
with a Livescribe pen in a Livescribe notebook. The stimulated recall of the previous
interview was semi-structured in that I chose specific video clips to play back and wrote
questions. The written questions targeted the participants’ explaining their thinking at
certain moments, the reasons behind the decisions-made, or their perceptions of the
situation including problems they perceived and ideas that they thought could be useful.
The interview was flexible in that the participant had the opportunity to pause, rewind,
and playback events that he or she deemed important. I asked follow-up questions as
needed. No questions written specifically asked participants to identify new ideas and the
context surrounding those ideas as Calderhead (1981) emphasized the importance of
screening the research goal from the participant. After the first stimulated recall,
participants worked on two more tasks, and I did not wish to have my focus on the
participants’ ideas play a role in their thought processes on these future tasks. The
stimulated recall portion of the second interview lasted approximately 40 minutes.
As an example of the stimulated recall protocol, consider Dr. A’s second
interview. I had previously generated hypotheses about what the ideas were and had
written questions about Dr. A’s motivation when solving the Lagrange Remainder
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Theorem task. I began by playing back the Livescribe recording which provided Dr. A’s
audio and also the writings that accompanied the audio. After playing a section, I would
pause the recording to ask questions about what Dr. A was thinking about, what Dr. A
had anticipated, and what motivated the certain actions that we had just viewed. Also,
Dr. A would point to sections where he wrote what he deemed as important information,
and we would play that section back. Dr. A would make comments, and I would followup with clarifying questions.
In the final portion of the second interview, the participants worked on two tasks,
one at a time. These tasks were chosen by another participant at the time of that
participant’s first interview. The protocol was as the task portion of the first interview,
but I provided additional resources including a list of definitions and relevant prerequisite
theorems that the participant may not recall. The definitions were provided as
mathematicians possess multiple instantiations of the terms involved (Alcock, 2008), but
it is possible that the participants did not perceive their definitions as equivalent to those
given by the author of the book. Similar to the first interview, at the conclusion of the
second interview, I provided the participants with a Livescribe pen and notebook to
continue work on the unfinished tasks for up to six additional days. I conducted
preliminary analyses of the data from the two tasks completed in this second interview as
well as the “at home” work to prepare for the third interview.
Interview Three
The third, and final, interview was a stimulated recall of the two tasks completed
in the second interview. Procedures for this interview were similar to the first portion of
the second interview. This final interview lasted approximately 90 minutes.
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Data Analysis
Data analyses proceed in three stages. The first stage was preliminary analysis of
interviews 1 and 2 for each participant preceding the stimulated recall of the interview.
The second stage was refinement of the previous preliminary analysis and descriptive
accounts of the total work on each task by each participant. Finally, analyses across tasks
and individuals were conducted. Each like-problem was analyzed across the two
participants that worked on it. The work by each participant was analyzed across the
tasks completed.
The units of analyses to be studied for the first research question were the ideas
that participants saw as moving the argument forward as these critical incidents were
what the overall research sought to describe (Patton, 2002). To answer the first research
question, I worked to identify and describe these ideas and the context surrounding these
ideas including the perceived problem or problems when the ideas are articulated, the
mode of inquiry into which the participant is entered, and what tools previously applied
contributed to the attainment of the idea. For the second research question, a further level
of analysis across the entire task was required to describe how the ideas related to one
another.
Preliminary Analyses
Preliminary analyses of each task-based interview were conducted prior to the
follow-up stimulated recall interview. The primary goal of these analyses was to
hypothesize which moments were significant in moving the argument forward, to
hypothesize the features of the situation that contributed to the generation of these ideas,
and identify moments where it is necessary for the participants to clarify the motivations
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for their actions. From this analysis, questions were created for the stimulated recall
interview.
In this preliminary analysis, I transcribed the videos and watched the video
recordings in sync with the Livescribe recordings. I noted moments where (a) the
participant appeared to generate a new idea, to identify a certain tool as useful, or to gain
some insight into the problem; and (b) moments where it was unclear what motivated a
certain action. Primary evidence for identifying the moments of new insights came from
the participants’ notations of the appearance of these ideas as per the interview protocol.
Additionally, I identified insights or ideas that the individual used to some satisfaction in
that the application of the idea or tool solved a perceived problem or led to the generation
of a tool that solved the problem. After identifying the moments where it appeared that
the participant had generated or used an idea that moved the argument forward, I
generated initial descriptions of these ideas.
The moments where these ideas occurred acted as markers of transitions in the
timeline of the evolution of the argument. In the next stage of the preliminary analysis, I
endeavored to give a structural description of the evolution of the argument by
performing Toulmin (2003) analyses on the argument prior to these markers and
following these markers resulting in a series of Toulmin diagrams of the personal
argument. The Toulmin analysis provided a description of the elements viewed useful by
the participant and for which purpose. Additionally, it provided insight into the motives
of various tool applications, anticipated outcomes, and the perceived problems for the
participant. In these initial analyses, motivations and some thinking were unclear; also,
the individual’s argument was not complete at intermediate points in the proof
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construction process. Therefore, at many moments, the Toulmin diagrams did not have
complete structures. The definitions given by Toulmin for the components of the
argument structure are given in the theoretical perspective, but in Table 4 I provide
working descriptions and standards of evidence for each component within the context of
the mathematical proof construction process and this study. Although Toulmin’s
argumentation scheme was used to classify the role of certain statements in the argument,
during the argument’s evolution, various components such as warrants, backing, and
rebuttals for warrants were less articulated than complete statements. For example, the
drawing of a picture sometimes acted as a backing for the warrant of a certain claim.

Table 4
Statement Categories of the Toulmin Argument Model
Statement Category

Description

Grounds

Particular facts about a situation relied on to clarify and
bolster the claim; may be the hypothesis of the statement
to be proved, specific features that point toward the
specific claim

Claim

Position being argued for

Warrant

Principle or chain of reasoning that connects the grounds
to the claim

Backing

Support or justification for the warrant

Modal Qualifier

Specification of limits to the claim, warrant, and backing

Rebuttal

Stated exceptions to the claim
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Once a series of Toulmin models were hypothesized, it provided a
characterization of the evolving structure of the argument which facilitated describing the
context surrounding the emergence of the ideas that the participant viewed as moving the
argument forward. Reviewing the context surrounding the emergence of the idea, I
hypothesized what the participant perceived as problematic, the phase of the inquiry
process that he or she appeared to be in when articulating the idea, the tools used that
influenced the generation of the ideas, and the anticipated outcomes of using these
influencing tools. These hypotheses included how the participant appeared to test the
idea that he or she viewed as moving the argument forward and how he or she used the
idea throughout the rest of the argument. Table 5 describes each aspect that was
hypothesized as well as the standards of evidence used to identify each concept. The
standards of evidence that required researcher inference are noted in italics. In this
preliminary analysis, all descriptions were hypotheses which were tested against the
information gleaned from the follow-up interviews. From these hypotheses, I selected
segments of the video to replay for the participants and generated questions to gain
clarification of the participants’ thought processes. These questions included requests for
participants to watch a chosen clip of the interview and describe their thinking and
motivations for certain actions.
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Table 5
Standards of Evidence
Concept

Description

Standards of Evidence

Idea that moves the argument
forward

Incorporation of the idea changes
the set of ideas that the individual
sees pertinent to the personal
argument.

The participant notes the moment
in the interview or the notebook
Comments such as: “I now
see…”
Line of questioning changes

What the problem is

Specific problem the participant
is currently entered into solving

Participant comments in the form
of “I want to…” “I don’t know
how to…” “I don’t know why…”

Mode of inquiry

Reflection: Participant has
articulated a problem and is
thinking of tools to apply to the
problem

Reflection: Comments such as
“what can I do?”; writing or
articulating observations or what
is known, instantiating the
situation with the purpose of
finding a tool to apply to the
problem

Action: Participant is currently
applying a tool or performing
some action
Evaluation: Participant has
applied a tool or is currently
applying a tool and is specifically
reflecting on the effectiveness of
said tool
Influencing tool

In its application, the tool used
effected some action or product
that the participant used in his
generation of the idea that moves
the argument forward.

Action: Participant is computing,
drawing a picture, articulating a
theorem, and so forth.
Evaluation: Comments such as
“does that help me?”
The participant refers to the
product or action either verbally
or with gestures as he/she
articulates the idea.
There is a relationship between
the idea and the product of the
tools
What the participant says about
why the tool may be helpful.

Anticipated outcome of
influencing tool

The purpose of the applied tool.

Testing of idea

Ways the idea are tested to
determine its usefulness

Comments such as “Does that
work?”; “What does that tell
me?”; “Is that helpful?”

Use of idea

How the idea influenced the
personal argument

The participant refers to the idea
or an outcome of the idea
An outcome of the idea is evident
later in the argument
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Primary Analysis
The analysis of these data borrowed from strategies of grounded theory (Corbin &
Strauss, 2008). Analysis began by writing a description of each idea that moved the
argument forward and the context surrounding the generation of that idea. I described the
argument’s evolving structure via Toulmin diagrams formulated in the preliminary
analysis and informed by the stimulated recall interviews. Written stories captured not
only the moment surrounding the idea but how the idea was tested and used as the
argument evolved. I then conducted open iterative coding of each idea to organize,
describe, and link the data. Finally, I looked for themes and patterns across participants
within the same task and across tasks.
The analyzed data included the interviews of the participants working on each
task, the follow-up interviews regarding each task, and the individual work of the
participants on the tasks outside the interview. All interviews and Livescribe recordings
were transcribed. I created a file incorporating all data pertaining to each task. I
conducted a further iteration of analysis on the transcripts in conjunction with the video
and Livescribe data to modify the previously generated list of ideas that moved the
argument forward. New ideas were added and moments previously identified as
significant ideas were combined or deleted based on the complete data set.
After creating a file incorporating all data pertaining to each task, I built upon the
primary analyses, identifying the ideas that move the argument forward. For each idea
that moves the argument forward, I wrote a description as well as the answers to the
following questions:
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1.

What problematic situation is the prover currently entered into solving when
one articulates and attains an idea that moves the personal argument
forward?

2.

What stage of the inquiry process to they appear to be in when one
articulates and attains an idea that moves the personal argument forward?
(Are they currently applying a tool, evaluating the outcomes after applying a
tool, or reflecting upon a current problem?)

3.

What actions and tools influenced the attainment of the idea?

4.

What were their anticipated outcomes of enacting the tools that led to the
attainment of the idea?

In the preliminary analysis, I hypothesized answers to the above questions. I
utilized the data in the follow-up interviews to test my hypotheses and modify the
answers to the above questions. I wrote these descriptions of each idea and modified the
Toulmin analyses of each idea for each task. Then, I wrote stories to describe the
evolution of the argument capturing the participant’s complete work on the task,
sectioned by the ideas that moved the argument forward. Specifically, I wrote to give
thick descriptions about each idea, the problem, tools, anticipations, and mode of inquiry,
how that changed the argument structure, and what previous ideas influenced that idea
and what happened with the idea as the argument evolved. In this process, some ideas
were collapsed into one idea because the prior determinations were results, tools, or
plans.
Once the stories of a single task were written across both participants who worked
on it, I used strategies of inductive analysis (Patton, 2002) to further analyze, compare,
and interpret the tasks to develop themes, patterns, and findings across tasks. The data
analysis was inductive in that largely “open and axial coding” (Strauss & Corbin, 1998)
was be used to develop a codebook. The codes used emerged out of the data and
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sometimes drew upon the language used by the participants in the style of “in vivo”
coding (Merriam, 2009) or if appropriate, implemented language used in the literature.
For example, I drew upon Dewey’s (1938) theory of inquiry to describe the mode of
inquiry.
Each idea was coded, individually. Specifically, I conducted open coding of each
idea that moved the argument forward, the problem situation encountered, the tools that
influenced the generation or articulation of the idea, and the anticipated outcomes of said
tools. I kept records of the generated codes and decisions made in the research journal
and associated files and spreadsheets. The final codebook utilized is given in Appendix
F.
I made note of emerging themes and patterns that were apparent in individual
tasks for individual participants. Analysis occurred across tasks and participants to
determine the limits of those patterns and themes. As the idea-types emerged, I
categorized idea-types according to their perceived purpose as the argument moved
forward. To answer the first research question, spreadsheets aided to analyze each ideatype across problems, tools, and structural shifts. The sense of the pattern of how the
ideas were used and tested came from the writing of the stories, in that it seemed that
aspects of the stories repeated themselves.
Strategies for Validating Findings
In this research, I endeavored to establish trustworthiness in the research results.
My ability to establish trustworthiness depended on how I conceptualize the study and
the strategies used in data collection, analysis, and interpretation (Merriam, 2009). This
study investigated people’s constructions of reality, and any interpretations of these
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constructions will never capture an objective truth. However, this study adopted and
employed strategies to increase the credibility of my findings: triangulation, reflexivity,
and peer review. Descriptions of my use of these strategies are given below.
Specifically, I considered the credibility of any assertions made about the thought
processes of the mathematicians. Human thought cannot be directly observed. This is
what motivated the inclusion of the methods of a think-aloud interview, the direction for
participants to note when their perception of the situation changes, and the follow-up
stimulated recall interviews. The research findings most likely cannot be replicated as
human behavior cannot often be isolated and controlled; therefore, as an alternative to
traditional reliability, I instead endeavored to ensure “the results are consistent with the
data collected” (Merriam, 2009, p. 221). My strategies for consistency and dependability
were triangulation, peer examination, articulation of the researcher’s role, and
establishing an audit trail. Generalizability in the traditional sense cannot occur in this
research as the participant sample was not large and random; however this research
endeavored to include enough description of the data and data collection procedures to
allow the reader to establish if the findings transfer to another situation. This
transferability can be aided by the use of rich, thick description.
Denzin (1978) described four types of triangulation: using multiple methods,
multiple data sources, multiple investigators, and multiple theories. In this study, I
employed multiple data sources and multiple methods. I employed multiple methods of
data collection; participants were observed working on tasks in a one-on-one interview
setting, and they also will complete tasks on their own. Multiple data sources include the
interview transcripts and Livescribe pen work from the interviews, the Livescribe pen
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work from the participants’ individual work, and the follow-up, stimulated recall
interviews with each participant for each task (Merriam, 2009). The process of
triangulation involved comparing observations from the task-based interviews with the
stimulated recall interviews.
Since the researcher is the primary instrument of data collection in qualitative
methodologies, I must explain my biases, assumptions, experiences, and dispositions
regarding the study. This reflexivity statement was given in an earlier section. Its
inclusion contributes to the credibility of this study. Peer examination (Merriam, 2009)
or expert audit review (Patton, 2002) will be conducted by the committee of this
dissertation. The committee applied critical eyes to assess the quality of data collection
and analysis according to the theoretical assumptions of this study. As a means of
increasing the consistency and dependability of this study, I maintained a researcher’s
journal (Merriam, 2009) to record my reflections, questions, and decisions throughout the
data collection and analyses phases. I used the journal to construct descriptions of how
data were collected, how categories were derived, and how decisions were made
throughout the study.
Ethical Considerations
Sensitivity to ethical considerations is important at all stages of the research
process (Creswell, 2007). In this particular study, no participants were from vulnerable
populations; however, I still considered how the qualitative interview process affected the
participants (Patton, 2002). Patton (2002) provides a checklist of issues to consider in
designing a qualitative study and highlights consideration of explaining the purpose,
promises and reciprocity, risk assessment, confidentiality, informed consent, data access
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and ownership, interviewer mental health, advice, data collection boundaries, and ethical
versus legal issues. I explained to participants that the purpose of the study is to observe
how mathematicians construct proof. I used this language in an effort to prevent the
participants from teaching. The specific research purpose and theoretical framing was
not shared in order to facilitate observing the process of proof construction as it occurred.
For credibility purposes, I asked participants to note when their perspective of the
problem situation shifted, and this may have hinted to them what my focus was.
I foresee no greater risk to mathematicians participating in this study than those
they encountered from their typical practice of engaging in mathematics and discussing it
with others. Participation in the study did require them to sacrifice time, three sixty to
ninety minute interviews and time engaging in the tasks outside the interviews which
may have had an impact on their professional and personal commitments. Participants
were informed of the time requirements prior to providing their consent to participate. I
did not compensate participants or provide tangible incentives.
I endeavored to maintain the confidentiality of all participants by assigning
pseudonyms for the participants and their respective universities of employment unless
the participants opted to be identified (Patton, 2002). Video data and Livescribe
recordings were stored on a password-protected computer. Participants’ written work
was stored in locked filing cabinets. Data will be maintained for three years or until the
publication of the results from this dissertation. I followed Institutional Review Board
(IRB) guidelines and requirements for research with human subjects and obtained an
expedited IRB approval prior to contacting potential participants and collecting data (see
Appendix G). I provided a written description of the aspects of participating in this study
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to the potential participants and obtained written informed consent. The chair of the
dissertation committee was charged with storing the data and consent forms. The
dissertation committee chair and I were the only individuals who viewed the video and
Livescribe data for the purposes of peer review.
The topics of the interviews were not likely to be emotionally draining for me as a
researcher. Even so, the interviews were conducted over a short period of time, and I
debriefed with committee members to process all that I observed (Patton, 2002). The
topics of the interview did not appear to be painful or uncomfortable for participants as
they were talking about their experiences in completing a mathematical task within their
own fields of study, a typical practice in their careers. However, I provided participants
with the option of ending the interview or discontinuing work on a task. The chair of the
dissertation committee acted as my confidant and counselor on matters of ethics as not all
issues could have been anticipated in advance.

100

CHAPTER IV
FINDINGS
Introduction
As stated in Chapter I, the study presented sought to describe (a) the ideas
mathematicians form while constructing mathematical proofs that move their personal
arguments forward, (b) the inquirential context surrounding the emergence of those ideas,
and (c) how the ideas are tested and how the ideas do or do not change the situation for
the mathematician. Data were interpreted through the framing of Dewey’s theories of
inquiry and instrumentalism and a conception of an evolving personal argument whose
structure was modeled by a series of Toulmin (2003) diagrams.
Three mathematicians participated in interviews where they solved proof
problems in real analysis. Table 6 summarizes demographic and professional
information about the participants, Dr. A, Dr. B, and Dr. C (pseudonyms). Dr. A and Dr.
C worked on three tasks, and Dr. B worked on four tasks. Table 2 from Chapter III listed
each task used in this study and Chapter III provided more details on participants and
tasks.
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Table 6
Participant Pseudonyms, Years of Experience, and Research Areas

Pseudonym
Dr. A

Years Teaching or Doing
Research in Real Analysis
Post PhD
20+ years

Dr. B

5 years

Applied probability theory

Dr. C

20+ years

Functional analysis

Primary research areas
Queuing theory;
evolutionary game theory

Problems, tools, and the types of shifts in the Toulmin structures modeling the
personal argument were open coded then refined into final types as described in Chapter
III. Tables in Appendix F provide the definitions or descriptions that were used after the
refinement process was completed. Table 40 in Appendix F gives the descriptions of the
nine types of problems the participants were entered into solving when they articulated
ideas. Table 41 presents descriptions of ten types of tools; more specifically, Table 42
expands on the various purposes of examples observed as participants articulated ideas.
Table 43 describes the immediate shifts in the Toulmin structures of the personal
argument seen upon articulation of a new idea. This chapter presents the thematic
findings in response to the primary research questions. Specifically, I present the
findings in three sections: the types of ideas that moved the argument forward, themes
regarding inquirential context surrounding the formulation of these ideas, and themes
found about how ideas were utilized and tested as the arguments progressed toward a
complete mathematical proof.
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Ideas That Moved the Personal Argument Forward
The ideas that moved the argument forward were ideas that accompanied a
structural shift in the personal argument as could be captured by a Toulmin diagram prior
to and following the articulation of the idea, provided the participant means to
communicate their personal argument in a logical manner, gave a participant a sense that
his way of thinking was fitting, or were explicitly referred to by the participant as a useful
insight. Pictures, examples, or individual actions were not included as ideas but as tools.
However, the insights extracted from performing and reflecting upon these tools or a
collection of tools were included as ideas. Ideas that moved the argument forward also
sometimes encapsulated facts, known theorems, and the results of their combination.
Proposed warrants (statements or reasons to connect evidence and claim) and
extracted or generated equations were included as ideas even though the participant may
not have fully believed the warrant or idea would be true or useful. I chose to include
these proposals because at the time that the participants articulated the proposals, they
seemed to perceive how they could connect the proposal to their argument.
Additionally, as will be described later, the acts of testing proposed warrants led to
extracting properties and relationships that were combined to formulate a new idea that
moved the argument forward.
Each idea was coded in terms of the work that the idea did for the participant.
There were 15 idea sub-types that were grouped into three categories: Ideas that Focus
and Configure, Ideas that Connect and Justify, and Monitoring Ideas. An action or
evaluation of that action described at one particular moment could solve multiple
problems or give rise to multiple feelings. Therefore, multiple idea-types could have
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characterized a single moment. For example, an insight that provided a deductive
warrant could also give the prover a sense of I can write a proof. In the following
sections present these three idea categories and the sub-idea-types within them. I will
describe each sub-idea-type using examples, present the salient inquirential contexts
surrounding the emergence of those ideas, and how those ideas were used as the
participant proceeded toward a routine conception of the task (see Figure 6).

Figure 6. Idea categories and idea sub-types.
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Ideas That Focus and Configure
Ideas that focus and configure are the ones that gave the participants a sense of
what was relevant, what claims to try to connect to the statement, strategies that would be
fitting to achieve connections, and a sense of how to structure and articulate the
argument. I have identified six such sub-idea-types under this category.
Informing the statement image. Informing the statement image ideas served the
purpose of broadening or narrowing the conception of the situation. They were found to
be useful by the participants and resulted in added data statements to the entire statement
image. Ideas met this sub-type if the participant identified them as relevant statements
but did not attribute them to serving some purpose such as acting as a claim or warrant in
the central argument or sub-argument to be proven. These ideas acted as added facts in
that they were true statements that the participant either believed to be true or justified to
be true. I provide two examples of ideas that inform the statement image.
On the own inverse task, both Dr. B and Dr. C combined the assumptions that the
function f is one-to-one and continuous to discern that f must be either increasing or
decreasing. The statement that f is either increasing or decreasing was added to the given
assumptions, and it informed their conception of how the function could behave. It
narrowed the class of functions that could fit the conditions on f.
I contrast that idea to a statement given by Dr. C on the own inverse task. Upon
first reading the statement, Dr. C elaborated the statement that f was its own inverse by
writing𝑓�𝑓(𝑥)� = 𝑥: “It’s just another way of saying that f is its own inverse. And I

knew that that idea was central to the argument that I was going to come up with. But I
didn’t know how it was going to fit in. I needed to find an algebraic way of making it fit
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in.” The participant viewed this statement as identical to the own inverse condition. The
participant stated that this algebraic representation of the condition should be relevant in
some way but was not sure how. This added data statement expanded the known
assumption of the function being its own inverse.
Table 7 details for which participants and on which tasks ideas that informed the
statement image were identified. Some ideas contributed new data statements but were
not coded in this category because the ideas contributed other structural changes that
were more saliently described in another idea-type. Dr. B had more instances of
specifically articulating that ideas informed his perception of what was going on than the
other two participants, but all three articulated an idea in this category at least once. New
data statements were added to the personal arguments on the Extended Mean Value
Theorem for Integrals (MVT) task and the Additive implies Continuous task but their
additions were not the salient features of an idea.
As shown in Table 7, the ideas that informed the statement image were generated
while the participants were working on a variety of problems with a range of tools. Four
out of the seven instances that were coded in this idea-type were articulated when the
participants were looking for warrants and while they had been exploring specific
examples. Structurally, the articulation of a new idea to inform the statement image
added or specified data statements, changed warrant statements, added subclaims,
changed qualifiers or rebuttals, and added backing.
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Table 7
Summary of Ideas That Inform the Statement Image
Inquirential context and structural shifts surrounding the emergence of ideas that
inform the statement image.
Tasks
Own Inverse (2)
UC (2)
A-Ind (1)
B-Ind (1)
C-Ind(1)
Participants

A (1)
B(4)
C (2)

Problem

No problem (1)
Tool Problem (1)
Understanding statement & objects (1)
Looking for Warrant (1)
Looking for (conceptual) warrant (3)
Articulating or Generalizing (1)
Determining Backing or Validation (1)

Tool

Conceptual knowledge (1)
Examples (4)
Heuristics & Experience (1)
Instantiations & Equivalencies (1)
Symbolizing (1)

Shift

Data added (4)
Changing warrant (4)
Added Subclaim (2)
Changed qualifier/rebuttal (1)
Added backing (1)

Informing ideas sometimes broadened the perception of all that was included in
an object’s description, and this broadened view sometimes lead to eliminating the
feasibility of proposed warrants or backings for warrants. This idea served as a means of
testing a proposed warrant and informing a more narrowed pursuit of a warrant (e.g., why
functions cannot oscillate more and more wildly on a compact set).
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Participants developed and used informing ideas at all stages of the process of
proof construction. They used the ideas in the pictures constructed; as the participants
interpreted these pictures, they formulated new warrants and backings. The
mathematicians evaluated the statements’ usefulness both explicitly and implicitly.
Explicitly, participants formulated formal or informal sub-arguments to persuade
themselves of the statements’ validity or declared a statement a known fact. Implicitly,
the statements were tested against their usefulness which was subjective. Participants
generated or noted some instantiations of these ideas as important, but the ideas only
played a role in the development of the picture. For example, on the Own Inverse Task,
Dr. B extracted the fact that if a and b were the endpoints of an interval then either f(a)=a
and f(b)=b or f(a)=b and f(b)=a as important evidenced by Dr. B’s uttering or writing the
idea in some form multiple times and writing it as a known statement in the final proof as
well. However, no part of the final argument explicitly depended on this fact. Rather,
Dr. B used it repeatedly to structure pictures, and Dr. B worked with the pictures to
formulate ideas used to justify claims in the final proof. Some informing ideas, like the
endpoint idea above, remained as data statements throughout the entire proof process.
Some ideas appeared to drift to the periphery of the personal argument.
Truth proposals. The ideas that are categorized in the truth proposal sub-idea
type were the participant-generated conjectures about the validity of a given claim.
Participants made conjectures during the proof process (e.g. proposing warrants), but
only the ones with the specific purposes of determining the truth of the statement given in
the task were classified as such (e.g. proposed warrants). For example, in the Additive
Implies Continuous task, participants were given the prompt to prove or disprove the
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claim. Dr. A was given a false version of the task and Dr. C was given a true version. As
such, determining the truth of the claim was a potential problematic issue and the
decision made would dictate how the participants would proceed. Dr. A went through a
series of truth proposals and began the task with the initial inclination that the statement
was not true based on his resources of past experiences. However, Dr. A thought about
the tool needed to prove the statement was not true, and decided that generating a
counterexample would require borrowing ideas from other realms of mathematics besides
real analysis and require knowledge beyond that of an undergraduate student in real
analysis. The participant’s perceptions about the context of the tasks given contributed to
deeming pursuing the counterexample inappropriate or infeasible. Dr. A pursued proving
the statement was true, that additive implied continuous. Because Dr. A had not yet
determined which one was correct, Dr. A used the given and accumulated data to
generate proposals of whether the statement was true or false.
As shown in Table 8, the only task that involved truth proposals was the ‘prove or
disprove’ prompt solved by Dr. A and Dr. C. Because Dr. A’s version of the task was
false and generating a counterexample was perceived to be difficult, Dr. A wavered and
made more truth proposals than Dr. C. Specifically, Dr. A set about to try to prove the
statement but was unsuccessful in solving the problems of finding warrants to connect
additive to continuous. When reaching an impasse, Dr. A would reflect again on the data
including the feeling that there is a counterexample, and propose that maybe the
statement was in fact false:
Let me try one more time. Yeah, you need to, what you need to show is that for
any epsilon. Okay so need to show, to show continuous, need to show that for
any epsilon bigger than zero, there exists a delta bigger than zero so that if x is
between zero and delta, then f of x is less than epsilon. Right, that would be
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sufficient, but how do you do that? //Yeah, what I tell people when I’m teaching
them how to do proofs is that, you, you know especially things like this, that are
wishy-washy, that tell you to prove or find a counterexample, you try one for a
while, if you don’t get, if you don’t get an answer then you try the other one. So,
right now I’m at the point where I’m gonna look for, I’m ready to start looking for
a counterexample.
It appeared that truth proposals were made when the gathered data pointed toward one
side being true or when one did not find success or progress in proving one side.

Table 8
Truth Proposal Occurrences with Counts
Aspect
Task

Instances
Additive implies Continuous (4)

Participant

A (3)
C(1)

Problem

Determining Truth (3)
Looking for Warrant (1)

Tool

Connecting & Permuting (1)
Heuristics & Experience (1)
Conceptual Knowledge (1)

Shift

Changing claim (4)
Opening structure (2)

Table 8 summarized the problems encountered and utilized tools when
participants made truth proposals. The most frequent problem encountered when making
a truth proposal was determining truth, but Dr. A did once change a truth proposal when
looking for a warrant. Participants gathered conceptual knowledge, past experiences,
assessments of context, and connections amongst known ideas to make decisions.
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Making a truth proposal was a choice in how to proceed with the inquiry: whether
to try to prove or to disprove. This could dictate the opening structure of the argument.
Changing the truth proposal resulted in changing the claim. Dr. A switched which side of
the argument for which to argue four times while working on the task while the
interviewer was present. The other participant, Dr. C, swapped claims when finding an
attempt at generating a counterexample was unsuccessful. The type of task dictated
whether these types of truth proposals would be made. The perception of the type of task
played a large role in how some of the mathematicians approached constructing their
proofs.
Type of task. On some tasks, it appeared that participants made assessments
about what tools or ways of approaching generating connections between the conditions
and the claim would be fitting. These feelings about how to classify the problem have
been deemed ideas about the type of task. These feelings were classified as ideas that
move the argument forward because they helped the prover identify what sorts of
arguments would justify the claim most efficiently.
On the Extended Mean Value Theorem for Integrals (MVT) task, both
mathematicians initially had a feeling that proving the Extended Mean Value Theorem
for Integrals would involve a specific set of one or more symbolic manipulations
combined with an application of the given First Mean Value Theorem for Integrals. Dr.
A held an expectation about a certain way to see it: “This kind of looks like the kind of
problem that once you see how to do, it then it’s easy.” In the follow-up interview, Dr. A
said that the choices for paths to pursue were guided by a feeling that some manipulation
would work: “I was sort of guessing somehow this would work…I think that’s normal
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procedure that you guess that something is going to work, and if it doesn’t, you try
something else.” Dr. B’s initial work on the task involved several attempts to make the
two equations look similar. Dr. B agreed that these first approaches to the task involved
attempts at some sort of symbol manipulation so that the two theorems would look
similar to each other. Dr. B also concluded the (never completed) work on the task with
the feeling that some symbolic manipulation was appropriate: “I still have a feeling
there’s a little trick I have to do, just some standard tricks, some rule I have to apply and
connect the symbols correctly where I can sort of connect these two theorems.”
As shown in Table 9, both Dr. A and Dr. B found assessments about task-type to
be useful, on the MVT task. Dr. B also asserted that a construction-type proof would be
fitting for his individually chosen task, and when first entering the uniform continuity
task, Dr. B spent time discerning the logical structure of the statement in order to
determine the claim to justify based on what evidence.
The task-type ideas were generated when participants were first entering the tasks
and working to understand the statements and objects. The participants were orienting
themselves to the task and reflecting on what was known attending to their conceptual
knowledge, connections among known ideas, and instantiations of ideas. The
participants employed heuristic strategies such as listing what was known or identifying
the hypothesis and conclusion of the statement which informed their choices of how to
approach proving the statement. Ideas about the task type influenced how the
participants proceeded. Specifically, identifying the task type gave them a direction in
what sorts of statements or operations they would need to form to connect the hypothesis
to the conclusion.
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Table 9
Ideas About Task Type Codes With Counts
Aspect
Task

Instances
MVT (2)
UC (1)
B-Ind (1)

Participant

A (1)
B(3)

Problem

Understanding statements & objects (3)

Tool

Conceptual Knowledge (1)
Connecting & Permuting (1)
Examples (3)
Heuristics & Experience (2)
Instantiations & Equivalencies (1)

Shift

Changing claim (1)
Changing warrant (1)
Data added (1)
Data repurposed (1)
Opening structure (2)

Identifying necessary conditions. Sometimes the mathematicians would extract
statements or properties that needed to hold in order for the statement to be true; they
identified necessary conditions. Necessary conditions gave a sense of “The statement
can’t possibly be true unless this condition is fulfilled.” In the additive implies
continuous task, Dr. A identified a necessary condition, or a statement determined that
must be true in order for the claim to hold, that the function must pass through the origin.
Dr. A hypothesized that an argument would involve needing this condition to be true and
knew that if it were not true then the statement would have to be false. On the same task,
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Dr. C also identified the same condition as a necessary condition for the statement to
hold.
Table 10 summarizes that both participants Dr. C and Dr. A identified at least one
necessary condition. This idea was only articulated five times; each time, the participant
was questioning the truth of the statement to be proven or a claim that had been made.
Dr. A and Dr. C identified necessary conditions on the Additive implies Continuous task
when they had not yet asserted a truth conviction. Also, Dr. A articulated necessary
conditions on the Extended MVT task when questioning whether the generated argument
containing a string of connected expressions would hold. (Dr. A needed
defined on its domain and 𝑔′ (𝑎) to exist.)

Table 10

Necessary Conditions Codings With Counts
Aspect
Task

Instances
Additive implies Continuous (3)
Extended MVT for Integrals (2)

Participant

A (3)
C (2)

Problem

Looking for warrant (3)
Tool problem (2)

Tool

Conceptual knowledge (3)
Instantiations & Equivalencies (3)
Known theorem (1)
Heuristics & Experience (1)
Symbolic Manipulation (2)
Symbolizing (1)

Shift

Added backing (1)
Added subclaim (1)
Change qualifier / rebuttal (3)
Changing warrant (1)

𝑔(𝑡)
𝑡−𝑎

to be well-
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As shown in Table 10, when the participants identified a necessary condition, they
were looking for a means to connect the conditions to the claim (looking for a warrant).
Dr. A also was inquiring into whether his proof or the statement was incorrect (tool
problem). The tools used were either (a) heuristic strategies or symbolic manipulations
interpreted with their conceptual knowledge or instantiations of concepts as a means of
moving the expression that they had forward, or (b) connections formed amongst their
conceptual knowledge and instantiations of concepts in an effort to find a connection
between the data and the claim.
The mathematicians envisioned the identified necessary condition as being critical
to their truth assessment. If they could prove the necessary condition held true, then they
would continue efforts to prove the statement true. If they found it not to hold, then they
would have evidence to support disproving the statement. Dr. C said, “At that point, I
don’t think I knew. I think, well I knew that the answer to the question would depend on
what that limit was going to be. If I could figure out what that limit was, I would answer
the question.”
Structurally, the necessary conditions ideas largely contributed a qualifier or
rebuttal to their argument. For example, since Dr. A was fairly certain that the error on
the extended MVT task was in the posing of the question and not in the work developed
in the interview, Dr. A decided to conclude that the developed argument was acceptable
with the rebuttal, “unless g’(a) does not exist.” At other times, the necessary condition
would contribute another sub-claim and sub-argument. Like in the additive implies
continuous task, Dr. A and Dr. C pursued proving the function passed through the origin
attempting an algebraic argument before recalling that the additive condition necessitated
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the function passed through the origin and the recollection of a standard mathematical
argument. The proof that the necessary condition contributed another line or subargument to their personal argument which resulted in a data statement for proving the
statement was true. Both participants hypothesized the statement would factor in as a
line in the overall proof. This hypothesized trajectory was a new idea of an envisioned
proof path.
Envisioned proof path. An envisioned proof path is an idea that proposes a
series of arguments that will lead to a solution. The path may not be complete as there
may be missing pieces in the middle, or the formalization of the argument may not be
defined. However, there are envisioned trajectories. In his work on the additive implies
continuous task, Dr. A articulated that if the function was continuous at zero, then that
would be sufficient. Dr. A had already proven that the function passed through the origin
but was having trouble connecting the additive property to continuity. In the follow-up,
the participant said that from there the proof would be easy and would only be a couple
lines. The diagram in Figure 77 shows my interpretation of Dr. A’s envisioned proof
path. The arrows indicate the warrants or arguments that would connect the statements in
the rectangular boxes. Solid lines indicate certainty; dashed borders indicate uncertainty.
As Table 11 shows both participants Dr. A and Dr. B envisioned a path to support
a claim. Dr. A had envisioned a proof path on the extended Mean Value theorem task
after he had already strung together a series of expressions symbolically. He envisioned
that the proof would be a matter of “tying up loose edges” to support that his symbolic
manipulations were mathematically sound. Dr. B endeavored to understand the given
first MVT in the extended MVT task. He developed an understanding of why the
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statement was true based on exploring examples of integrals of constant and step
functions. Dr. B stated that he could envision how he would prove the statement:
So now, I’m convinced. I’ve convinced myself this theorem is true because now
the standard machine, and that’s building from step functions to continuous
functions, should prove this…So that’s really good because now I understand the
first theorem in the context of step functions… At least at this point, I understand
better the statement of the first theorem and how to prove the first theorem.
Dr. B did not try to prove the statement, but felt comfortable moving forward based on
the envisioned path.

Figure 7. Dr. A’s envisioned proof path for the additive implies continuous task.
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Table 11
Envisioned Proof Path Codings With Counts
Aspect
Task

Instances
Additive implies Continuous (1)
Extended MVT for Integrals (2)
UC (1)

Participant

A (2)
B(2)

Problem

Looking for warrant (1)
Looking for (conceptual) warrant (2)
Backing for previous idea (1)

Tool

Conceptual knowledge (1)
Connecting & Permuting (2)
Examples (1)
Instantiations & Equivalencies (1)
Other (1)

Shift

Change qualifier/rebuttal (3)
Change warrant (1)
Data added (1)
Data repurposed (1)
None (1)

Participants developed envisioned proof paths when looking for justifications
using connections between ideas and properties developed from exploring examples,
their known instantiations of concepts, and conceptual knowledge. A result of the
development of an envisioned proof path was a change to the participants’ personal
argument structure as a change or addition of a qualifier or rebuttal in that participants
could articulate under what conditions they could prove the statement to be true as shown
with Dr. A’s argument after articulating that showing continuous at zero would be
sufficient in proving continuous everywhere (see Table 12).
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Table 12
Dr. A's Personal Argument Structure After Articulating His Envisioned Proof Path
Data

Claim

Warrant

Backing

MQ/Rebuttal

Getting a
counterexample
requires going
outside analysis;
f(0)=0;
f is additive;
Continuous
means: if y is
really small then
f(y) must be
really small

F is continuous

If continuous at
zero, then
continuity
follows
immediately

If y is really
small then f(y)
must be really
small
Envisioned steps

Truth depends on
continuity at 0

The envisioned proof path idea-type “did work” for the participants in so far as
the participants’ intentions when they developed it. Since the version of the statement
given was false, Dr. A was not able to fill in the warrant that showed that f was
continuous at zero. The envisioned path was abandoned in pursuit of a counterexample.
Later Dr. A explained that if provided with the fact that f was continuous at zero, then the
proof would just need a few more lines. Dr. B did not pursue the envisioned proof path
for the First MVT because that was not the intention. The participant was working to get
enough of an understanding about why it worked to potentially apply it to proving the
Extended MVT. In Dr. B’s evaluation, the work achieved the purpose. Dr. B did realize
the envisioned proof path while working on the uniform continuity task.
Ideas about formal logic and the representation system of proof. As expected
when the task is to write a proof of the situation, the mathematicians made decisions
regarding structuring and communicating a formal mathematical argument. Ideas were
classified as ideas about formal logic and the representation system of proof if they
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involved decisions in how to either structure or communicate an argument apart from the
actual mathematical content of the problem. It should be noted that not all logical
decisions were identified as ideas that move the argument forward because many logical
decisions were embedded within other ideas or the realizations of these ideas which
typically occurred without incident for the participants to note them as important. Other
uses of formal logic and the representation system of proof that contributed to the
development of other ideas were coded as tools.
The logic and representation system decisions noted as ideas that move the
argument forward included decisions on how to structure the argument, what qualifiers to
use, writing or rewriting the given task’s conditional and hypothesis statements, and
discerning what constitutes mathematical proof. As an example consider some of the
ideas posed by Dr. C on the Own Inverse task. Early on, Dr. C identified that if a
function were increasing and not equal to the identity function, then something would go
wrong with the symmetry. The participant spent some time trying to identify what that
something was. This led to the idea of pursuing a proof by contradiction attempting to
prove the following statement: “Let f be as given, increasing, and not equal to the
identity, then f-inverse cannot be f.” Later on, Dr. C developed a warrant found to be
generalizable and then had the idea to change the argument to prove the statement: “Let f
be as given and increasing, then f(x) = x.” This idea related to how Dr. C planned to
structure the argument.
As noted in Table 13, Dr. B expressed more ideas about logical structure than the
other two participants, and they appeared on every task that Dr. B worked on. On two
tasks, Dr. B decomposed the statement into logical P and Q statements and discerned that
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it was appropriate to pursue a P implies Q argument. I asked Dr. B if this was typical of
his practice, and Dr. B responded that he often found this useful in analysis tasks:
Doing the P and the Q part? Um, because in analysis, because of the complexity
of the statement, there’s so many little quantifiers and logical things like that. For
me it just helps organize the problem and really isolate the antecedent and the
consequence so you can just look at them individually, and individually sort of
decode them, you know. So it just helps me, it’s difficult for me to look at sort of
the original statement. It helps me to visually sort of isolate the statements that,
that are involved in the logic we are using. Just on a logical level, yeah. So,
that’s, I think that’s what I isolated those is just to make things more organized on
a logical level so I could identify the, I could work with those sort of individually,
yeah, in terms of describing them in different mathematical ways if I need to I
guess, yeah.
Table 13
Logical Structure Codings and Counts
Aspect
Task

Instances
MVT (1)
Own Inverse (2)
UC (3)
B-Individual (1)

Participant

A (1)
B (5)
C(1)

Problem

Backing for previous idea (1)
Articulate & generalize (1)
Understanding statements & objects (2)
Tool problem (1)
No problem (2)

Tool

Connecting & Permuting (1)
Heuristics & Experience (4)
Instantiations & Equivalencies (2)
Knowledge of sociomathematical norms and logical structure (6)
Symbolizing (2)

Shift

Changing/Specified Claim (1)
Changing Warrant (3)
Data removed (1)
None (1)
Opening structure (2)
Order of presentation (3)
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Only one of each of Dr. A and Dr. C’s ideas that move the argument forward were
classified as ideas about formal logic and the representation system of proof; they were
an idea about how to better structure a final argument (Dr. C on the own inverse task) and
an evaluation that an argument did not count as mathematical proof and should be
explored further (Dr. A on the MVT task).
The formal logical decisions were not the aspects of the task that participants
found problematic with the exception of Dr. B’s including determining the logical
structure of the claim with working to understand the statement. When making the
logical decisions, the problems the participants were entered into solving were looking
for ways to articulate or generalize a warrant, justify a previous idea, or fix a perceived
error in their write-ups.
Dr. C, for example, achieved an algebraic contradiction on the Own Inverse task
and moved to writing the details in a formal proof. Dr. C made decisions while carrying
this out to change the argument from a proof by contradiction to a proof that if f were as
given and non-decreasing, then it must be f(x) = x. In making that decision, the
participant made the necessary changes to the inequalities in the original algebraic
warrant. However, Dr. C applied these decisions or tools expertly knowing the exact
outcome each decision would achieve. Dr. C even described that there were instances of
writing without thinking which indicates non-inquirential behavior or that no problem
was perceived. Dr. C did engage in some checking in rethinking a qualifier used. The
participant also checked the argument and realized that it only proved one of two cases
and went on to prove that second case.
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The structural shifts noted in Table 13 indicate the immediate consequences of
this particular idea. Decisions like choosing to argue by cases affected the structure of
the personal argument by adapting or changing the warrant, backing, or order that the
argument was presented. The implementation of logical structure ideas did not always
affect the structure of the personal argument. Ideas about formal logic and the
representation system of proof informed how the participants chose to pursue an
argument and how they chose to present it.
Summary about ideas that focus and configure. The six above idea-types were
grouped together because they all appeared to do work for the participant as far as
making decisions about how to begin, how to proceed, and what tools and ideas to use in
doing so. Specifically, ideas that informed the statement image broadened, narrowed, or
shifted participants’ view of what statements, facts, relationships, and so forth were
potentially pertinent to completing the task. Combining these ideas with other perceived
useful tools enabled participants to make truth proposals, discernments about task-type,
and identify necessary conditions. Truth proposals and identified necessary conditions
guided the direction of pursuit in that they identified claims to try to connect to the data.
Ideas about formal logic and the type of task gave information about potential strategies
for development of connections between the data and the claim. Envisioned proof paths
and necessary conditions advised what steps would be needed in order to connect to the
claim. Ideas about formal logic and envisioned proof paths informed the organization
and articulation of the argument. As noted above, the implementation of these ideas did
only not affect the organization, data, and claims of the personal argument; focusing and
configuring ideas also had influence on warrants and backing as they provided
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information as to which warrants and backings could be useful and which were
inappropriate. The warrants and backings were the means by which the connections
sought were achieved and justified.
Ideas That Connect and Justify:
Warrants and Backing
Warrants and backings were the means by which the participating mathematicians
connected data with claims. The mathematicians sought specific warrant and backing
pairs that would establish connections in ways that could be finally articulated and
justified in a mathematical proof. This inquiry sometimes involved looking for and
finding symbolic manipulations and syntactic applications of known and given theorems
and definitions that could be pieced together to connect the hypothesis and conclusion.
Other times, participants needed more information in order to determine what
manipulations and theorems should be applied and how they could be applied. So, they
first searched for a structural or conceptual reason beyond the symbolic representations
that underlie the link between the two mathematical statements. In either instance,
participants made conjectures as to which connections would be useful and the
connections may or may not have been based on logical deductions.
Inglis et al. (2007) found that when mathematics graduates were making
conjectures, they justified them with warrants that were not always based on deductive
backing. Inglis and colleagues identified three such warrant-types. Deductive warrants,
(warrants based on deductive backing), structural-intuitive warrants (warrants backed by
the prover’s intuition and knowledge about the mathematical concepts and their
relationships), and inductive warrants (warrants backed by the exploration of specific
examples). I borrow from Inglis and colleagues to describe the warrant ideas that the

124
mathematicians had while in pursuit of a mathematical proof. I expand upon their
classifications to include the warrant-type, syntactic connections, in order to include
proposed and utilized warrants that serve to connect statements symbolically but do not
always attend to the mathematical conditions permitting the manipulation’s deployment.
Each warrant-type was coded as an idea that moved the argument forward because their
proposal, testing, and implementation either led directly the development of a
mathematical proof or provided new information deemed useful to the eventual
construction of the proof. Examples of these four warrant-types are provided in the
sections below.
Typically, proposed and utilized connections between statements fell into these
four categories. As such, the backings for the connections were categorized within the
warrant type. There were instances where participants proposed new backings to support
an already articulated warrant. Also, there were instances where a vague sense of a
backing or underlying reason to a connection between the two statements was vaguely
articulated prior to the establishment of a warrant to match it. All these ideas were coded
as proposed backings.
Table 14 summarizes the four warrant-type ideas and the proposed backing ideas.
I will refer to the table in specificity within each subsection and further describe the ideatype, provide examples, summarize the inquirential context surrounding their emergence,
and their immediate impact on the personal argument. A later section describes themes
regarding the utilization and testing of ideas and the different ways that the warrant-types
and backings interacted as the argument progressed toward resolving the deemed
problem.
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Table 14
Summary of Warrant-Types and Proposed Backing Ideas With Counts
Deductive

Syntactic Connections

Inductive

Structual-Intuitive

Proposed Backing

Task

Additive implies
Continuous (2)
MVT (1)
OwnInverse(2)
UC(2)
A-Ind (4)
B-Ind (1)
C-Ind (3)

MVT (3)
A-Ind (3)

MVT (2)
OwnInverse (4)
UC (1)

Additive implies
Continuous (4)
Own Inverse (1)
UC (3)

Additive implies
Continuous (1)
OwnInverse (2)
UC (1)
A-Ind (1)

Participant

A (6)
B (4)
C (5)
Determining truth (3)
Looking for Warrant
(3)
Generalizing/
articulating idea (3)
None (6)

A (6)

B (6)
C (1)

Looking for Warrant
(symbolic connection)
(5)
None (1)

Looking for Warrant
(conceptual )(6)
Looking for Warrant
(deductive) (1)

A (2)
B (3)
C (3)
Determining truth
(4)
Looking for
Warrant
(deductive) (1)
Looking for
Warrant
(conceptual) (3)

A (1)
B (2)
C (2)
Looking for
Warrant
(conceptual) (2)
Looking for
Warrant (deductive)
(1)
Generalizing/
articulating idea (1)
Tool problem (1)
None (1)

Modes

Reflection (4)
Action (7)
Evaluation (2)
Unknown (1)

Reflection (4)
Action (1)
Evaluation (1)

Reflecting (1)
Action (3)
Evaluation (3)

Reflection (3)
Evaluation (5)

Reflection (1)
Action (2)
Evaluation (2)

Tools

Conceptual
Knowledge (6)
Connecting &
Permuting (9)
Heuristics &
Experience (4)
Instantiations (1)
Known Theorem (2)
Logical structure
(implied in all)
Symbolic
Manipulation (4)
Symbolizing (3)

Conceptual knowledge
(1)
Connecting &
Permuting(4)
Known Theorem (2)
Symbolic Manipulation
(4)

Examples
-to see why true (4)
-to understand (1)
-to test (2)
- articulate (1)
Conceptual
knowledge (3)
Heuristics &
Experience (1)
Instantiations (2)
Interruption (1)

Example
-to understand (1)
-to test (1)
Conceptual
knowledge (6)
Connecting &
Permuting (5)
Heuristics &
Experience (2)
Instantiations (2)

Example
-to see why (2)
Conceptual
knowledge (1)
Connecting &
Permuting (4)

Structural
Shifts

Added subclaim (3)
Added backing (5)
Change claim (2)
Change warrant (5)
Data added…(3)
Data repurposed (6)
Opening (1)

Added subclaim (6)
Data added (4)

Change backing (2)
Change warrant (4)
Data repurposed (1)

Added subclaim
(1)
Change claim (3)
Change warrant
(5)
Data repurposed
(1)
Opening (3)

Added backing (2)
Change MQ/
rebuttal (2)
Change warrant (2)
Data added (2)
Data repurposed (1)

Tested

None (6)
Write deductive
backing (2)
Symbol connections
(5)
Mathematically
hold(2)
Unknown (1)

Symbol connections (6)
(later) mathematically
hold (6)
(implied)

Example (6)
None (1)

Look for
deductive backing
(5)
Example (2)
Context (1)

Example (3)
Symbolizing (3)
Extend case (1)
Symbol connections
(1)

Problems
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Deductive warrants. Participants had the overall goal of developing deductive
warrants; that is they worked to develop reasoning why the claim would be true based on
generalizable logical statements. Dr. C referred to attaining a deductive warrant as
figuring out “how to do it algebraically.” An example of the development of a deductive
warrant was Dr. C’s development of an algebraic contradiction to the own inverse task.
Dr. C had been trying to find a reason that could be rendered into a proof why f(x) = x is
the only increasing function with the properties of being continuous, bijective on the set
[a,b], and its own inverse. After some proposed warrants and backings, Dr. C stated that
“It has to depend somehow on the fact that when I reflect over the diagonal line, the piece
of the curve that’s below the diagonal line ends up above the diagonal.” Dr. C then set
about trying to utilize this idea in a symbolic way deploying several ideas that he had
developed earlier: an idea to argue by contradiction, an idea about how not being on the
line y = x meant that a point was either above or below the line, symbolic manifestations
of what it meant for a function to be its own inverse, and the developed idea that
something happens when the point is reflected across the line to develop the contradiction
in Figure 8.

Figure 8. Dr. C’s sketch of a deductive argument for the Own Inverse task.
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The structure of the personal argument before and after the articulation of the
argument is given in Table 15 below. The actual deductive warrant is the idea that there
is an x-value, u, such that f(u) must both be greater than and less than u. The backing for
the warrant is the series of logical deductions that support it.

Table 15
Dr. C’s Personal Argument on the Own Inverse Task Before and After Developing a
Deductive Warrant Idea
Data

Claim

F is its own
inverse so
f(f(x))=x and it is
symmetric about
y=x
F is 1-1,
continuous, onto, f
is either increasing
or decreasing
Reflecting over
y=x moves points
below the line
above the line
Trichotomy
principle

F is decreasing
except f(x)=x

F is its own
inverse so
f(f(x))=x and it is
symmetric about
y=x
F is 1-1,
continuous, onto, f
is either increasing
or decreasing
Reflecting over
y=x moves points
below the line
above the line
Trichotomy
principle

F is decreasing
except f(x)=x

Warrant

Backing

MQ/Rebuttal

Something that
uses points moving
above or below the
line y=x
The trichotomy
principle means
points will be
below/above the
line

If f were increasing
and not f(x)=x,
then would get a
contradiction that
f(u)<u and u<f(u)

Assume u<f(u)
(since fIx) is not
x), since f is
increasing f(u)<
f(f(u))=u

“this gets it”
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As we can see, Dr. C attended to several data statements. The development of the
deductive warrant changed the warrant, the backing, and Dr. C announced a qualifier of
certainty that he could develop a proof. It should be noted that the above argument is not
a completed mathematical proof. The idea for a deductive warrant came before or during
the articulation of an actual proof. The warrant idea is a proposal for a means of
connecting the data and claim. It may need to be combined with other ideas to yield a
mathematically correct proof.
As was shown in Table 14, each participant developed a deductive warrant idea
on at least one task. Some participants developed more than one deductive warrant for an
individual task as a means to justify sub-claims within their overall argument. There
were two cases where an idea was coded as an (incorrect) deductive argument which
meant that the prover had believed that they had deductively justified the claim, but the
backings were based on incorrect mathematical statements.
In the example above, Dr. C was addressing the problem of determining
symbolically what actually went wrong when the point was reflected over the line (coded
generally articulating an idea). The contradiction with the inequalities came while he was
applying the above ideas symbolically (coded connecting & permuting, symbolizing, and
symbolic manipulation). In general, participants developed deductive warrants by
deploying and connecting a variety of known facts, relationships, and heuristics
symbolically. Knowledge of logical structure was implied in all cases, just as Dr. C had
implied there was still the needed step to write down the case that u was greater than f(u).
The problems encountered were actively seeking to develop a connection, seeking to
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generally articulate an idea, and to determine truth. There were instances when
participants developed deductive warrants without perceiving a problem.
Finding warrants that could be articulated generally and in the representation
system of proof acted as critical moments in the development of mathematicians’
arguments. Upon articulation of the deductive warrants symbolically, participants either
tested them or declared they were finished with proving that particular claim. The
deductive warrant ideas were tested by writing down and checking over the deductive
statements to back them, checking over the symbolic connections against the given data
to ensure all connections were allowable, the symbols matched, and that all cases were
covered.
The immediate effect on the personal argument was the adding of sub-claims and
data statements if several sub-statements were linked together, the changing of the
warrant and backing, and the purposing of data statements as warrants or backing. The
two instances where there was a change in claim referred to Dr. C’s work on the
individual task that required assessing the continuity of a given function. The changes in
claim were due to the open-ended nature of the task where the person working on the task
was to provide the domain on which the function was continuous. Dr. C deductively
made assertions about where the function was continuous.
Syntactic connection ideas. As a means of connecting two statements,
participants would sometimes search for ways to connect the symbolic representations of
the two statements. For example on the extended MVT task, the statement to be proven
was an equation between two integral statements, and the first MVT that was given as a
known also had a similar looking equation. Based on their assumptions about the task-
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type, both Dr. A and Dr. B worked to connect the known equations and expressions to
result in the an equation of the left-hand-side of the theorem to be proven with the right
anticipating it would involve symbolic manipulations that would enable an application of
the First MVT.
I term the ideas of useful symbolic manipulations syntactic connections. An
example of a syntactic connection is the idea Dr. A developed to allow a (t-a) factor
appear in the product 𝑔(𝑡)𝑓(𝑡) by multiplying and dividing g(t) by (t-a). These means of

connections are a type of warrant as they connect the given evidence to the claim.

However, a series of these syntactic connections may need to be strung together to
actually connect the evidence to the claim, and they may not always be supportable by
deductive reasoning or may not attend to the mathematical objects that the symbols
represent. For example, Dr. A found multiplying and dividing by (t-a) was useful in
manipulating the expression to look in an intended way, but Dr. A did not attend to the
fact that dividing by (t-a) was potentially problematic until going back to clean up the
“loose edges” of the argument.
As was shown in Table 14, Dr. A was the only participant to utilize what I termed
as syntactic connections on the Extended MVT task and on Dr. A’s own chosen
individual task that applied the Lagrange Remainder Theorem which also involved
proving a symbolic equation was true. Dr. B did try to find ways to connect expressions
symbolically on the Extended MVT but was not successful. The syntactic connections
that Dr. A developed either were strung together immediately step-by-step or were left as
data statements as other equations were developed. Looking for similarities amongst the
gathered statements on the Lagrange Remainder Theorem task, Dr. A employed algebraic
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substitution to eventually connect all the equations. On The Extended MVT task, once
Dr. A had symbolically connected the two expressions to result in the equation to be
proven, Dr. A declared that he now knew the steps of the argument but would need to
check if the steps were allowed: “I think I know how to do it…I’ve got the skeleton. I
know the steps. I’ve got to make sure each step is right.” Dr. A then worked to write up
the proof of the statement. The syntactic connections remained warrants, but Dr. A
checked if conditions were met in order to back these syntactic connections. With
syntactic connection warrants, the evolving personal argument seemed to consist of a
continual adding of sub-claims that would eventually be strung together as proven claims
would become data.
Inductive warrants. Inductive warrants are statements meant to connect data to
claim based on specific examples. An instance of an inductive warrant was the warrant
that convinced Dr. B of the truth of the first MVT. The task as given is shown below.
Given: Theorem1- MVT for Integrals: If f and g are both continuous on [a,b]
and 𝑔(𝑡) ≥ 0 for all t in [a,b], then there exists a c in (a,b) such
𝑎
𝑏
that∫𝑏 𝑓(𝑡)𝑔(𝑡)𝑑𝑑 = 𝑓(𝑐) ∫𝑎 𝑔(𝑡)𝑑𝑑.
Prove: Theorem 2 – Extended MVT for Integrals: Suppose that g is continuous
on [a,b], 𝑔′(𝑡) exists for every t in [a,b], and 𝑔(𝑎) = 0. If f is a continuous
function on [a,b] that does not change sign at any point of (a,b), then there exists a
𝑏
𝑏
d in (a,b) such that ∫𝑎 𝑔(𝑡)𝑓(𝑡)𝑑𝑑 = 𝑔′(𝑑) ∫𝑎 (𝑡 − 𝑎)𝑓(𝑡)𝑑𝑑.
Dr. B had set about trying to understand the two theorems with specific examples

of functions. Exploring the first MVT using 𝑔(𝑥) = 1 and 𝑓(𝑥) = 𝑥 2 , Dr. B developed

an understanding about what the theorem meant:

I’m just saying that if I have an area like this then and again the function doesn’t
really have to be positive, just g has to be positive. I’m going to assume g equals
one right here. It’s telling me I can always find an x so that the area, there’s
always going to be a rectangle whose area is the same as my function. That
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makes sense. Okay I can always find a rectangle whose area is the same as my
function there.
Dr. B referred to a picture drawn (see Figure 9) as contributing to the rectangle
interpretation which was that the ‘c’ chosen would scale down the rectangle formed by
the area under 𝑔(𝑥) = 1 to a height (𝑓(𝑐)) where the area of the new rectangle is equal to

the are under 𝑓(𝑥) = 𝑥 2 which was the product of 𝑓 and 𝑔.

Figure 9. Dr. B’s first specific example of the First MVT for Integrals.

But it was easy for me to see geometrically that, that’s what I was thinking back
here. In this, um previous picture, in this picture [pointing at screen]. One of
these pictures here, I had a line through it. But the thought was that, yeah, all it
was saying is that if you have a function like this that the area underneath g
[meaning f] is equivalent to the area of some rectangle [pointing to picture] that
you draw across from that. And that’s geometrically easy to imagine, you know.
And then that was just for a special case for one of the functions.
Dr. B worked to extend the idea about having a rectangle to another case where
𝑔(𝑥) = 1 + 𝑥, but Dr. B was not able to identify a rectangle associated with the nonconstant g(x). Therefore, the participant decided to do another example keeping g

constant. “What if g of x is two? We’re going to slightly complicate, g seems to be
throwing me off.” Dr. B thought about 𝑔(𝑥) = 2 and 𝑓(𝑥) = 𝑥 2 . Dr. B drew the two

functions on the interval [0,1] as well as their product. Dr. B thought for a while about
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the areas under the product curve and the area under the constant function (see Figure
10). The participant placed an ‘x’ at a point on the function f, and concluded that 𝑐 = 𝑑.
“So I want to say the integral of the function g times f from zero to one, [shades under

g*f] I can take two [shades under g] this is two, times, alright [marks an x on the f curve],
and actually in that case, c equals d.”

Figure 10. Dr. B’s specific example for first MVT (MVT-graph6).

As shown in Figure 10, Dr. B tested why 𝑐 = 𝑑, writing the equation for the first

MVT for the earlier worked example using 𝑔(𝑡) = 1 and 𝑓(𝑡) = 𝑡 2 and the equation for

the first MVT for the current example, getting the constant that makes both equations true
is

1

. Even though Dr. B talked about constants ‘c’ and ‘d’ which are used in the first

√3

and extended MVTs, respectively, these values were the two constants needed for the
first MVT for the two pairs of example functions. It is reasonable to assume Dr. B was
not thinking about the ‘d’ in the extend MVT because the participant was not exploring it
and in later explorations Dr. B declared it was an attempt to understand the first MVT.
After exploring the examples involving a constant function, Dr. B discerned a
grasp on understanding why the first MVT held when one function was constant based on
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areas of rectangles as well as computations. “That’s how that works. You can do this
thing for any step function. So if you have g of x equals constant, then c is going to equal
d.” So, the idea evolved from seeing that there is a rectangle whose area is equal to the
area under the product curve to the statement that no matter the constant function, the
same constant value will make the equation hold. Dr. B alluded to this also holding for
any step function and tested this:
And now, sort of, ideas are starting to sink in here. Because as soon as I can do
something for a step function as far as integration theory, you can do other, sort of
interesting things. If I had a step function, now this is a step function, so g is not
continuous in this case, but it is still going to work.
Dr. B generated a step function 𝑔(𝑡) and paired it with the function 𝑓(𝑡) = 𝑡 2 as

before. The participant did not compute the values of the integrals but used properties of
integrals to rewrite the statement to be proven as a sum of integrals that could restrict g(t)
to constant functions as before (as seen in Figure 11).

Figure 11. Dr. B's example step function used in exploring the First MVT for Integrals.
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To the participant, this equation was enough to achieve personal conviction that
the first MVT held for step functions, and Dr. B envisioned a way of proving the theorem
would hold for any continuous function using the “standard machine” for integral
arguments:
So now, I’m convinced. I’ve convinced myself this theorem is true because now
the standard machine, and that’s building from step functions to continuous
functions, should prove this…So that’s really good because now I understand the
first theorem in the context of step functions.
To address the greater problem of understanding the First MVT, Dr. B set about
determining if his proposed idea that the ability to create rectangles of a certain size was
the key idea supporting why the statement was true. Because the rectangle idea was
developed based on a constant function and then supported by a different constant
function, Dr. B proposed that the theorem could be shown to work for step functions with
the end in view of using standard integration theory tactics to extend the step functions to
all continuous functions. The idea emerged while Dr. B was evaluating the work in
testing the idea for constant functions. It proved fruitful when Dr. B developed selfconviction in the idea’s viability on step functions by partially exploring an example step
function that spanned the interval [0,1]. Dr. B did not feel the need to input the functions
into the integral computations or to find the ‘c’ needed to make the equation true and did
not test varying the function f(x). This was because Dr. B’s purpose was not to prove the
First MVT but to gain enough of an understanding of the First MVT to render it in
exploring why the Extended MVT was true. Table 16 summarizes the ending structure of
Dr. B’s argument supporting the First MVT. It is not a proof as it is based on inductive
verifications, but it sufficiently convinced Dr. B and gave the feeling of being able to
render the argument into a proof.
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In addition to the Extended MVT task, inductive warrant ideas were utilized in the
Own Inverse task by both Dr. B and Dr. C, and by Dr. B on the Uniform Continuity task.
Dr. B and Dr. C developed inductive warrant ideas, but Dr. A derived none. In fact, Dr.
A did not pose any examples while working on any task, but that may have been due to
the perceived nature of the tasks that he worked on. Neither Dr. A nor Dr. C utilized
specific examples on the additive implies continuous task, and Dr. B only deployed
examples on the MVT task because he did not achieve success symbolically while Dr. A
did.

Table 16
Structure of Dr. B's Personal Argument Specifically Pertaining to Proving the Given
First MVT for Integrals
Data
Statement of 1st
MVT (𝑔(𝑡) ≥ 0, g
and f continuous on
[a,b]
In 1st MVT, g(t) acts
as a weighting
function
Earlier argument
that MVT works or
constant g(t)

Claim

Warrant

Backing

MQ/ Rebuttal

∃𝑐 ∈ [𝑎, 𝑏]such that
𝑏
∫𝑎 𝑓(𝑡)𝑔(𝑡)𝑑𝑑 =

A standard
argument that
extends integrals of
step functions to
integrals of
continuous functions

Computations
and pictures with
𝑔(𝑥) = 1 and
𝑔(𝑥) = 2 while
𝑓(𝑥) = 𝑥 2 on the
interval [0,1]

Not a proof

𝑏

𝑓(𝑐) ∫𝑎 𝑔(𝑡)𝑑𝑑

As was shown in Table 14, both Dr. B and Dr. C developed and utilized inductive
warrants while trying to achieve some conceptual understanding of why the statement
was true or to find a deductive warrant. The examples utilized ranged from examples
posed to see why true (used to explore the underlying causes), examples to understand
the objects or relationships given in the statement, examples to test to see if another claim
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holds, and examples to help articulate a vague sense of understanding. The extracted
warrants from the examples were based on conceptual knowledge.
The inductive warrants were tested against other examples. For Dr. B, the
standard by which the ideas’ feasibility was measured was Dr. B’s personal
understanding or ability to envision how an argument would go. These ideas were used
to formulate an envisioned argument of why the First MVT was true. As elaborated in a
later section that discusses the evolution of the personal argument, in other cases the
inductive warrants were tested to see if the idea extends to other cases and to determine
why the extracted property had to work so that an underlying cause could be wielded and
articulated in a deductive argument. Structurally, the development of an inductive
argument resulted in a new warrant.
Structural-intuitive warrants. A structural-intuitive warrant is to be a statement
or idea that the prover proposes could link the data to the claim based on a feeling that is
informed by structure or experience. Inglis et al. (2007) observed structural-intuitive
warrant-types as “observations about, or experiences with, some kind of mental structure,
be it visual or otherwise, that persuades them of a conclusion” (p. 12). All three
participants utilized a structural-intuitive warrant (Table 4). The warrant-type was used
on the additive implies continuous task, the own inverse task, and the uniform continuity
task. I describe Dr. A’s and Dr. C’s structural-intuitive warrant on the additive implies
continuous task here.
Upon first reading the statement to be proven, Dr. A expressed a concern that the
statement was not true because he remembered that there were things that could be done
with unmeasurable functions and the axiom of choice that could produce a
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counterexample. The proposed warrant that there could be a counterexample was backed
by a memory he described as vague and unclear. He was not quite persuaded so his
structural-intuitive warrant was coupled with a truth proposal not a conviction.
Dr. C used a structural-intuitive warrant to shed doubt on the truth of the
statement when he stated that a function with the additive property would not be
continuous on the real numbers because he knew the only continuous linear functions
were in the form y = mx, and this function was not of that form. Moreover Dr. C knew
that proving the additive property was continuous on the rational numbers would involve
an inductive argument, but it would not be straightforward for irrational numbers:
I was thinking about the well-known fact that the only continuous linear functions
in the reals to the reals are those of the form y equals mx for some fixed m. And
one shows that those are continuous on the rationals fairly easy - linear functions
are continuous on the rationals pretty easily by doing some induction.
The participant had used knowledge of structure to connect the additive property to
linearity. Dr. C’s intuition contributed to the idea that the additive property would not be
enough to show continuity.
I did not observe structural-intuitive warrant ideas on any of the individual tasks
nor on the Extended MVT task. The majority of the warrants observed on the individual
tasks were deductive or syntactic connections. In these tasks, the participants largely
proceeded to justify their claims deductively or symbolically with little problem. On the
Extended MVT task, Dr. A was able to find syntactic connections so did not have to exit
the representation system of proof. Dr. B did explore ideas semantically and used
conceptual knowledge and knowledge of mathematical structure, but the conclusions
were backed by the exploration of examples deeming the warrants as inductive.
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With Dr. A and Dr. C on the additive implies continuous task, these structuralintuitive warrants were starting points when the participants were encountering the
problem of determining the truth of the statement. They were reflecting on what they
viewed as related. Dr. C mentally compared the additive function to a class of functions
(conceptual knowledge), and Dr. A related the conditions on the function to previous
experience (heuristics and experiences). Other structural-intuitive warrants drew on
connecting knowledge, experience, and strategies to propose a connection between
claims specifically in pursuit of a truth determination or a conceptual reason why the
statement was true.
On the prove or disprove task, the structural-intuitive warrants informed the
mathematicians’ initial perceptions that the statements were not true. For the other tasks,
since they were not deductive, participants worked to test and generally articulate these
warrants. In a later section, I will elaborate some of the ways that inductive and
structural-intuitive warrants were tested to see if they could be rendered into deductive
warrants. Mostly, in testing their warrants, participants worked to try to generalize or
symbolize their intuition or test their intuition on another example to try to extract a
general backing.
Proposed backing and proposed (vague) backing. With the non-deductive
warrant types, the backing for a statement was implied by the means of developing the
warrant and was coupled with the warrant. With Dr. B’s exploration of an example to
explain why the First MVT worked for constant functions, Dr. B extracted the warrant
that one could always find a rectangle backed by the manipulation of the example. The
example was the backing. However, participants sometimes proposed a backing separate
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from a warrant. Participants proposed backings for previously identified non-deductive
warrants but also participants proposed a vague sense of what would underlie a possible
warrant that may have not yet been articulated. I first describe an instance of a proposed
backing for a previously proposed warrant, and then I show how the same participant
articulated a feeling about what would be instrumental in any warrant.
Dr. C worked on the Own Inverse task and explored why the identity function
(f(x) = x) would be the only possible increasing bijective, continuous function that was its
own inverse. Based on an instantiation of inverse as being the reflection across the line y
= x and some explorations involving drawing and imagining pictures, Dr. C had
articulated that any other increasing function would fail to be its own inverse because it
would not be the same function when reflected across the line y = x. Dr. C was unsure
how to articulate why this would happen in a proof and explored both symbolically and
with pictures some consequences of being increasing and one’s own inverse as shown in
Figure 12.

Figure 12. Picture CI-3: Dr. C permuting the logic on the own inverse task.
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Dr. C then stated “that doesn’t seem to be going anywhere.” Dr. C characterized
the above work as “permuting the logic of all the conditions I was interested in, trying to
find a combination of permutation with those things that I can connect with each other to
get an argument.” Dr. C declared this work unfruitful because “I’m not seeing anything
that I can use in that reformulation of what’s going on.” Right after declaring that this
work investigating as in Figure 12Figure 1 was not going anywhere, Dr. C stated,
Oh, but let’s see here. The inverse of an increasing function is also an increasing
function. And this means that the only way this can work is for f(x) to be x for all
x in I. So we can’t have f equal to f-inverse if f is an increasing function. That
does it. You want me to write it up?
The idea was consistent with his picture CI-3 in Figure 12. Dr. C had declared a
general reason why a non-identity function would fail to be its own inverse that could be
articulated in a formal write up of the proof. Dr. C felt that this idea was enough to show
a proof of the statement using the idea if f(x) is a non-identity, increasing function, then it
won’t be symmetric across the line y=x. The idea, to the participant, served as a
reasonable backing for the warrant (contradiction) that the function and its inverse would
not be the same function. This instance was an example of a proposed backing idea as it
was an idea for backing up an already articulated warrant.
The problem encountered was finding a reason why an increasing function could
not be its own inverse that could be generalized. Dr. C was applying a strategy of
“permuting the logic” and had been working with picture CI-3 in Figure 112 in an effort
to find a combination of ideas that could be used for an argument. The participant had
almost declared this work unhelpful, but then noticed that the inverse of his increasing
function was also increasing. Table 17 illustrates the changes in the personal argument.
The backing changed from a picture to a statement that f would not be symmetric because
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the inverse would be a different function since the inverse of an increasing function is
also increasing.

Table 17
Dr. C's Personal Argument Upon the Articulation of a Proposed Backing
Data

Claim

Warrant

Backing

MQ/Rebuttal

Prior to
articulation

F is its own inverse
so f(f(x))=x and it
is symmetric about
y=x
F is 1-1,
continuous, onto

F is decreasing
except f(x)=x

Picture CI-2

not an argument

After
articulation

F is its own inverse
so f(f(x))=x and it
is symmetric about
y=x
F is 1-1,
continuous, onto, f
is either increasing
or decreasing

F is decreasing
except f(x)=x

If f was
increasing and
not the
identity, then
the inverse
would be a
different
function
If f was
increasing and
not the
identity, then
the inverse
would be a
different
function

Picture CI-3
and associated
reasoning that
the inverse of
an increasing
function is also
increasing

“that’s it”,
needs to be
written up

Dr. C went to work to write up the argument based on this proposed backing but
got stuck, stating that what was written down did not match what Dr. C was thinking and
the personal thinking was wrong:
Did I get things backwards up here? I think I did. / It’s still correct I think.
Somehow. / But I seem to have showed that the inverse of an increasing, or I
seem to have thought that the increase of a, the inverse of an increasing function
is a decreasing function. And that’s not right./ It has to depend somehow on the
fact that when I reflect over the diagonal line, the piece of the curve that’s below
the diagonal line ends up above the diagonal. // And that, I think, is where we
have to go.
This was the first time that Dr. C articulated this idea that the points move above and
below the diagonal as really important:
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That was the first time I thought, I think that that idea itself was important…I
should have seen it when I wanted to think about what happens when x and f(x)
are different. That’s the trichotomy principle. Either x is equal to f(x) or it’s less
than, or it’s greater than. And it was at about that point that I began to see that
that was the key to what I needed to do.
The problem was re-assessing why an increasing function would fail to be its own
inverse. The participant was looking back at pictures drawn before and was reflecting on
what was going on. Dr. C had used the idea that points below the line end up above it
implicitly when drawing the picture but did not focus on that being a reason why a
contradiction could happen. The participant proposed that a contradiction would be
based on a new warrant was not yet fully articulated. Comparing the argument structures
in Table 17 to Table 18, we see that the proposed (vague) backing wiped the warrantslate clean and offered a feeling about what would be important in terms of justifying that
warrant. As described in an earlier section, Dr. C moved forward to render this and other
ideas into a deductive warrant and eventually a completed proof.

Table 18
Dr. C's Personal Argument After Proposing a New (Vague) Backing
Data

Claim

F is its own inverse
so f(f(x))=x and it
is symmetric about
y=x
F is 1-1,
continuous, onto, f
is either increasing
or decreasing
Reflecting over
y=x moves points
below the line
above the line

F is decreasing
except f(x)=x

Warrant

Backing
Something that
uses points moving
above or below the
line y=x
The trichotomy
principle means
points will be
below/above the
line

MQ/Rebuttal
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As was shown in Table 15, each participant proposed a backing at least once in
every task where non-syntactic thinking led to a deductive argument. Dr. A also
proposed a backing in the purely syntactic argument for the individual task when
identifying that a particular given condition in the theorem statement gave a hint about
what syntactic connection to propose. Proposed backing ideas were articulated while
participants were engaged in solving a variety of problems. For four of the instances,
participants were either looking for a warrant or a means of generally articulating their
already proposed warrant idea. Connecting and permuting data statements and properties
was a salient tool contributing to the development of these ideas.
Structurally, the implementation of a proposed backing idea resulted in varied
structural shifts in the personal argument. Backing ideas were tested by trying to yield
them on specific examples and attempting to symbolize the argument or to extend the
case. Dr. A tested the backing for a syntactic connection by seeing if its deployment
would yield a useful connection. I explain how these backing ideas potentially could
yield rendering a non-deductive warrant into a deductive warrant further in Theme 3 of
the results regarding the evolution of the personal argument.
Summary of warrants and backing ideas. In this section, I described how ideas
that connect and justify data with claims fell into five categories. Four of the categories
were warrant-types paired with their associated backings, deductive warrants, syntactic
connections, inductive warrants, and structural-intuitive warrants. The fifth category was
for proposed backings or ideas that underlie the connection that were articulated
independently from a warrant. For each idea-type, I provided a description of the ideas
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both generally and within an observed example. In an effort to answer the research
questions, I described the inquirential context surrounding the emergence of those ideas.
The warrants and their associated backing were means by which participants
found connections between data and claims. Even though non-deductive warrants were
not the major goal, their articulation, exploration, and utilization proved fruitful in the
attainment of new information and ideas that guided future explorations or helped
participants assert truth. In the next section, I will talk about the ideas related to the
assessment about the usefulness of the generated ideas or ways of thinking.
Ideas That Monitor the
Argument Evolution
Along with ideas that focus and configure and ideas that connect and justify, in
the proof construction process, I observed ideas or feelings about the mathematicians’
progress on the task. These monitoring ideas guided the mathematicians’ decisions in
terms of moving the argument forward. There were four idea-types that described the
mathematicians’ progress on the task: truth conviction, “I can write a proof”, unfruitful
line of inquiry, and support for line of inquiry. I describe each idea type with examples
from participants’ work. As these monitoring feelings could be utilized on any type of
other idea-type, any type of problem, or on any tool, I focus on describing on how these
ideas affected decisions made and the structure of the personal argument. The first
monitoring idea-types described are those specific to the proof construction process.
Truth conviction. In the ideas that focus and configure section, I described truth
proposal ideas that were unique to proving statements whose truth value is unknown.
However, achieving a feeling of truth conviction or personal belief as to why a statement
must be true is not isolated to any one type of statement. In fact, as shown in Table 19 in
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all but three instances participants achieved moments where they were convinced why the
statement must be true. The three instances where the participants did not overtly state
that they had achieved some belief that the statement either was or was not true were Dr.
A’s work on his individual Lagrange Remainder Theorem task and the Extended Mean
Value Theorem task, and Dr. B’s work on his individual limits of sequences task. In all
of these tasks, participants implied an underlying belief that the proof should work out.
In fact, Dr. A asserted that the MVT task-type was one where the symbols should work
out.
The three instances where the participants did not overtly state that they had
achieved some belief that the statement either was or was not true were Dr. A’s work on
his individual Lagrange Remainder Theorem task and the Extended Mean Value
Theorem task, and Dr. B’s work on his individual limits of sequences task. In all of these
tasks, participants implied an underlying belief that the proof should work out. In fact,
Dr. A asserted that the MVT task-type was one where the symbols should work out.
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Table 19
Moments When Participants Expressed Truth Conviction by Task
Participant
Dr. A

Dr. B

Task

Moments that came with truth selfconviction

Associated ideas

Individual (LRT)
Additive implies
continuous
Extended MVT

Not observed, implicit belief
Assessment that would not be able to
prove true
Not observed, implicit belief

--Unfruitful line of
inquiry
---

Individual
(sequences)
Extended MVT

Not observed, implicit belief

--

Envisioned how would prove given
first MVT

Inductive Warrant
Envisioned proof path

Uniform
Continuity

Identifying reasons why showing u.c.
on the whole function would not be
difficult once established the function
was u.c. on a closed interval
Identifying the one exception

Envisioned proof path

(Incorrect) continuity assertion based
on misreading statement

Deductive warrant
Can write a proof

Continuity assertion based on
symbolic manipulation and content
knowledge
Fulfilling final necessary condition by
applying a given condition
“Heuristically” seeing why the one
exception must be f(x)=x

Deductive warrant
Can write a proof

Own Inverse
Dr. C

Individual
(Determine
continuity)

Additive implies
continuous
Own Inverse

Structural-intuitive
warrant

Deductive warrant
Can write a proof
Structural-intuitive
warrant

The following examples illustrate moments where the participants achieved a
truth conviction. The own inverse problem statement was not typical of the statements of
many proof tasks as the own inverse statement had an unknown answer, namely finding
what the one exception is. For both Dr. B and Dr. C on this task, finding that the one
exception was the identity function occurred along with believing that the statement to be
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proven was true or having an intuitive idea why the statement is true. These ideas were
articulated early on.
Now if it’s its own inverse, that means that’s reflected across this diagonal.
That’s the geometric way of thinking about inverse functions. [draws sketch and
line y=x] So if it started here and here, it would reflect back and forth, like that. It
would reflect back and forth and in order to be its own inverse and increasing, so
its reflection would be the same thing that you started off with. [runs pen over
line y=x] And you’d have to be right on that line because there’s no other way of
doing it. So, f of x equals x suffices. (Dr. B)
Okay. I can see heuristically why this must be so. The exception is f of x equals
x. And the other possibility, or the other possibilities all have to have graphs that
are symmetric about the line y equals x because that’s the f equals f-inverse
condition. [long pause] But I don’t see how to do it / algebraically. (Dr. C)
For both participants, there was an early on recognition what the one exception must be
accompanied by some recognition or belief that any other increasing function could not
be symmetric over the line y=x which was a structural-intuitive warrant.
Dr. B achieved a feeling of a truth conviction on two other theorems when
envisioning proof paths. On the uniform continuity task, Dr. B had focused on proving
the function would be uniformly continuous on a closed interval in the aims of later
extending it to the entire function. In searching for a reason why the function, would be
true on the compact set, Dr. B developed reasons why showing uniform continuity on the
whole function would not be difficult upon establishing the function was uniformly
continuous on a closed interval a fact remembered to be true. As explained earlier, Dr. B
worked to understand why the given First MVT for Integrals was true by exploring
examples. Dr. B achieved an understanding that he could imagine guiding a proof.
Dr. A was finally convinced that the version of the additive implies continuous
task was not true after trying to prove the statement without success or inclination as to
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how to move forward. On the same task, Dr. C was convinced that the statement was
true only upon completing a deductive argument to link the additive property to
continuity.
When the participants articulated a truth conviction prior to arriving at a
completed deductive argument, they moved to tackle the problems of finding a deductive
warrant to prove the statement, generalizing or justifying the ideas that convinced them of
the truth, or to continue to try to prove another statement. In the case of the tasks where
participants were to make a truth determination, the truth helped the participants to
specify the claim and to direct their efforts.
I can write a proof. A moment of transition for participants was when they

identified that they had gained enough information and had formulated the connections
necessary to communicate their argument as a final proof. I observed all participants
achieve this sense at least once on each of the tasks they proved with the exception of Dr.
A on two tasks and Dr. B on one task. On the Extended MVT task, Dr. A found issues
with how the problem was posed and could only conclude that his argument probably
held if another condition was met. On the additive implies continuous task, Dr. A
generated the counterexample on his own, away from the Livescribe notebook so I only
was able to observe the articulation of the final proof. Dr. B reached an impasse on the
MVT task and solved the own inverse task instead.
Table 20 provides descriptions of the moments and idea-types that accompanied
the feeling that the participant could write a proof. Note that for three of the instances,
the moment that participants were able to write a proof and the moment of truth
conviction was the same. On the uniform continuity task, Dr. B achieved self-conviction
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in the task upon envisioning proof path that depended on proving that continuous
functions on closed intervals are uniformly continuous. Dr. B fulfilled that envisioned
proof path in that once achieving an argument (although faulty) for the sub-statement, the
participant was able to begin and execute a mathematical proof.

Table 20
Moments Where Each Participant Achieved Feelings of "I Can Write a Proof"
Participant
Dr. A

Task

Moments that came with “I can write a
proof feeling”

Idea-types

Individual (LRT)

Envisioning symbolic connections
between current expressions and
equation to be proven
Not achieved because of conditions on
statement
Not observed

Syntactic connection

Individual
(Sequence)

The achieved construction of a
sequence

Deductive warrant
recognition of routine

Ext. MVT
Uniform
Continuity

Not achieved
Achieving the (incorrect) argument
showing continuous functions are
uniformly continuous on closed
intervals
Writing of algebraic contradiction

Ext. MVT

Dr. B

Additive implies
continuous

Own Inverse
Dr. C

Individual
(Determine
continuity)
Own Inverse
Additive implies
continuous

(Incorrect) continuity assertion based
on misreading statement
Continuity assertion based on symbolic
manipulation and content knowledge
Achieving a proposed backing for a
warrant (found issues)
Writing of algebraic contradiction
Fulfilling final necessary condition by
applying a given condition

(incorrect) Deductive
warrant
Deductive warrant
Logical structure
Deductive warrant
Truth conviction
Deductive warrant
Truth conviction
Proposed backing
Deductive warrant
Deductive warrant
Truth conviction
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As expected, when participants stated that they could prove the statement, they
moved to try to write down a logical proof. In two instances, Dr. C miscalculated an
assessment. On the individual task, Dr. C did not attend to the full conditions of the
statement and wrote an argument that was incorrect for the statement as given. When I
asked about the argument, the participant found the error and wrote a correct argument.
On the own inverse task, Dr. C had asserted through explorations that a non-identity
increasing, bijective function would fail to be its own inverse because the inverse of
increasing functions were increasing:
Oh, but let’s see here. The inverse of an increasing function is also an increasing
function. And this means that the only way this can work is for f(x) to be x for all
x in I. So we can’t have f equal to f-inverse if f is an increasing function. That
does it. You want me to write it up?
Dr. C moved to write up the argument, but as described earlier, found issues with
his thinking. Dr. C explored more and eventually wrote an algebraic contradiction that
did not serve as a full proof, but provided self-conviction that a logical argument could be
written.
Often the identification of when the participant could write a proof was coupled
with recognition of routine. As a quick example to this, both Dr. A and Dr. B identified
f(0 )= 0 as a necessary condition for the additive implies continuous statement to be true.
The participants set about trying to construct an algebraic argument but both had
moments where they remembered that the argument would be simple. Dr. A was
convinced that it had to be true because all linear functions pass through the origin and
that led to a standard proof by contradiction. Dr. C remembered the standard argument.
Most of the proofs that the participants were to write were not as simple and standard as
the one described, but the mathematicians knew which tools to use and what language
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would articulate their ideas. The mathematicians were adept at logically articulating their
ideas. That is not to say that they did not make errors. Participants did sometimes slip up
quantifiers or miss cases while writing but typically addressed this issue knowing which
tools to adapt to correct the problem before completing the task.
Unfruitful line of inquiry. Participants would sometimes abandon a particular
line of inquiry because they were not finding it useful in achieving their aims. An
unfruitful line of inquiry idea was an idea that persuaded the participant that the tools or
actions the participant was pursuing or considering to pursue would not be the best choice
for achieving the purpose set. These ideas included feelings that there could be an easier
way, that the method would not solve the problem, or that the method was not
appropriate given the context or the participants’ perceived evaluation of the situation.
On the additive implies continuous task, Dr. A generated ideas that fit this category
including the idea that the statement ought to be true since generating a counterexample
would not be trivial and would require going outside the realm of real analysis. This idea
led to pursuing proving the statement instead of generating a counterexample. In the
same task, Dr. A determined not to continue pursuing a set of developed equations
because it would not be useful in connecting the additive property to continuity for
irrational numbers.
In an effort to prove the statement was true, Dr. A had derived the equation
𝑚

𝑓� � =
𝑛

𝑚
𝑛

∗ 𝑓(1). The participant wrote it and then asserted that the equation was

probably not true. “Yeah, I have this horrible feeling that this thing isn’t true.” Dr. A
explained in the follow-up interview what he was thinking about when after generating
the new statements that led to once again considering the statement to be false.
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𝑚

𝑚

Dr. A: That’s [𝑓 � � = ∗ 𝑓(1)] true regardless of any of this measurability
𝑛
𝑛
stuff that I was looking at before.
MT:

So after you got this, what were you thinking should come next or was not
working?

Dr. A: Well, any real number is going to be really close to m over n and
somehow that would be enough. But yeah, that’s where I could get stuck
is just because a real number is close to m over n, you’re still back, you
know, even if you’re a millionth of an inch away. There’s no rule saying
that means it’s close. That’s what you’re trying to prove. You can’t use
what you’re trying to prove the thing. And so, it was just, I was just going
in circles. And so, yeah, at some point, I, it dawned on me or whatever
that it was time to give up trying to prove it and try to look for a
counterexample because it, there didn’t seem to be any way to get it, you
know, break that circular stuff.
While not voiced at the time, Dr. A had evaluated the usefulness of the statement,
𝑚

� �=
𝑛

𝑚
𝑛

∗ 𝑓(1) , against what was known about establishing continuity, and had

determined that it could only possibly useful for rational numbers. In other words, after
evaluating the new relationships established, Dr. A did not find them to be sufficient tools
to solve the problem of connecting the linear property to continuity along the real line.
Furthermore, Dr. A did not appear to have ideas for new tools. This coupled with the
previous idea that a counterexample, while “horrible”, could exist, led Dr. A to once
again consider that the statement might not be true.
The inquirential context surrounding the determination of an unfruitful line of
inquiry was largely an evaluation that the tools deployed or the way of thinking about a
task was not fitting. To make these evaluations, participants, like Dr. A above, drew on
their conceptual knowledge, connections and permutations of previously identified as
relevant ideas, as well as their perceptions of the success they were making against the
perceptions of what was fitting with the problem setting.
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When a participant encountered an unfruitful line of inquiry, they would change
tactics somehow. The additive implies continuous was a prove-or-disprove task so when
participants identified an unfruitful line of inquiry, they sometimes would change their
claims to argue for the other side of truth. Dr. A had been investigating a proof by
induction argument to show that the statement was true but found his argument would
only hold for rational numbers. Dr. A identified an unfruitful line of inquiry and also
spoke again about a recollection that there might be a counterexample. In this case,
structurally, the data generated previously that was not pursued was repurposed as a
possible rebuttal to the claim of the statement being true.
Support for the line of inquiry. There were feelings that an approach would be
unfruitful, but there were also moments that gave participants a sense that what they were
doing was fitting. On the additive implies continuous task, Dr. C had not known for
certain that the statement was true but had identified f(0)=0 as a necessary condition for it
to be true. The participant was able to prove that the necessary condition held which was
needed to move forward with the general strategy of determining the value of the limit
instantiation of continuity. “If I could figure out what that limit was, I would answer the
question. And it was pretty straightforward to figure out what the limit was. It was the
additive identity was all I needed to use.” Participants could get a sense of support for a
line of inquiry along with a feeling that they could write a proof; however, participants
could also gain support for a line of inquiry without yet having a feeling that they could
write a proof. For example, on the Uniform Continuity task, Dr. B had previously
articulated a feeling that proving the statement as given would be similar to proving what
Dr. B had characterized as an easier case of the statement (continuous functions on closed
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intervals were uniformly continuous). As Dr. B worked to determine why the easier case
was true, the participant reaffirmed the feeling that the two cases would be similar.
“Now first of all, I you know, I’m realizing that there’s no difference between showing
this on all of R than showing this on [a, b].” Dr. B articulated this sense but was not yet
come ready to write a proof.
Summary for monitoring ideas. Monitoring ideas were used to help participants
monitor their progress and push them toward a more efficient solution strategy. Their
knowledge of content, what was fitting within the realm of analysis tasks, and their
previously posed ideas were standards against which their progress was monitored.
This concludes the section detailing the ideas and types of ideas observed in this
study. In the final sections of this chapter, I describe holistically how ideas in the three
categories, focus and configure, connect and justify, and monitor, interact in the evolution
of the personal argument and how ideas were generated within the perspective of
Dewey’s Inquiry framework.
Logical Mathematical Inquiry
and the Emergence of Ideas
In addition to describing the ideas that move the prover’s personal argument
forward, this research sought to describe the context surrounding their emergence. The
previous section described each idea type and the problems and tools surrounding their
development within each type. The next subsection gives a description of the
development or lack of development of ideas while engaging in genuine inquiry; later I
discuss how engaging in solving different problems with various tools played a role in the
types of ideas that were formulated and discuss the exhibited non-inquirential tool use.
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To provide context, I first remind the reader of the types of problems entered and tools
utilized by the participants in Tables 21 and 22.

Table 21
Problems Encountered by Participants While Proving
Problem Code

Description

Understanding statements
or objects

The participant does not understand what the statements mean or the
definition o f a object described in the statement of the proof or how the
objects in the statement relate and is entered into working understand
Prover is engaged in determining the truth value of the statement
Prover is looking for a means to connect the statement to the claim that
eventually can be rendered into a proof. I f participants specifically are
searching for conceptual reasons why the statement is true or are seeking to
connect statements via a symbolic manipulation, then the next two codes
were used.
Prover is trying to find why the statement is true based on conceptual or
empirical understandings
Prover is trying to find means to directly connect symbolic instantiations of
statements
Prover is engaged in finding a way to communicate or generalize an
argument, warrant, backing, or other idea
Prover is engaged in finding general or generalizable support for a posed idea
or claim
Actions are taken or tools are applied without the individual reflecting on the
tool to use. The individual indicates that the action taken is “second nature”,
“what you’re supposed to do”, “how I usually do it”, etc. The individual
may look back at what the action did for him/her but nothing has been
deemed problematic prior to that evaluation.
There is an identification and entrance into solving a problem with individual
tools or application of these tools, i.e. trouble generating a helpful example,
computation issues, etc.

Determining truth

Looking for warrant
Looking for conceptual
reason why true
Looking for way to
connect symbolically
Looking for way to
communicate/generalize
Looking for backing for
previous idea

No problem
Tool problem
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Table 22
Classifications of Tools Utilized by the Participants to Generate Ideas
Tool Type

Description

Conceptual knowledge

Knowledge of relationships among mathematical objects, consequences of
actions on objects, or mathematical structure
Specific use of a theorem known to be true
Attending to connecting and rearranging previously generated ideas,
definitions, and related concepts
Alternative or Non-formal representations of mathematical concepts or
definitions
Rewriting statements, definitions, or representations in terms of symbols
Actions on symbolic representations
a particular case of any larger class about which participants generalize and
reason
Rule of thumb, technique that comes with experience
Knowledge of logical structure and the norms of behaving and
communicating in the mathematics community
Time, disturbances in the situation, outside resources, etc.

Known theorem
Connecting and permuting
Instantiations and
equivalencies
Symbolizing
Symbolic manipulations
Example
Heuristics and experiences
Logical structure
Other

Table 23 presents the ideas generated by participants while encountering each
kind of problem. Since participants could have encountered multiple problems at a single
time and a single idea could fall under multiple idea-types, summing to get a total idea
count is not meaningful. Participants mostly developed ideas while engaged in the
problems of looking for warrants, looking for conceptual reasons why true, and
determining truth. However, they also developed twenty-two ideas while not perceiving
any problem. Table 24 lists the tools that participants deployed that led to the generation
of ideas of each sub-type. As can be seen in the table, ideas within each sub-type could
have been formed by tools of multiple types. I found it less informative to describe
exactly which tools contributed to which idea-type. What was informative was to
describe the patterns in how ideas emerged.

Table 23
Ideas Generated by Problem Encountered
Understanding
Statements/
Objects
Focusing
and
Configuring
ideas

informing
concept
image
task type
truth
proposal
logical
structure

Connecting
and
Justifying
ideas

Monitoring
ideas

identifying
necessary
conditions
envisioned
proof path
inductive
warrant
Structuralintuitive
warrant
syntactic
connections
deductive
warrant
proposed
backing
truth
conviction
can write a
proof

B(2)

Looking
For
Warrant

Looking For
Conceptual
Reason Why True

C (1)

B (1)

B(3)

A(1)

B(1)

A(2)
C(1)

Looking For
Way To Connect
Symbolically

Looking For
Way To
Articulate/
Generalize
B(1)
C(1)

Looking For
Backing For
Previous Idea

No
Problem

Tool
Problem

B(1)

A(1)

B(1)

A(1)
B(1)
C(1)
A(2)

B(1)

A(1)

A(1)

A(1)

A(1)

C(1)
B(1)

A(1)

A(1)
C(2)

C (1)

A(2)
C(2)

A(1)
B(1)
C(1)

B(2)

C(1)

B (4)

C(2)

C(2)

B(5)

B(1)
B (3)

A (1)
A(5)

C (3)

C (1)

A (1)
C (1)
C (1)

B (1)

B (2)
C (1)
C (2)

A (2)
B (2)
B (1)

B (1)
C (1)
B (1)

A (1)

A (2)
B (2)
C (1)
A (1)
C(1)

B (2)

A (1)
B (1)
C (1)
C (1)

B (2)

B (2)

A(2)

B (1)

A (3)
B (2)
A (1)

C (1)
C (1)

C (1)

B (1)

C (2)

C (2)

C (1)

B (2)

A (1)
B(1)

C (1)
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unfruitful
line of
inquiry
support for
line of
inquiry

A(1)
B(1)

Determining
Truth

158

Table 24
Ideas Generated by Tool Type

Focusing
and
Configuring
ides

Connecting
and
justifying
ideas

Monitoring
ideas

informing
concept image

Conceptual
knowledge

Known
theorem

Connecting
& Permuting

Instantiations
and
Equivalencies
B(1)

Symbolizing
B (1)

task type

B (1)

B (1)

B (1)

truth proposal
logical
structure
identifying
necessary
conditions
envisioned
proof path
inductive
warrant

C (1)

A (1)
B (1)

B (2)

B (2)

A (1)
C (1)

A (1)
C (1)

C (1)

intuitive
warrant
syntactic
connection
deductive
warrant

A (1)

A (1)

Examples
B (4)

Heuristics
A (1)

B (3)

A (1)
B (1)
A (1)
B (4)

C (1)

C (1)

B (1)

B (1)

B (3)

B (1)

B (2)

B (7)
C (2)

A (2)
C (3)
A (1)

B (2)
C (2)
A (5)

B (1)
C (1)
A (1)

B (2)
C (1)

A (2)
B (1)

A (2)
B (4)
C (5)
A (1)
C (2)

A (1)

B (1)

A (2)
B (2)

A (2)
B (1)
C (2)
C (1)
A (1)
B (1)
B (1)

A (1)
B (1)

A (3)
A (1)

A (1)
B(2)
A (1)
B (2)
A (1)
B (3)
B (1)

Logical
structure

Other
A (1)

A (1)
B(4)
A (1)

B (1)

A (5)
B (2)
C (1)

A (3)
C (1)

B (1)

A (1)
A (1)
B (1)

B (2)

A (1)
A (1)

B (2)
A (1)
A (1)

B (2)

B (1)

B (2)

B (1)
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proposed
(vague)
warrant
truth
conviction
can write a
proof
unfruitful line
of inquiry
support for
line of inquiry

A (1)
C (1)

Symbolic
manipulation

159
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In this section, I describe the thematic findings about the context surrounding the
emergence of the ideas that moved the argument forward within the perspective of
Dewey’s theory of inquiry. The ideas emerged from the systematic testing of ideas and
tools. I describe this process and some of the notable tools utilized and how the problems
that the participants encountered progressed as participants proceeded toward the
resolution of an argument. I describe a third theme that participants sometimes deemed a
tool to be unsuccessful, but its deployment led to new insights. I finally note some other
observed patterns.
Theme 1: Ideas Generated through
the Testing of Ideas and Tools
While I was unable to describe a distinct pattern as to which types of problems
and tools contributed to which types of ideas, there was a discernable pattern where the
participants would propose or articulate an idea or tool, test the tool or idea’s usefulness
or the usefulness of prior ideas against the consequences of the new idea, and then
articulate a new idea or evaluation. The process itself involved the passing through,
perhaps multiple times, the inquirential cycle of reflecting, acting, and evaluating. This
process necessarily began with an initial idea proposal which was often formulated based
on reflection or heuristic strategies for orienting to a proof task. Subsequent ideas were
formulated as new ideas were tested. I illustrate this process within the context of Dr.
A’s work on the additive implies continuous task.
Define f as linear if for every x and y, 𝑓(𝑥 + 𝑦) = 𝑓(𝑥) + 𝑓(𝑦). Let f be a
function on the reals. Prove or disprove that if f is linear, then it is continuous.
Opening ideas. This section elaborates on the generation of the first idea

integrated into Dr. A’s personal argument then compare his process those of other
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participants in other tasks. Upon reading the statement, Dr. A recalled that there could be
a counterexample based on a memory of previous experience:
I’m afraid that there’s some counterexample using the axiom of choice. Okay, let
me, I’ll try to prove it. What am I thinking though with the axiom is there might
be an unmeasurable linear function. Let’s see, what am I thinking? I’m not sure
what I’m thinking.
He explained what backed up the idea in the follow-up interview illuminating that the
vagueness of a memory could be the reason for the unclear thinking.
MT:

So you initially have this inclination that this wasn’t true. What made
you-

A:

Oh, just some vague memory from a long time ago. Yeah, you know, I
guess anything can be analysis. To me this is sort of something that you
find in a book on set theory. Or something…I spent some time, I forget
when it was, twenty years ago, more than that I think. I was studying set
theory for some unknown reason. I think that was when I kind of learned
this stuff. Or I knew that these things existed out there. So, yeah, I had
this vague recollection that things are not as simple as they sound. So
yeah, that’s probably cheating too.

This initial idea was a truth proposal based on a structural-intuitive warrant to
solve the problem of determining the truth of the statement. The thought of a potential
counterexample occurred as Dr. A reflected upon the statement to be proven against
personal experience. The participant had not applied any tools prior to this, but reading
the statement led to remembering experiences outside the field of analysis. The other
participants on the other tasks also articulated initial ideas while orienting to the task.
Upon reading a task, participants entered into the problems of understanding the
statement or determining truth. To achieve these goals, participants would often reflect
upon the given statement in conjunction with seen to be relevant conceptual knowledge,
experience, and known properties and theorems. The reflections were, at times, coupled
with heuristic strategies for orienting to proof tasks such as actively listing the relevant
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definitions, rewriting and verbally articulating what was known in one’s own words, and
articulating what to show. In these reflections, participants connected and permuted
properties, theorems and definitions, imagined instantiations of concepts and definitions,
and performed hypothetical actions. The initial ideas were ideas that informed the
statement image, truth proposals, truth convictions based on structural-intuitive warrants,
and ideas about the formal logic or task type. The testing and realization of these initial
ideas and subsequent ideas was the mechanism by which the argument moved forward.
Ideas generated while testing a developed tool or idea. Dewey’s (1938) theory
of inquiry allows for evaluation to occur during and after a proposed tool’s fulfillment.
The following is an example of an idea developed after a full cycle of inquiry. On the
Uniform Continuity task, Dr. B had recognized that the given property that the function
had limits at positive and negative infinity indicated that or a given epsilon, the real line
could be broken into the union of three intervals: (−∞, 𝑁) ∪ [𝑁, 𝑀] ∪ (𝑀, ∞).

Where N and M were the x-values beyond which each output was within half of epsilon
of the limit value (see Figure 13). Dr. B anticipated that showing uniform continuity on
these tails would be straightforward and decided to assume that continuous functions on
closed intervals (like [N,M]) were uniformly continuous.
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Figure 13. Dr. B's argument that the function is uniformly continuous on its tails.

Dr. B had nearly concluded his proof, showing that the function was uniformly
continuous on each of the three intervals. The participant chose to check to see that the
argument would support the definition of uniform continuity. As a means of checking,
Dr. B walked through where pairs of points x and xo would come from. Dr. B noted that
the argument did not account for when they straddled one of the points N and M. Dr. B
had checked silently and then articulated the issue out loud: “And, um, but, / let’s see
there’s a little board work case I have to worry about. [pause] Hmm. I think I have a little
problem. There’s a little overlap here…if I take x and x-not on each side of N or each
side of M, I’m in trouble.”
MT:

Let’s see you write this.

[playback going, no audio playing]
MT:

About 30 seconds of just quiet.
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Dr. B: and that’s when I realized that I had this extra case…I know exactly what I
was doing. I was going, okay, I’ve got this case, this case, because I think
I handled the endpoints before that. So I was thinking what else could
happen? So I said okay I could have them straddling.
The idea of the issue with how the argument was structured was proposed while Dr. B
was evaluating the written argument. When the issue was identified, Dr. B articulated a
proposed rebuttal and crossed out what was written previously.
Ideas that moved the argument forward were developed and incorporated into the
personal argument via this mechanism where one developed or proposed tools that could
potentially be rendered into moving the argument forward; tested the tool or idea against
previous ideas, conceptions of the problem, conceptual knowledge, and the problem the
prover intended to solve; and then made an evaluation that either established a new idea
or devalued a previous idea. As described in earlier sections, the testing process differed
across idea-types and problems posed. The problems posed played a role in determining
which ideas would be useful. In the next sub-sections, I specifically describe how
participants used examples and the tool of connecting and permuting ideas, conceptual
knowledge, and instantiations of concepts.
How examples were used. In this study, the term example describes any
particular case of a larger case. As shown in Appendix F, participants in this study used
examples for four purposes: (a) to understand, (b) to test, (c) to generate a warrant, and
(d) to articulate or explain. I provide examples of each of these purposes below.
On the Uniform Continuity task, Dr. B was working to show why a function with
finite limits at infinity would be uniformly continuous and drew a picture of an example
function that had the conditions set forth by the task statement in an effort to understand
the function involved in the problem. “It’s totally just important for my visualization in
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understanding the problem.” Drawing this picture led to his idea that this task was a
complication of showing that continuous functions on closed intervals are uniformly
continuous. This idea was coded as an idea about task type.
Dr. C used a specific example to test whether the piecewise function generated on
the Additive implies Continuous task was a counterexample to the statement. Dr. C had
generated the piecewise function 𝑓(𝑥) = {

0
𝑥

𝑖𝑖 𝑥 𝑖𝑖 𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖
based on the given
𝑖𝑖 𝑥 𝑖𝑖 𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟

condition that the function was continuous at x=0 and previous conceptual knowledge
about additive functions being continuous on the rational numbers but discontinuous on
the real numbers:
Well, I knew that it had to work for the rationals. So I thought I would try
something that had one definition in the rationals and something else in the
irrationals. And it seemed to me that x in one case and zero in the other case
would be the easiest thing to try as a first effort.
To test whether this function was a counterexample, Dr. C looked to see if it satisfied the
additive condition, 𝑓(𝑥 + 𝑦) = 𝑓(𝑥) + 𝑓(𝑦). “It’s clear when x and y are both rational
because x plus y is also rational and f of x plus y is therefore … f(x) + f(y). But it’s not
clear for irrationals.” He chose to plug in 𝑥 = √2 and = 2 − √2 . These specific

examples of irrational inputs yielded different values for 𝑓(𝑥 + 𝑦) and 𝑓(𝑥) + 𝑓(𝑦)
showing his function was not a counterexample.

As an instance of where participants explored examples to find a warrant,
consider Dr. B’s work on the Uniform Continuity task. Dr. B had narrowed the task to
tackling the problem of proving a function on the compact set [0,1] was uniformly
continuous or in Dr. B’s words that it could not get steeper and steeper. In a search for a
reason why the function could not get steeper and steeper (a warrant based on conceptual
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understandings), Dr. B drew a picture of a specific function on the set [0,1] and worked
to determine why for a specific epsilon equal to 0.5, one could always find a delta. While
in the action of thinking about why the example function could not get steeper and
steeper, Dr. B articulated the idea that the function would achieve a maximum and a
minimum:
So I wanna be able to, I need to be able to find for any, I need to be able to find an
x, a delta such that for any location I might choose, if I go within that of x, it
won’t vary by more than point 5. Now I’m starting to get to something because
one thing I do know is that it has to achieve a min and a max.
At the time, Dr. B anticipated that the remembered idea that the function would
have a minimum and maximum would help justify why the function would not get
steeper and steeper, but was not sure in what way. So, it became an added data statement
with a hypothesis that it could inform the generation of a warrant. Dr. B did test the
usefulness of this idea by determining the minimum and maximum fact could be
extended beyond compact sets to the given task.
Participants also, at times, utilized examples to articulate or explain their thinking.
Dr. B and Dr. C did this on the Own Inverse task. Both participants articulated that they
had an intuitive feeling why the statement must be true. After articulating a belief that
the statement was true, Dr. B reflected back to try to articulate what exactly gave the truth
conviction. “So what have I convinced myself geometrically? … Okay. So first of all,
why is f(x)=x the only increasing function. So my intuition there, if it wasn’t, then if you
reflected itself, there would have to be double values of this thing from its reflection.” To
illustrate and test this idea Dr. B drew picture BI-2 shown in Figure 14. By double
values, Dr. B meant there will be two points on the same function (𝑎, 𝑓(𝑎)) and

(𝑎, 𝑓 −1 (𝑎)). Dr. B was attending to f being its own inverse as symmetry across the line
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y=x. Picture BI-2 served the purpose of helping articulate what the intuition was, but the
participant still had the question, “So why would there be double values on this thing?”

Figure 14. Picture BI-2 drawn by Dr. B on Own Inverse task to assist him in articulating
his thinking.

Connecting and permuting ideas, conceptual knowledge, and instantiations
of concepts. A tool used by participants that commonly contributed to the generation of
new ideas was the action of connecting and permuting given and known ideas and
statements. The act of connecting refers to putting statements, facts, and instantiations of
concepts, and so forth together to form new ideas. Dr. A demonstrated the connecting
while working on the additive implies continuous task when generating the necessary
condition idea that the function must pass through the origin.
Dr. A: So at some point it occurred to me that f of zero has to be zero… If it’s
going to be continuous, then it must be a straight line. Because if it’s not a
straight line, then it’s not going to be linear. So, I was thinking straight
line but at first it didn’t occur to me that it had to go through zero.
MT:

Why was it important that it was zero at zero?

Dr. A: Uh, I think I was just flailing around. Yeah, I, well I was going to try to
do something like g-. What was I? Yeah. Ah, yeah, yeah, no I was just
flailing around. I mean I knew, I guess I knew that whatever the function
is, f(x+y) is f(x)+ f(y). So if it’s going to be continuous, then if y is really
small, then they have to be about the same. So you’re going to get f(x+y)
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is going to be equal to f(x) plus something really small. And that’s how
you’re going to show that it’s continuous. And uh, so I needed that f of
zero was zero. If f of zero isn’t zero, then if x is really small, f(x) won’t be
near zero. Yeah, so I needed f of zero to be zero and it didn’t occur to me
that that was obvious so that you didn’t even have to prove it.
Dr. A reflected on the function and the idea of linearity as well as what it meant to
be continuous. The participant’s conceptual knowledge was rich with pictures of what it
meant to be linear and instantiations of continuity at a point. Dr. A, specifically, drew
upon a flexible conception of the definition of continuity that involved the notion that a
continuous function has the property that adding a small amount, y, to an input, x, would
only move the output a small amount from f(x). Dr. A never wrote it down, but
essentially the conception of continuity used was equivalent to the limit definition of
continuity: lim𝑦→0 𝑓(𝑥 + 𝑦) = 𝑓(𝑥). The instantiation of the definition fit well with the

additive property of the function. This definition of continuity was a tool Dr. A applied

while reflecting on the problem of what could connect the additive property to continuity.
The participant anticipated this tool could be used to gather some more information about
f that could be applied.
The permuting characterization of this tool comes from Dr. C’s descriptions of
work on the Own Inverse task. To understand why a function that was one-to-one,
continuous and increasing would fail to be its own inverse, Dr. C explored both
symbolically and pictorially what would happen if the function were increasing or
decreasing. The participant called these actions “permuting the logic”:
What I’m doing here is permuting the logic of all the conditions I’m interested in,
trying to find a combination of permutations with those things that I can connect
with each other to get an argument. I’m trying to establish that a certain
definition can be applied that works. So I’m working with that definition and
permuting different pieces of it to see if I can find something that I can use to
construct an argument that establishes what I want.
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As could be seen in Table 22, participants used connecting and permuting to generate
ideas of nearly every type. In the lens of Dewey’s (1938) theory of inquiry, I interpret
this as participants constantly testing their previously formulated ideas and observations
against new observations and previous knowledge of structure and instantiations of ideas
with the end-in-view of solving the problems that they pose for themselves.
Theme 2: A Progression
of Problems
The salient problem types encountered by the participants were presented above in
Table 21. It appeared that the participants transitioned through a series of problems to
tackle or tasks to complete in order to finish the construction of the proof. I list them
below.
1.

Understanding the statement and/or determining truth

2.

Determining a warrant of some kind

3.

Validating, generalizing, or articulating those warrants

4.

Writing the argument formally

Aside from these major problems to solve, the participants also tackled problems
parallel to or embedded within these problems such as dealing with a found problem with
a tool. Some types of problems described in Table 21 are specifications of the problems
in the list above. Varying the task changed the problems the participants entered to yield
new ideas. The various tasks determined what kinds of warrants the participant pursued.
Also, when a general, deductive warrant was achieved, writing the argument formally
was often unproblematic. For the remainder of this section, I will describe the
progression of problems within the context of Dr. B’s work on the Own Inverse task,
generalizing to the other tasks and other participants.
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Participants would read the task, and then set to the task of trying to get a handle
on what was going on in the problem or to determine the truth of the statement. Dr. B
began by writing the statement and then working to draw a picture of the conditions:
“Okay, let’s think about this one. We have a continuous function on a closed set a,b.
And it’s one-to-one. I can draw a picture. So I’m going to draw a visual picture of
what’s going on here. Try to figure out how to prove this.” While endeavoring to draw
an example function that would be representative of the function in the statement, Dr. B
discerned the ideas that the function must be monotonic and where it must start and stop
on the interval:
One hundred percent geometric thinking...It’s all part of chipping away at the
geometric restrictions. Because that’s what I took to this right away because this
is my kind of problem. It’s saying that f has to have this certain geometric
property. So, you know, let’s start not literally, I mean in some sense looking at
your boundaries, …I’m going to say well, they’re telling me it has to have this
certain geometric property. Let’s draw the most general picture and sort of
whittle down. Yeah, and sort of sculpting.
Dr. B had developed ideas to inform an image of what the function in the statement could
look like and how it could behave. Continuing his pursuit to understand the statement
and objects involved in the statement, Dr. B drew a second picture thinking of what it
would mean for the function to be its own inverse. Dr. B articulated an intuitive belief in
the statement.
Show that except for one mathematic- see it’s one-to-one, it’s onto, and it’s its
own inverse. Now if it’s its own inverse, that means that’s reflected across this
diagonal. That’s the geometric way of thinking about inverse functions. [draws
sketch and line y=x] So if it started here and here, it would reflect back and forth,
like that. It would reflect back and forth and in order to be its own inverse and
increasing, so its reflection would be the same thing that you started off with.
[runs pen over line y=x] And you’d have to be right on that line because there’s
no other way of doing it. So, f of x equals x suffices. That should be our only
increasing function. So I know that’s what they’re looking for. F of x equals x
intuitively seems like the only increasing option they’re talking about.
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In pursuing the problem of understanding the statement geometrically, Dr. B
worked to draw pictures of the situation. This drawing involved reflecting upon and
connected instantiations of the relevant definitions of one-to-one, continuous, and the
inverse of a function. The ideas formulated in this reflection informed the pictures
created and what was imagined to happen when one reflected an increasing function over
the line y=x. The picturing of the situation resulted in an understanding of what the one
exception should be which provided self-conviction of the statement’s truth.
Participants moved on from working to understand a statement to working to find
a warrant that they could use to justify the statement’s truth when they developed a
personal truth conviction, a truth proposal, or an idea about the task type that pushed
them toward pursuing certain lines of inquiry that could lead to a warrant. At times the
truth proposal or truth conviction was accompanied by a warrant of some type that
participants immediately sought to justify, other times participants moved to find other
means of connecting their statement and claim.
Dr. B found what the one exception was and an intuitive belief that no other
increasing function would work and then set about looking for a link or warrant between
the data and the claim that f(x)=x was the only increasing function with the given
properties. Dr. B articulated an initial structural-intuitive warrant:
So now the question is this. So what have I convinced myself geometrically? And
how do I prove those things? Okay. So first of all, why is f(x)=x the only
increasing function? So my intuition there, if it wasn’t, then if you reflected itself,
there would have to be double values of this thing from its reflection
Achieving that link, Dr. B set about working to articulate and to test that warrant.
The process involved empirically testing a proposed warrant and proposing new warrants
based on the evaluations of those tests. The process by which participants worked to
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validate, to articulate, and to generalize their warrants differed by warrant-type and will
be elaborated in another section. If a proposed warrant was tested and found to not be
valid or if participants could not wield it into a general algebraic articulation, they cycled
back through the problems to either try to understand more about the objects in the
statement or they proposed a new warrant which they set about to test.
Once a generalizable warrant was found and written algebraically, the mechanics
of writing the argument formally involved the non-inquirential application of tools as
participants did not perceive this task to be problematic. After achieving an algebraic
warrant, Dr. B set about writing the formal argument which involved a proof by
contradiction with two cases. Dr. B found this writing to be unproblematic, but made
errors in his final write up. This occurrence will be described under the theme of autopilot actions in a subsequent section.
Theme 3: Tools Deemed of No Use
May Be Gateways to New Ideas
In the pilot study, Dr. Heckert was looking for a reason why the characteristic and
minimal polynomials of a pair of 3x3 similar matrices must be equal. To gain some
insight, Dr. Heckert constructed an example 2x2 matrix and calculated a matrix to be
similar to it. Dr. Heckert found the characteristic polynomials of each matrix, and they
were not equal. The participant found a computation error in this construction of the
similar matrix. Instead of trying to fix the mistake, the participant determined that
working from the examples would not be fruitful. However, looking at the factored form
of the polynomials written down, Dr. Heckert started to consider equivalent eigenvalues
and found that useful in developing an argument. Dr. Heckert’s work with the specific
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example deemed to be unfruitful led to a development of an idea that moved the
argument forward. This phenomenon also occurred in the current study.
In an effort to identify an algebraic or generalizable argument why an increasing,
one-to-one, continuous function not equivalent to f(x)=x could not be its own inverse, Dr.
C worked on “permuting the logic” of a function being increasing and its own inverse.
Dr. C drew an example with two points of a function in an increasing relationship located
below the line y=x. The participant also showed their reflection points with the view that
the inverse function could not be equal to the original function if the function were to be
increasing. Dr. C then moved to understand what would happen if the function was
decreasing. “If f(u) is greater than f(v), how are the points (f(u), u) and (f(v), v) related to
each other? //Let’s see, f(u) is greater than f(v), but u is less than v.” However, Dr. C
actually drew another increasing function (see Figure 15). I asked about this mismatch.
Dr. C: I’m not sure what I was up to there because I drew the picture wrong. So I
must have been just on automatic pilot thinking about something else but
I’m not sure what. Because I’ve got f(u) clearly smaller than f(v) there.
So that picture isn’t relevant…I think I was in a trance trying to figure
things out.
Dr. C determined that this reasoning was not giving him any new information, but then
extracted the idea that the inverse of an increasing function is increasing which he saw as
enough to explain why f could not be equal to f-inverse:
That doesn’t seem to be going anywhere. / Oh, but let’s see here. The inverse of
an increasing function is also an increasing function, and this means that the only
way this can work is for f (x) to be x for all x in I. // So we can’t have f equal to f
inverse if f is an increasing function. / That does it. You want me to write it up?
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Figure 15. Dr. C's permuting the logic on own inverse task.
Dr. C did not recognize any benefits of his permuting the definition and drew
something different from what was spoken. The idea that the inverse of an increasing
function is also increasing is consistent with the picture drawn. I asked if the idea came
from pictures drawn on the previous page or this one. “I think it came from the whole
collection of pictures and just thinking about the relationships of points on one graph to
points on the other graph and the symmetry involved.” This picture added to the previous
pictures as well as the participant’s thinking about the relationships of the points on f to
those on f-inverse played a role in Dr. C’s finding this idea useful, which was similar to
what Dr. Heckert did with his example formulation.
Outlier Themes Involving the
Development of Ideas
The earlier half of this section presented some general patterns to how
participants’ developed new ideas by reflecting upon, testing, and evaluating proposed
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tools and previous ideas. In this section, I elaborate upon an outlier case where a
participant engaged in active inquiry, but found now new ideas. I also describe how
participants were able to proceed routinely without needing to actively reflect upon their
actions and consequences of those actions.
Inquiry with no ideas. This section focuses on Dr. B’s initial work on the
Extended Mean Value Theorem for Integrals task. Dr. B established a need to find a way
to link the related equations and determined that some set of symbolic manipulations
would connect the expressions. Dr. B tried a series of manipulations but was not
successful. This work on the task during the interview was an instance of trying to solve
a problem by reflecting on a perceived to be problematic issue, applying a tool to resolve
that issue, and evaluating its usefulness. After a series of tools were not deemed useful,
Dr. B proposed modifications to the purpose or approach which could be viewed as tools
in themselves. Dr. B had first approached the problem of proving the equation by
focusing on the problem that the right hand sides of the equation to be proven and the
equation given were not the same and worked to manipulate the right hand sides of the
equations in order to see how the given theorem could be applied to the equation to be
proven. After applying a number of tools, Dr. B reevaluated and proposed a new purpose
of trying to directly equate the two right hand sides of the equation but deemed it
unachievable. The third tactic was to work to equate the two sides of the equation to be
proven by working backwards from the right hand side, directly applying the given
theorem in reverse, and then searching for a symbolic manipulation to equate the
expression to the left hand side of the equation.
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The proposed tools were reflective of Dr. B’s way of thinking about the problem.
The participant thought that some direct application of the First MVT would enable
pulling the function g(t) or f(t) out of the integral but some manipulation would need to
be required to attain the derivative and the factor (t-a). Each tool proposed was aimed at
either turning the function into its derivative, attaining the factor (t-a), or enabling the
direct application of the First MVT because the overall goal of the participant was to
make the left hand side of the equation equal the right hand side of the equation in the
Extended MVT. Some tools were reapplied in a different way at different aims, but Dr.
B did not spend time working on modifying tools.
Dr. A worked on the same task and also worked to achieve syntactic connections
amongst the expressions; he, however, was successful in making progress after less than
two minutes of thinking. It is difficult to say what about Dr. B’s inquiries did not lead to
a useful syntactic connection, but I can note the differences between the two
mathematicians’ approaches. Both started out with the same anticipation that the First
MVT would be applied and that symbolic manipulations would be necessary. There was
a difference in approaches in that Dr. A sought to equate the left hand side with the right
knowing that at some point the First MVT for Integrals would be utilized. Dr. B, on the
other hand, appeared to want to try to directly equate the right hand side of the First MVT
with the right hand side of the Extended MVT or to make the two theorems look similar
enough in order see how they related. Dr. B attended to the names of the functions and
explicitly thought of the named function f in the First MVT as analogous to the function
named g in the Extended MVT and vice versa. Dr. B did find that directly mapping the
functions to each other in this way would not yield the desired results, but the perceived
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analogy persisted through Dr. B’s work on the task. Dr. A, on the other hand, did not try
to apply the First MVT right away but only after finding an algebraic manipulation and
then was flexible in allowing a quotient to act as the function called f in the First MVT.
Both Dr. A and Dr. B noticed that the two equations looked different from each
other and proposed manipulations that would attend to the (t-a) factor and the derivative
g’(t). A difference was that Dr. B primarily attended to either getting rid of the
appearance of the derivative g’(t) or creating a derivative in the First MVT. Dr. A on the
other hand initially attended to trying to get the (t-a) term to appear on the left hand side
of the equation. Dr. B’s attention to g’(t) was a result of his working to directly correlate
the two theorems as opposed to Dr. A’s work to move the left hand side of the equation
to be shown to the right hand side knowing that the given theorem would somehow be
used.
Just as inquiry could proceed without participants making progress on the task,
participants could make progress on the task without engaging in inquiry because they
perceived no problem. In the following section, I describe how participants worked on
the task when they perceived a routine or non-problematic situation.
Auto-pilot actions. Participants recognized a routine by the removal or
resolution of the perceived to be problematic and would sometimes make those moments
known as they would articulate a feeling of “now I see it” or “I can do it now”. This
typically was accompanied by the idea that the participant could write a proof.
Participants continued to choose tools to apply, but they then knew the tool for the job
and did not feel the need to stop and evaluate their tools’ effectiveness after applying
them because they anticipated the effect that it would have.
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More than once, the participants were writing statements and drawing pictures
while not thinking about what they were drawing. They admitted to being in a trance or
on “autopilot”. They did this for one of two reasons: (a) writing statements as a stalling
tactic to think about other problems or the next action they need to take, or (b) they had
resolved the problem and are just carrying out the actions.
On the own inverse task, Dr. C drew an increasing function when stating an
intention to draw a decreasing function. When we watched the play-back together in the
follow-up interview, Dr. C was surprised by these actions. In the follow-up, the
participant did not appear to remember the thinking or the goals surrounding these
actions.
Dr. C: I’m not sure what I was up to there because I drew the picture wrong. So I
must have been just on automatic pilot thinking about something else but
I’m not sure what. Because I’ve got f of u clearly smaller than f of v
there. So that picture isn’t relevant. I think I was in a trance trying to
figure things out. Yeah. Because I’ve started with something that I’m
reasonably sure can’t be [points to statement f(u)>u] / Oh, wait a minute.
What is going on? What am I doing there? / I want to show that’s what
happens. / Oh, I’m going backwards. That’s what I’m doing. I’m trying
to- Okay, yeah. So I am trying to get / somehow a contradiction, I guess.
Yeah. / What if f of u is bigger than f of v? What can I say about u and v?
But then I drew the picture wrong.
MT:

Alright. So, you’re asking so what if it is decreasing? [Points to statement
‘f(u)>f(v) but u<v’] And then?

Dr. C: Well, if it’s decreasing, can I force u to be smaller than v is what I’m
asking myself…I guess. I’m not- I was kind of thrashing around trying to
find something that I could use.
Performing actions while thinking ahead could have been a stalling tactic as
demonstrated by Dr. C. After establishing that the idea that an increasing function’s
inverse is also increasing would be enough to justify the statement, Dr. C moved to write
up the proof, beginning by writing the utilized assumptions.
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MT:

Okay. When you were starting to prove, were you planning to prove by
contradiction or were you planning to prove that if it’s increasing then it
has to be f of x equals x?

Dr. C: Well, I think that I didn’t really know at this point. What I’m doing, what
I’m writing out here is a fairly essential part of a formal proof. I’m also
stalling for time while my brain figures out how to work on this.
MT:

And what is your brain figuring out?

Dr. C: What’s it mean to be off the diagonal.
Dr. C was beginning the formal write-up of the proof but was still working on another
problem. Dr. B also demonstrated similar autopilot actions.
The role of interview context and affect. It appeared that the choices that
participants made as far as what tools to utilize and what choices were reasonable were
influenced by the interview situation and their own affect toward the situation. The
interview context played a role in Dr. A’s work on the Additive implies Continuous task.
Dr. A had the initial feeling that the statement was not true because some counterexample
existed. However, Dr. A recalled that generating such a counterexample would draw
upon knowledge from mathematical fields beyond real analysis. Dr. A perceived that it
would be difficult to remember how to generate such an example; therefore, the
participant decided to pursue proving that the statement was in fact true:
It sure seems like it ought to be true. But the thing is that, you know, to come up
with a counterexample you’ve got to go way off the tracks. It’s not, you’re
talking I think sort of undergrad real analysis, and so the counterexample is not
something that you learn about in undergrad real analysis. It’s elsewhere.
The perception about the problem being solvable by undergraduate students was most
likely because when Dr. A chose tasks for the other participants, he chose tasks that he
had previously assigned to his undergraduate students. The perceived difficulty of
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generating the counterexample did not fit with Dr. A’s perception of the context of the
interview situation throughout his work on the task.
Affect certainly played a role in participants’ decisions as they chose whether to
persist or not to persist in solving the problems they encountered. On the Uniform
Continuity task, Dr. B made affective decisions when determining whether or not to
continue trying to reformulate the proof of the theorem that continuous functions on
closed intervals were uniformly continuous, a statement he knew to be true and to be
necessary for proving the task statement. Dr. B had earlier determined to not assume its
truth and had worked for a period of time to determine why the theorem was true. The
majority of Dr. B’s work on the task was in pursuit of this warrant; the participant finally
wrote an incorrect argument that gave enough self-satisfaction to move on to proving the
task statement. When I asked about what Dr. B wrote, it appeared frustration and fatigue
(affective elements) played a role in this writing and accepting of the incorrect argument:
“Yeah, I don’t know what I was. This, this just is, this is just barking up the wrong
tree…yeah, and probably this is the point I just got so frustrated I decided to prove the
simpler version.” By “simpler version,” Dr. B was referring to the final write-up where
Dr. B made the decision to assume the theorem to be true. In this task, affect (negatively)
played a role in that Dr. B wrote and accepted an incorrect sub-argument; however,
making the decision not to continue pursuing the sub-proof of this theorem known to be
true was prerequisite to the writing of a final proof of the main statement.
This section summarized how the inquirential context played a role in the
development of ideas. The problems and tools themselves do not dictate whether ideas
are developed, but the interaction amongst the tools, ways that they were applied, the
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problem and the acts of reflection and evaluation deployed by the prover determine if
ideas are generated. The next section provides findings about how ideas found to move
the argument forward did in fact move the personal argument forward.
The Evolution of the Personal Argument
I described the ideas that moved the argument forward and I illustrated the
context surrounding the formulation of those ideas through the lens of Dewey’s (1938)
theory of inquiry. In this section, I summarize the observed shifts in the personal
argument by category of idea. I depict the findings regarding the conditions surrounding
certain types of structural shifts. I conclude the section discussing the interaction
amongst the three larger idea-types within the inquirential framework as the personal
argument evolves answering how ideas are used and tested.
Shifts in the Personal Argument
Changes in the mathematicians’ personal arguments were coded into 10
categories. Table 25 summarizes their descriptions. In the descriptions of each ideatype, I summarized which shifts were attributable to the implementation of the idea.
Table 26 compares the shifts across idea-types. With the exception of ‘data removed’,
‘order of presentation’, and ‘no changes’, each structural shift was supported by 10 or
more generated ideas. Viewing the gaps in the table by idea category, we see that few
focusing and configuring ideas informed data being repurposed, changes in claim or
specification, backing being added or changed. Monitoring ideas, though few, were
dispersed throughout all shift-types. Syntactic connections largely supported the addition
of sub-claims and data as new equations were formulated and incorporated.
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Table 25
Observed Structural Shifts
Structural Shift
Opening structure

Description
The structure that the participant begins with when
articulating the first idea

Claim changed or specified

The claim of the argument is either changed to a new
claim or delimited in some way

Sub-claim added

In addition to attending to justifying the central claim,
participants add new claims to proven

Data added, extended or
specified

New statements are incorporated into the set of
statements that the participant deems as relevant or
existing statements are extended to new cases or existing
statements are reformulated

Data statements repurposed

Given statements or previously generated ideas are
purposed in the argument as claims, warrants, backing, or
MQ/rebuttals

Data removed

Previously perceived relevant statements are removed

Warrant added, changed or
removed

Warrant is added if none previously existed, replaced by
a new warrant, or eliminated as a potential link between
statements

Backing added, changed, or
removed

Backing statements are incorporated if none previously
existed, replaced, or eliminated

Qualifier or rebuttal changed

Qualifier or rebuttal is typically implicit or not present,
this code notes when one is specified or removed

Order of presentation

The relevant statements are not changed or deleted but
are rearranged or combined with other claim structures

None

No changes
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Table 26
Structural Shifts Enabled by Each Idea-Type

informing
concept image
Focusing
and
Configuring
ideas

Connecting
&
Justifying
ideas

Monitoring
ideas

task type
truth proposal
logical
structure
identifying
necessary
conditions
envisioned
proof path
inductive
warrant
intuitive
warrant
syntactic
connections
deductive
warrant
proposed
(vague) warrant

truth conviction
can write a
proof
unfruitful line
of inquiry
support for line
of inquiry

opening
structure
B (1)
C (1)
B (1)
C(1)
B (2)

Claim
Changed or
Specified
C (1)

Sub-claim
added
B (2)

B (1)
B (1)

A (1)

A (1)

A (1)
A (1)

Data
statements
repurposed

Data
removed

Warrant
changed or
removed
B (4)

B (1)

B(1)

B (1)

A (1)

B (2)
C (1)
A (1)

A (1)

A (3)
A (1)

A (1)
C (2)

Data added,
extended,
specified
A (1)
B (3)
C (1)

B (1)

A (1)
B (1)
C (1)

B (1)
A (7)

A (8)

C (2)

A (1)
B (1)

A (1)

C (1)

A (1)
B (1)
C (2)

A (2)
B (2)

A (1)

C (2)

A (1)

A (1)
C (1)

A (1)
B (1)
A (2)

A (1)
A (1)

A (3)
B (1)
C (1)

Backing
added or
changed
B (1)

Qualifier
or
rebuttal
changed
B (1)

A (1)
C (1)

B (1)

B (1)
C (2)
B (2)

B (1)

A (1)

B (1)

B (1)

B (5)

C (1)

B (3)
C (1)

A (2)
B (1)
C (3)
C (1)

A (1)
B( 2)
C (2)
B (1)
C (1)
B (1)
C (1)

A (2)
B (3)
C (1)
B (2)
C (1)

B (2)
C (2)
B (2)
C (1)

B (1)

C (1)

B (1)

B (1)

C (3)

A (1)
C (3)
B (1)
A (1)

none

B (4)

B (1)
C (1)
B (2)

Order of
presentation

B (2)
C (1)

B (1)

B (1)
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Theme 1: Ideas That Inform Can
Be Repurposed
Many data statements were repurposed as warrants or backing for the central
argument or sub-arguments. On the Additive Implies Continuous task, Dr. A utilized a
previous idea to be data in generating a deductive warrant. When building the
m

counterexample used to disprove the statement, Dr. A utilized the property f � � =
𝑚
𝑛

n

f(1). This property was a proven claim while the participant was trying to prove the

statement was true. The statement also served as evidence when Dr. A concluded that f
would be true on rational numbers but not for irrational numbers based on a structuralintuitive warrant that irrational numbers could not be close enough to the quotient m/n.
So Dr. A’s proven claim generated while trying to prove the statement was true became
data in arguments that the statement was false based on a structural-intuitive warrant and
also a deductive warrant.
The ideas that were purposed were those that ended up being necessary or to
underlie the claim. Consequently, many of the statements given as conditions in the
statement of the task began as data statements and were repurposed as warrants or
backings for warrants.
Theme 2: Claims Could Be
Reversed or Specified
On tasks where there was more unknown than how to prove the claim,
participants developed ideas to move the argument forward when they were able to
specify or determined they would reverse the claim. Dr. B and Dr. C specified the claim
when they determined what the one exception was on the Own Inverse task. Dr. C
specified a claim on the determine continuity task each time something new was
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discovered about the function. Dr. A and Dr. C detailed initial truth proposals on the
additive implies continuous task. When they found that pursuing the proving the side
that they had proposed would be an unfruitful line of inquiry, they reversed the claim and
worked to argue for the opposite side. I describe this swapping of claims for Dr. A
below.
Because the prompt on the additive implies continuous was to ‘prove or
disprove’, Dr. A needed to determine for which claim to argue. Deciding which was true
was a persistent question. Dr. A switched which side of the argument for which to argue
four times during work on the task while the interviewer was present. Dr. A called this
state of mind, being ‘aBayesian’ meaning being amenable to a probability distribution
informed by the collected data:
When you’re trying to prove something you don’t know whether it’s true or not,
you need to be ‘aBayesian’. So what one does is you come up with a prior, and
you think, well, I’m ninety percent sure that linear functions are continuous, I’m
ninety percent sure. Since I’m ninety percent sure, I’m more than fifty percent
sure, I’m going to prove that the functions are continuous. And then I try and I
try and I try, and eventually, given all this new data that I’ve tried for 15 minutes
to prove that linear functions are continuous and I can’t do it. Suddenly, my
posterior distribution has changed. I now think that it’s like, uh, eighty percent
sure that it’s not true. And so what I start to do then is look for a counterexample.
Dr. A began the task with the initial inclination that the statement was not true
based on the resources of past experiences. However, the participant thought about the
tool needed to prove the statement was not true, and decided that generating a
counterexample would require borrowing ideas from other realms of mathematics besides
real analysis and require knowledge beyond that of an undergraduate student in real
analysis. These perceptions about the context of the tasks given contributed to deeming
pursuing the counterexample inappropriate or infeasible. Dr. A pursued proving the
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statement was true, that additive implied continuous. The participant gathered
information about the function, that it passed through the origin and that all outputs for
rational inputs would be the input times the function evaluated at one. Reflecting on the
gathered information Dr. A decided that these tools would not serve the purpose of
showing that the function was continuous on all the real numbers. Because Dr. A saw no
means of connecting additive to continuous, he returned to the claim that it was not true
suspecting a counterexample.
The consideration of the claim was short lived because Dr. A presented a rebuttal
that the counterexample would be hard to attain. Dr. A indicated not remembering how
to construct the counterexample just that it existed. So Dr. A once again attended to
proving the statement was true. He worked proposing new approaches and articulated
that showing that the function was continuous at zero would be sufficient as only a few
more steps would show the function was continuous on the entire domain. Dr. A did not
find a means of doing this and ended the interview session saying that based on his lack
of progress, the statement was most likely untrue, but he would not be able to generate
the counterexample in the interview.
It appeared the ‘prove or disprove’ nature of the statement and the requirement to
draw upon knowledge outside the realm Dr. A perceived to be relevant to the interview
tasks contributed to this switching between opposite claims. The events preceding the
claim swaps were not finding appropriate tools to argue the current direction, having a
convincing rebuttal, or evaluating progress. Dr. C swapped claims when he found his
attempt at generating a counterexample was unsuccessful. Dr. C decided that if the
function he generated was not a counterexample, then no function would be a
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counterexample since all functions that would be continuous on the rationals and
discontinuous otherwise would be of the same class of functions of the one he generated.
Theme 3: Testing and Exploring
Non-Deductive Warrants
As described earlier, a phase of the proof construction process involved working
to test proposed warrants which often meant working to render non-deductive warrants
into deductive warrants that could be generally articulated in a proof. The testing process
would result in the formulation of new warrant-type ideas as the argument progressed.
This section provides descriptions of some ways that syntactic connections were
developed into deductive warrants. I explain an instance where a participant cycled
through proposing and testing non-deductive warrants until finding an idea that could
yielded into a deductive argument, and I illustrate how non-deductive, non-syntactic,
informal reasoning was successfully rendered into a deductive argument.
Rendering syntactic connections into deductive warrants. The non-deductive
warrant type that was most easily rendered into a deductive warrant was the syntactic
connection because their representations both lie within the representation system of
proof. Dr. A was the only participant to develop syntactic connection ideas so I will
focus on what his work on the MVT task whose statement I present below.
Given: Theorem1- MVT for Integrals: If f and g are both continuous on [a,b]
and 𝑔(𝑡) ≥ 0 for all t in [a,b], then there exists a c in (a,b) such
𝑎
𝑏
that∫𝑏 𝑓(𝑡)𝑔(𝑡)𝑑𝑑 = 𝑓(𝑐) ∫𝑎 𝑔(𝑡)𝑑𝑑.
Prove: Theorem 2 – Extended MVT for Integrals: Suppose that g is continuous
on [a,b], 𝑔′(𝑡) exists for every t in (a,b), and 𝑔(𝑎) = 0. If f is a continuous
function on [a,b] that does not change sign at any point of (a,b), then there exists a
𝑏
𝑏
d in (a,b) such that ∫𝑎 𝑔(𝑡)𝑓(𝑡)𝑑𝑑 = 𝑔′(𝑑) ∫𝑎 (𝑡 − 𝑎)𝑓(𝑡)𝑑𝑑.
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On the Extended Mean Value Theorem Task, Dr. A began with a conception
about the task-type that there was some set of connections that would allow the left hand
side of the equation to be rendered into the right hand side utilizing the given first MVT
and other conditions of the statement. Dr. A proposed a series of three syntactic
connections that when strung together made the symbolic expressions match up. The
three manipulations were (a) multiplying and dividing by (t-a), (b) applying the given
first MVT to the new statement, and (c) applying the regular MVT to the resulting
function utilizing the given fact that g(a)=0. His resultant equations are given in Figure.
After writing the work in Figure 16, Dr. A went through checking to see the
symbols matched up. This gave Dr. A a feeling about how the argument would go but
that this work was not yet a proof, “Okay, this isn’t rigorous, so I think now I know how
to do it.” Dr. A then started the task of identifying and securing what he called “loose
edges.” Upon the formulation of syntactic connections between statements, Dr. A set
about checking to see if the manipulations were logically or mathematically valid.
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Figure 16. Dr. A’s sketch of a proof for the Extended Mean Value Theorem for
Integrals.

𝑔(𝑐)
𝑐−𝑎

The participant first wrote a lemma to support the equation 𝑔′ (𝑑) =

𝑔(𝑐)−𝑔(𝑎)
𝑐−𝑎

for some d. Dr. A attended to the rest of his argument and noted that he had a

potential problem with t-a in the denominator of the function

𝑔(𝑡)
𝑡−𝑎

=

as t gets close to a.

“Okay, so I gotta be careful with g(t) over (t-a), because when t gets small, I’m dividing
by zero.” Dr. A was not encountering a problem as he was working to make his work into
a proof. Dr. A explained in the follow-up interview that he had not yet realized that the
above was an issue until he had entered into checking over the work.
MT:

Okay. So were you, were you thinking about this that you have to be
careful about this function earlier? Like on the previous page?
Dr. A: No. I don’t think so. No, no, I don’t think so. And now, I’m wondering if
I have to because let’s see, ah, because you’re integrating, yeah, you’re
integrating from a to b so I do have to be careful. Yeah. / Yeah, it looks
like, yeah, I’m not sure exactly what I was thinking there. But yeah, you
have to be careful when you’re, if you are integrating from a to b, you’ve
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got a problem with this g of t over t minus a. So what I want to do is like
call g of t over t minus a, call that h of t or something. And just make sure
that h of t is a nice function. So yeah, I mean it’s fine except possibly so
when yeah, and so taking that some kind of limit, so that’s where it’s
conceivably a problem, and I’m not 100 percent sure it’s resolved, but
yeah, if there’s any problem, that’s where it is.
MT:

Okay. So this question of it potentially being a problem, it just was right
then.

Dr. A: I think it dawned on me right about there.
Dr. A had identified a necessary condition for his proof argument to hold. The
participant recognized that the rational function would be in the form zero over zero
when evaluated at t=a since g(a) was given to be zero, so it would be appropriate to
apply l’Hopital’s rule to determine the limit as t approaches a and discerned that the limit
would be g’(a). Dr. A noted that the statement of the theorem did not say that the
function’s derivative was defined at its endpoints, so he recognized a problem and either
the problem was with his argument or with the posing of the task statement. Dr. A
checked over the argument and the wording of l’Hopital’s rule, and decided to end the
argument with the rebuttal “unless g’(a) does not exist.”
Dr. A illustrated a technique to approaching proofs of this type where one
proposes a series of manipulations to make the expressions match up and then works to
justify the connections logically. How the participant justified his connections relied on
ideas that inform planning. His decision to first justify the use of the regular MVT was
an idea about formal logic, and he identified a necessary condition that the rational
function be well-defined which focused his inquiry. In this example, I demonstrated how
some arguments that only illustrate the symbolic connections are incomplete and that
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leaving an argument as such is problematic. However, the instance also illustrates how
syntactic connections can be useful to the prover.
Cycling through non-deductive warrants successfully. All participants
proposed some type of non-deductive warrant, but Dr. B proposed the most. Across the
four tasks he worked on, he proposed nine inductive or structural-intuitive warrants,
while Dr. C proposed four, and Dr. A proposed two. For this reason, I will use Dr. B’s
work on the own inverse task which involved cycling through a series of proposed
warrants and example functions and in the end, developing a deductive backing based on
one of the inductive warrants.
Let f be a continuous function defined on I=[a,b], f maps I onto I, f is one-to-one,
and f is its own inverse. Show that except for one possibility, f must be
monotonically decreasing on I.
Prior to first proposing warrant, Dr. B had made some assertions about f needing
to be either monotonically increasing or decreasing, where it would have to start and stop,
and that being its own inverse would mean that it was symmetric about the line y=x. The
participant drew a picture of the situation (Picture BI-1 in Figure 17) and articulated a
thought that the one exception would be f(x)=x because “its reflection would be the same
thing that you started off with. And you’d have to be right on that line because there’s no
other way of doing it.”
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Figure 17. Picture BI-1 by Dr. B in Own Inverse task.

Dr. B had articulated a truth conviction based on a structural-intuitive argument while
working through the construction of a general picture. The personal argument structure is
given in Table 27.
Dr. B articulated the intuition that gave self-conviction of why f(x)=x was the one
exception, namely that if f was increasing, not the identity, and symmetric about y=x,
then it would not pass the vertical line test for functions.
Dr. B: So now the question is this. So what have I convinced myself
geometrically? And how do I prove those things? Okay. So first of all,
why is f(x)=x the only increasing function. So my intuition there, if it
wasn’t, then if you reflected itself, there would have to be double values of
this thing from its reflection.
At this point, Dr. B had not drawn any other pictures besides BI-1 in Figure 17. To
illustrate and provide some backing for this idea the participant drew picture BI-2 shown
below in Figure 18. By double values, Dr. B meant there would be two points on the
same function (a, f(a)) and (𝑎, 𝑓 −1 (𝑎)). Dr. B was interpreting f being its own inverse as

symmetry across the line y=x.
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Table 27
Dr. B's Own Inverse Personal Argument Structure Upon Articulating Warrant 1
Data

Claim

Warrant

Backing

F is one-to-one, onto,
and continuous
mapping I to I

F is monotonically
increasing from a to b
or decreasing from b to
a

Geometric
instantiations of
definitions

F is continuous,
monotonically
increasing from a to b
and its own inverse
Geometric instantiation
of “own inverse”

F(x)=x

Monotonic and
continuous is the same
as one-to-one
There’s no other way
about it
“you’d have to be right
on that line (y=x)”

F is one-to-one, onto,
continuous, its own
inverse on [a,b]
F is either
monotonically
increasing from a to b
or decreasing from b to
a.

F is monotonically
decreasing except for
the one function f(x)=x

“there’s no other way of
doing it”
Own inverse means “its
reflection would be the
same thing that you
started off with”
Picture BI-1

MQ/Rebuttal

“I’ve convinced
myself” “intuitively
seems like the only
option”

Figure 18. Picture BI-2.

Picture BI-2 (see Figure 18) served the purpose of helping Dr. B articulate what
his intuition was. When evaluating this picture against the goal of validating and
generalizing the warrant, Dr. B still had the question, “So why would there be double
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values on this thing?” Dr. B tried working with BI-2 to answer the question but decided
he would need to draw another picture to figure out why it would have to happen and
drew BI-3 (see Figure 19) with the point (𝑎, 𝑓(𝑎)) and thought about why (𝑎, 𝑓 −1 (𝑎))

would also be a point. “So why does there have to be an f-inverse of a corresponding to,
oh, because this is in the same domain.”

Figure 19. Picture BI-3.

The participant’s articulation of the intuition changed the warrant supporting the
claim that the only increasing function would be f(x)=x (see Table 28). The backing
continued to be based on intuition but also now based on some empirical data from the
drawn pictures because based on the picture Dr. B thought there was now evidence that
this double-value idea would always happen.
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Table 28
Dr. B's Own Inverse Personal Argument Structure Upon Articulating Warrant 2
Data

Claim

Warrant

Backing

F is one-to-one, onto,
and continuous
mapping I to I

F is monotonically
increasing from a to b
or decreasing from b to
a

Geometric
instantiations of
definitions

F is continuous,
monotonically
increasing from a to b
and its own inverse
Geometric instantiation
of “own inverse”
F is one-to-one, onto,
continuous, its own
inverse on [a,b]
F is either
monotonically
increasing from a to b
or decreasing from b to
a.

F(x)=x

Monotonic and
continuous is the same
as one-to-one
There’s no other way
about it
Otherwise there would
be double y-values
from reflection.

Intuition, Picture BI-1,
Support from example
picture BI-2; picture
BI-3

MQ/Rebuttal

Intuitive self-conviction

F is monotonically
decreasing except for
the one function f(x)=x

Picture BI-2 (see Figure 18) served the purpose of articulating an intuitive
warrant. Dr. B did not find it useful in determining why the double values phenomenon
would always have to occur so he worked with picture BI-3 (see Figure 19). Being
convinced by the example, Dr. B determined that the double values idea would serve as a
contradiction and worked to articulate this in a symbolic proof by contradiction.
However, Dr. B was unable to write down why the function would have double values.
Dr. B wrote down these thoughts symbolically and continued working on and adding to
picture BI-3. Dr. B worked for a period of time but was interrupted by a knock at the
door while trying to articulate why the point on his picture (a, f(a)) would also have to
correspond to a point (𝑎, 𝑓 −1 (𝑎)) within the representation system of proof.

Dr. B returned to working on the task explaining that he had been interrupted and

worked to reorient himself to what he had worked on before. “So what’s going on here? I
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was just about to get on this. I have this nice picture. And on my picture I know, I can
see that if I reflect this type of function, it’s not going to be one-to-one.” The participant
articulated a contradiction that was wholly different from what he had worked on before
based on the picture that was meant to justify his previous warrant. When I asked Dr. B
about this change, in the follow-up interview, he said that he had probably forgotten what
he had done before and was trying to figure out what he was trying to contradict earlier.
“I’m just trying. I think there’s so many little facts about this I’m trying to think what am
I trying to contradict here?...I sort of lost track of what I was doing because of when I got
interrupted.” The interruption resulted in a new warrant that Dr. B attributed to being
based on the picture, so he developed warrant 3, an inductive warrant (see Table 29).

Table 29
Dr. B's Own Inverse Personal Argument Structure Upon Articulating Warrant 3
Data

Claim

Warrant

Backing

F is one-to-one, onto,
and continuous
mapping I to I

F is monotonically
increasing from a to b
or decreasing from b to
a

Geometric
instantiations of
definitions

F is one-to-one, onto,
continuous, and its own
inverse
F is continuous,
monotonically
increasing from a to b
and its own inverse
Geometric instantiation
of “own inverse”
F is one-to-one, onto,
continuous, its own
inverse on [a,b]
F is either
monotonically
increasing from a to b
or decreasing from b to
a.

It is possible for f to be
decreasing

Monotonic and
continuous is the same
as one-to-one
There’s no other way
about it
There are a plethora of
examples

Drawn and mental
pictures

Absolute

Otherwise f would not
be one-to-one

Picture BI-3

“I can see”

F(x)=x

F is monotonically
decreasing except for
the one function f(x)=x

MQ/Rebuttal
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Dr. B then tried to figure out why the function, specifically the one in picture BI-3, could
not be one-to-one. While exploring Dr. B noted that the point (𝑎, 𝑓(𝑎)) would connect to
its inverse point but did not see how that could happen based on the picture drawn:

It has to go through something over here. [Draws line connecting (𝑓 −1 (𝑎), 𝑎) to
f(x)] // so let me get this right. That function can’t be it…So if the inverse
function came through there, what would happen? / Right. So I think I see what’s
going on. If I go through there, it can’t do that. So I’m thinking backwards.
This time while exploring, Dr. B noted the inverse point to (𝑎, 𝑓(𝑎)) and noted

that there would be a path from the origin to the inverse point to (𝑎, 𝑓(𝑎)) (see Figure

20), but he had been thinking of (𝑎, 𝑓(𝑎)) coming directly along a path to the origin. Dr.
B explored for a while wondering about why the two paths would happen and eventually

concluded that there would not be a path from (0,0) to (𝑎, 𝑓(𝑎)) otherwise it would result
in double values. The idea that there would need to be a path up and then down was a
potential backing for his warrant that the function would not be one-to-one, but Dr. B
expressed confusion noticing an issue with how he had originally drawn the picture.

Figure 20. Picture BI-3.4.
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Dr. B had not connected points on f to their inverse points previously. It seemed
that this was a change in the way of thinking about the picture of the function. Dr. B now
thought of f and f-inverse as a single function where previously it appeared there was f
and f-inverse came from reflection. Dr. B was not able to fully articulate the change. His
idea here was still a vague idea that something goes wrong when points are connected,
but he did assert that he had been thinking about it “backwards” (see Table 30).

Table 30
Dr. B's Own Inverse Personal Argument Structure Upon Articulating An Issue With His
Picture
Data

Claim

Warrant

Backing

F is one-to-one, onto,
and continuous
mapping I to I

F is monotonically
increasing from a to b
or decreasing from b to
a

Geometric
instantiations of
definitions

F is one-to-one, onto,
continuous, and its own
inverse
F is continuous,
monotonically
increasing from a to b
and its own inverse
Geometric instantiation
of “own inverse”
Picture BI-3 additions
F is one-to-one, onto,
continuous, its own
inverse on [a,b]
F is either
monotonically
increasing from a to b
or decreasing from b to
a.

It is possible for f to be
decreasing

Monotonic and
continuous is the same
as one-to-one
There’s no other way
about it
There are a plethora of
examples

Drawn and mental
pictures

Absolute

Otherwise would not
be one-to-one

Picture BI-3

“I’m thinking about it
backwards”

F(x)=x

MQ/Rebuttal

F is monotonically
decreasing except for
the one function f(x)=x

The problem was articulating why he knew the increasing function would not be
one-to-one. Dr. B used the picture BI-3 to do so anticipating the picture was “nice” and
would reveal why this would happen. However, the picture was originally drawn to
justify another warrant. Dr. B even stated that this picture was not going to work. The
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personal argument shifted in that Dr. B articulated some more justification as to why the
function would not be one-to-one, that it would have to connect (a, f(a)) to its inverse.
However, Dr. B was not quite able to articulate this as such just yet. The participant
noted as a rebuttal to the argument, that there was something wrong with the picture in
that the lines he drew connecting may not actually be there.
Dr. B stated that in his previous pictures he had not fully been using the fact that f
was its own inverse so he stated, “Instead let’s do, supposing that f inverse of x equals f of
x for all x.” Dr. B explained, “I finally realized that’s the other fact I needed. Because
it’s its own inverse, right? And that’s really what I’m contradicting…Yeah, I think I was
like, what am I contradicting here? And I hadn’t written this down.” Dr. B stated he was
not using the fact, but that was the fact that his argument was actually contradicting with
the pictures. This idea led to his drawing of a new picture that used this idea where if
(𝑥, 𝑓(𝑥)) was a point on the function, then (𝑓 −1 (𝑥), 𝑥) was also a point on the function.
The participant had developed a vague sense about what would be an important reason

behind a contradiction. Dr. B introduced idea that could be used to back a warrant; the
idea was coded as a proposed (vague) backing. The idea about the two points having to
occur was coupled with this proposed (vague) backing about f being its own inverse and
increasing when Dr. B found a contradiction that 𝑓�𝑓 −1 (𝑥)� would need to be both

greater than x and less than f(x). Dr. B had begun drawing picture BI-4 (see Figure 21)
knowing that his previous pictures were not capturing the own inverse idea and that lines
drawn connecting points may not actually be there. So picture BI-4 only had points at the
beginning and end of the interval and at (x, f(x)) and its inverse point. Then Dr. B

thought for a minute and a half about why there would be a problem before drawing a
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dash above the point (x, f (x)) corresponding to the point (x,x) and declaring “if finverse…then it can’t go through there. Right, okay, I get it.” I asked about what the
contradiction was that Dr. B seemed to have found.

Figure 21. Picture BI-4.2.

Dr. B: I wanted to show that when I plugged f(x) into the original function, that
gives two different values that can’t be equal actually. Because since f
equals f-inverse, then f(f(x)) would be x. But I mean then that would mean
you have a decreasing function because f(x) is right there. You can see it
geometrically. I think what I realized that I had to have f(f(x)) be less than
f(x). But at this, if I also had that the inverse was equal to the original
function, that also tells me f(f(x)) would also have to be greater than f(x).
Yeah, so they can be both of those things at once.
Dr. B had articulated a fourth warrant based on an example that was developed based on
a (vague) backing (see Table 31). Dr. B worked to articulate this idea and justifying why
this would have to happen. In doing so, he focused on f having to decrease on some
portion if it was its own inverse and was able to render his argument into an algebraic
form.
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Table 31
Dr. B's Own Inverse Personal Argument Structure Upon Articulating Warrant 4
Data

Claim

Warrant

Backing

F is one-to-one, onto,
and continuous
mapping I to I

F is monotonically
increasing from a to b
or decreasing from b to
a

Geometric
instantiations of
definitions

F is one-to-one, onto,
continuous, and its own
inverse
F is continuous,
monotonically
increasing from a to b
and its own inverse
Geometric instantiation
of “own inverse”
Picture BI-3 additions
F is one-to-one, onto,
continuous, its own
inverse on [a,b]
F is either
monotonically
increasing from a to b
or decreasing from b to
a.

It is possible for f to be
decreasing

Monotonic and
continuous is the same
as one-to-one
There’s no other way
about it
There are a plethora of
examples

Drawn and mental
pictures

Absolute

Otherwise f(f(x))
would need to be both
less than and greater
than f(x)

Picture BI-4
F(f(x))=x implies
f(f(x)) is greater than x
on the picture
F(f(x)) would need to
be less than x for f to be
increasing

Based on picture

F(x)=x

F is monotonically
decreasing except for
the one function f(x)=x

MQ/Rebuttal

In summary (see Table 32), Dr. B proposed Warrant 1 based on structuralintuitive understanding which utilized picture BI-1 to work through the conditions of the
statement to arrive at that understanding. The participant articulated the intuition more
specifically as Warrant 2 and used Picture BI-2 to test and articulate it and Picture BI-3 to
discern why it would work generally. Dr. B thought he found a reason why and moved to
articulate it in a proof but found that he was not able to generally articulate why the
function would have double values. Dr. B returned to working with the same picture BI3 to validate and generalize the warrant. While testing the idea Dr. B was interrupted and
upon returning, he articulated the inductive Warrant 3. The participant still needed to
justify why it always worked so he continued exploring Picture BI-3.
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Table 32
Dr. B's Progression of Warrants on the Own Inverse Task
The change

Warrant

Backing

MQ/Rebuttal

Warrant 1

“you’d have to be right
on that line (y=x)”

“there’s no other way of doing it”
Own inverse means “its reflection
would be the same thing that you
started off with”
Picture BI-1

“I’ve convinced myself”
“intuitively seems like the only
option”

Warrant 2

Otherwise there would be
double y-values from
reflection.

Intuition, Picture BI-1, Support from
example picture BI-2; picture BI-3

Intuitive self-conviction

Warrant 3

Otherwise f would not be
one-to-one

Picture BI-3

“I can see”

Proposed backing

Otherwise would not be
one-to-one

Picture BI-3

“I’m thinking about it backwards”

Warrant 4

Otherwise f(f(x)) would
need to be both less than
and greater than f(x)

Picture BI-4
F(f(x))=x implies f(f(x)) is greater
than f(x) on the picture
F(f(x)) would need to be less than f
(x) for f to be increasing
OR
The function will end up decreasing
on a portion since (x, f(x)) and
(f(x),x) are both points on the graph.

Based on picture

While exploring why the function would not be one-to-one, Dr. B noted a property that
the function needed to have to be its own inverse that his picture was not capturing. The
participant chose to abandon his picture, BI-3, and reflect once again about what it meant
to be its own inverse. He applied the instantiation of the concept by writing the statement
f(f(x))=x and used this conception of own inverse along with previous ideas about where
an increasing function with the given properties should start and stop to draw Picture BI4 with the aims of determining a contradiction. The exploration of this picture involved
attending to how both points would be on the same function and how the function was
meant to be increasing. Through this exploration, Dr. B extracted Warrant 4 which he
was able to use in pursuing an algebraic argument. Dr. B’s acts of articulating, testing,
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and exploring examples to generate backing for his warrants are examples of inquiry
resulting in new information. Dr. B was able to reason informally and to achieve a
formal argument in the end. However, Dr. B’s and Dr. C’s work on the own inverse task
were the only instances where insights gathered from working with non-deductive
warrants led directly to the formulation of a deductive warrant.
When are ideas from informal explorations developed into deductive
warrants? A goal for Dr. B and Dr. C who explored inductive and structural-intuitive
warrants was to move from these informal understandings into a deductive warrant. As
illustrated above, Dr. B actively pursued justifying that his warrants formulated on
intuition and examples would always occur. Dr. B explored finding this justification
empirically. As described earlier, Dr. C worked to justify his warrants both symbolically
and with pictures in acts he called permuting the logic.
Taking the view of the inquiry framework, the participants had gathered, assessed,
and connected data statements to formulate a proposed warrant. They evaluated the
warrant based on its ability to convince them of the truth and their ability to justify it in a
mathematically deductive way. Finding it problematic to do so, they set about either reexploring to formulate a new warrant or inquiring into and exploring their current warrant
until a new insight was found, that new insight could be a reformulation or specification
of the warrant, a possible backing for the warrant, or a new unrelated piece of
information. Dr. B explored and found an entirely new proposed warrant that the
function would fail to be one-to-one. These new insights were tested either by trying to
prove the statement or by further exploring. At one point, Dr. C moved to test his ideas
by writing the proof symbolically, but while thinking about his next step he noticed
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something amok with his thinking. While exploring why the function would fail to be
one-to-one, Dr. B also noticed something was “backwards” about his thinking and the
picture that he had drawn.
At some point during both of their efforts to justify their warrants, they both
identified (if vaguely) aspects of the conception of a function being its own inverse that
they were not attending to that they should. Dr. B said he was not using the idea that
f(f(x))=x and that his pictures were not accounting for how points on the inverse and
points on the function must connect. Dr. C said he was not focusing on how points below
the line y=x end up above the line and vice versa. They identified that these aspects of
the own inverse property would be important in any contradiction that they might get,
and this assertion of a proposed backing was critical to their attainment of the deductive
warrant.
Informed by this new piece of data, the participants moved to perform more
explorations (or actions). This time Dr. B’s picture only held the given pieces of
information and the aspects that he found useful; Dr. C connected the ideas that his
previous explorations had shown to be pertinent including the proposed backing idea.
The acts of inquiring yielded new information including a sense that there was something
missing from how they had been thinking about the ideas. These missed or unfocused
aspects of the own inverse property ended up being central to the mathematical
justification of the contradictions that they found.
Relationship Among Idea
Categories
This section provides a description of how ideas within the three outlined idea
categories, Focusing and Configuring, Connecting and Justifying, and Monitoring were
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tested and used with each other in the evolution of the personal argument. I first
demonstrate the development, testing, and interaction of ideas within the context of a
specific task. Later, I summarize how this example compares and contrasts with the work
on other tasks by other participants before summarizing the chapter.
Dr. C’s evolving argument on the additive implies continuous task. I chose to
demonstrate utilizing the additive implies linear task because its directions to prove or
disprove provided an open ended format. Dr. C deployed both formal and informal
modes of thought, made his monitoring thoughts apparent either within his work on the
task or in the follow-up interview, and was not certain he could solve the task until he had
developed a deductive warrant so was actively engaged in inquiry as moved forward.
The statement as given to Dr. C is presented.
Let f be a function on the real numbers where for every x and y in the real
numbers, 𝑓(𝑥 + 𝑦) = 𝑓(𝑥) + 𝑓(𝑦). Prove or disprove that f is continuous on the
real numbers if and only if it is continuous at 0.
Dr. C read the statement and articulated a truth proposal, “It’s certainly

continuous on the rationals. I don’t believe it for the reals though.” The assertion was
based on connecting perceived to be relevant content knowledge about how one proves
that linear functions (in the form y = mx) are continuous:
I was thinking about the well-known fact that the only continuous linear functions
in the reals to the reals are those of the form y equals mx for some fixed m. And
one shows that those are continuous on the rationals fairly easy - linear functions
are continuous on the rationals pretty easily by doing some induction.
Although not voiced aloud during his work on the task, Dr. C had brought in statements
and facts that he perceived to be relevant. These ideas that informed the statement image
were the basis of his truth proposal. The conjecture was made based on his knowledge of
mathematical structure and relationships. It was a structural-intuitive warrant. The truth
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proposal informed Dr. C’s decision moving forward. He shifted his inquiry focus from
determining the truth of the statement to looking for a way to disprove the statement
which he knew to be achieved by developing a counterexample. The structure of his
argument is given in Figure 22.
Dr. C chose to develop a function that was continuous at zero and continuous on
the rational numbers and discontinuous otherwise based on his earlier structural-intuitive
warrant idea. The example would serve as a means of testing his warrant. To test the
example, Dr. C knew that the function would need to be continuous at zero and have the
additive property. The participant justified that the function was continuous at zero nonproblematically as he had designed it to be so. Dr. C tested the additive property with a
specific critical example of a pair of irrational inputs whose sum was rational. Dr. C
worked through the example and concluded that his function did not satisfy the additive
condition.
As a means of testing the structural-intuitive warrant by trying to develop a
deductive argument based on the same ideas that informed a warrant, Dr. C deployed the
tool of an example in the anticipation that it would serve to disprove the statement. Dr. C
found his example tool failed. He evaluated the situation and stated that maybe the
statement was true.
Dr. C: It turned out that didn’t work. And if the easier ones didn’t work, then the
harder ones probably wouldn’t either. Matter of fact, if the easier one
didn’t work, then it seemed likely that none of the harder ones would
work.
M:

Okay. So I was going to ask about that. So after you found that it didn’t
work, it didn’t satisfy it. You paused for a while. Was it because you
were trying to think of different examples, or were you convincing
yourself that it-
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Dr. C: Yeah. I was trying to convince myself that if this didn’t work, then
nothing would.

(implied) not a
proof

F(x+y)= f(x)+ f(y)
The only continuous linear functions on
the reals are of the form y=mx
Prove linear functions are continuous
on the rationals easily by induction

F is not continuous on the reals

No clear way of proving
for the reals

The induction argument
won’t work for irrational
numbers

Figure 22. Dr. C's personal argument structure on additive implies continuous task upon
articulating a truth proposal.

As can be seen in Figure 23, the new truth proposal informs the claim rectangle on the
right. The warrant backed by inductive information provides some connection between
the data and claim, but as the warrant is not a deductive type, the connection is not solid
and the qualifier is not absolute.
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“maybe”

F(x+y)= f(x)+ f(y)
F continuous at zero
Proposed function does not have the
additive property

F is continuous on the reals

No function can be
continuous at 0, continuous
on rational numbers but
discontinuous otherwise,
and additive

If that function was not a
counterexample, no
others would be.

Figure 23. Personal argument structure upon changing the truth proposal based on an
inductive warrant.

Dr. C had used the example as a means of testing not only the warrant but the
truth proposal it backed. This moment was characterized by a second truth proposal but
this time achieved by an inductive warrant, content knowledge about a type of function,
and a feeling that pursuing a counterexample would be an unfruitful line of inquiry. The
tools used and the monitoring idea that there is an unfruitful line of inquiry worked with
the inductive warrant to connect the data to the truth proposal.
Dr. C then moved to try to prove the statement was true or to provide an absolute
link between the data and the claim. The participant deployed tools of instantiations of
the definition of continuous that he deemed to be fitting with the additive property of the
function as well as his knowledge of properties of limits to extract the equation given in
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Figure 24. Dr. C concluded that the continuity of the function depended on the value of
lim𝜀→0 𝑓(𝜀) being equal to zero or not.

Figure 24. Dr. C's limit equations.

Dr. C had developed a necessary condition based on the deployment of tools
chosen based on data statements perceived to be useful and a deductive warrant. In an
effort to fulfill the condition and test his earlier truth proposal, Dr. C determined that the
function would need to satisfy f(0) the second necessary condition informed his planning.
He remembered an algebraic proof that f(0)=0 which satisfied one aspect and provided
support for the line of inquiry of attempting to prove the statement true. However, Dr. C
still had a condition to fulfill, “So f of zero is zero. But that doesn’t mean that the limit as
epsilon goes to zero of f of epsilon is zero. Does it? Why should it?” Dr. C looked back
at his writing of the statement because he “was thinking about how to bring the definition
of continuity into the picture. That was returning to what I was given and figuring out
how to bring that into the picture to evaluate. Or to show that limit was f of zero which is
the central question for continuity at the origin.” In an effort to glean more data, Dr. C
looked back at the statement and saw that it was given that the function was continuous at
zero. “Ah, but we’re given that f is continuous at the origin. And we know that f of zero
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equals zero. So the limit as epsilon goes to zero of f of epsilon is zero. I think that makes
it work.” Dr. C symbolically evaluated that his assertions were correct and declared truth
conviction. This was coupled with a sense that he could now write the proof based on his
deductive warrants. Because Dr. C’s work in proving the task was based on deductive
warrants within the representation system of proof, the writing of the proof did not
require the formulation of any new ideas (see Figure 25).

Figure 25. Personal argument structure upon the realization of a necessary condition.

Interaction of ideas for Dr. C. During the task, Dr. C articulated ideas from
every idea category as summarized in Table 33. The first idea was to bring in some
perceived to be relevant facts to inform the statement image which when combined led to
a truth proposal based on structural-intuitive backing. The proposal was tested by a
possible counterexample that was generated based on the insights relevant to the
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structural-intuitive warrant. The possible counterexample function was tested by a
numerical example and found to not serve as a counterexample. Conceptual knowledge,
an inductive warrant, and a sense of an unfruitful line of inquiry informed a new truth
proposal. The truth proposal was tested by the pursuit of a deductive argument. The
fulfillment of the argument was achieved by deductive warrants but focused by the
identification of necessary conditions whose fulfillment inspired monitoring ideas of
support for the line of inquiry which supported the continuation of the proof to the
fulfillment of the necessary condition and a truth conviction and the feeling of being able
to write a proof.

Table 33
Ideas Generated During Dr. C’s Work on the Own Inverse Task
Focusing and Configuring
•
•
•

Informing statement
image
Truth proposals (2)
Necessary
conditions (3)

Connecting and Justifying
•
•
•

Structural-Intuitive
warrant
Inductive warrant
Deductive warrant
(2)

Monitoring
•
•
•
•

Unfruitful line of
inquiry
Support for line of
inquiry
Truth conviction
I can write a proof

As described above, the idea-types were not always formed independently of
other idea-types but sometimes simultaneously in coordination with each other. After Dr.
C tested his proposed function and found that it did not serve as a counterexample, he
identified a new truth proposal based on an inductive warrant and an identification of an
unfruitful line of inquiry. The example was just an example until Dr. C used it to justify
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his new truth proposal. Dr. C would not have made a new truth proposal if it had not
been for his evaluation combining the identification of an unfruitful line of inquiry, the
evidence from the example, and conceptual knowledge of types of functions. The
identification that searching for a counterexample would be an unfruitful line of inquiry
essentially was an idea to pursue proving that the statement was true based on conceptual
knowledge and the empirical evidence. No one of these three idea-types was generated
prior to the other, their formulation depended on the others, and all three categories of
focusing and configuring, connecting and justifying, and monitoring were apparent in this
single moment.
Because of this possible amalgam of idea-types into one single moment, linear or
even cyclical of patterns defining the steps at which these ideas are formed such as
focusing and configuring, then connecting and justifying, then monitoring, repeat are not
generally discernable. What is noticeable is a process of proposing or articulating an
idea, testing the idea’s usefulness or the usefulness of prior ideas against the
consequences of the new idea, and then articulating a new idea. The process itself
involved the passing through, often multiple times, the inquirential cycle of reflecting,
acting, and evaluating.
Consider again what followed Dr. C’s articulation that f(0)=0 was a necessary
condition. Dr. C tested the truth proposal against this necessary condition. He reflected
upon why f(0)=0 could possibly be true and began to think about ways of proving it so.
Dr. C recalled a standard argument that would prove f(0)=0 and applied that argument.
In the evaluation of the results of his actions against the statement to be proven, Dr. C
declared a monitoring idea of support for the line of inquiry, namely pursuing proving the
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statement true, but also another necessary condition, that f is continuous at zero. Even
though there is no discernable pattern amongst the order that the ideas in each category
emerge, the idea categories have purposes in structuring the argument and informing the
problem-solving pathways.
The focusing and configuring ideas of informing the statement image, truth
proposals, and necessary conditions provided the data and claims of the argument
structure as well as a proposed pathway. The warrants filled in the links between the data
and claim, and the backing, once deductive, made those links sound. We saw in Figure
24 that the identification of the necessary condition that f(0)=0 provided another
rectangular box claim that was known to be needed to serve as data being somehow
connected with other data to support the final claim. This focused Dr. C’s inquirential
pursuit. He moved to solve the problem of warranting that f(0)=0. The monitoring ideas
were not always visible in the argumentation structure, but their effects were apparent in
the decisions made in that Dr. C abandoned pursuing a counterexample and continued
trying to pursue proving true when monitoring ideas were achieved.
Summary of the relationship amongst idea types. Every other participant on
each task identified ideas from each of the three idea categories. For each participant, the
focusing and configuring ideas informed the rectangle data and claim boxes, warrants and
backing, as expected, served as connections between the data and claims, and monitoring
ideas, in combination with other means of testing ideas, provided information to the
prover as to whether their work was fitting or not.
As seen with Dr. C, the evolution of the personal argument is not linear in
identifying focusing and configuring ideas, identifying connections and justifications, and
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then making monitoring decisions since single moments may characterize multiple ideatypes, simultaneously. The process of articulating ideas, testing the new idea or previous
ideas against these new ideas, and then proposing new ideas was apparent. The process
of testing ideas varied by idea-type as described in earlier sections, but the process
involved active, productive inquiry. In general, the ideas were tested against their
abilities to do work in solving a perceived problem. As these problems evolved, the ideas
were eventually tested against their ability to work with the existing personal argument
structure to move the argument into a general, deductive proof.
Summary of Findings
The purpose of this study was to describe the ideas mathematicians developed to
move their personal arguments forward, to describe the inquirential context surrounding
the emergence of those ideas, and to describe how the mathematicians used and tested
those ideas as they proceeded to resolve the proof problem. The mathematicians in this
study developed ideas that moved their personal arguments forward. That is, they
developed insights, feelings, and statements whose incorporation into the personal
argument changed the argument’s structure. I grouped ideas into three categories
according to their perceived functionality: Ideas that Focus and Configure, Ideas that
Connect and Justify, and Monitoring Ideas. The focus and configure ideas included ideas
from six sub-types: statement image, task-type, truth proposal, necessary condition,
envisioned proof path, and logical structure ideas. The ideas that connect or justify were
the proposed warrant and backings for warrants, meaning the proposed reasoning to
connect the evidence with the claim. I further classified the proposed warrants based on
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their respective backings. Monitoring ideas were feelings the participants had about their
progress and success in completing the proof tasks and solving their problems.
The ideas emerged through the mathematicians’ purposeful recognition of
problems to be solved and reflective and evaluative procedures to solve them that
incorporated the implementation and development of tools. These tools included rich
conceptual knowledge, multiple instantiations of concepts and definitions, purposeful
exploration of specific examples, knowledge of heuristic strategies, and the connecting
and permuting of ideas and statements. The ideas did not emerge in a linear or cyclical
pattern of an idea from each category. However, there was a pattern of working to (a)
understand the statement or determine the truth of the statement, (b) find a warrant (or a
reason why the statement would be true), (c) validate, generalize, and articulate the
warrant, and (d) write the final proof.
As the mathematicians articulated and incorporated new ideas, the structure of
their personal arguments changed, notably that data statements could be repurposed as
warrants or backing or participants could change their claims. When the mathematicians
reasoned informally, they would proceed to test their non-deductive warrants in an effort
to progress into formal arguments. In the next chapter, I summarize these findings
against the literature and provide possible explanations. In addition, I elaborate on
limitations and hypothesize implications of these findings for teaching and research in
mathematical proof.

CHAPTER V
DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSIONS
In this chapter, I present a summary of the study and a discussion of the ideas the
participating mathematicians developed to move their argument forward, how that
development occurred, and how those ideas were utilized and tested as the personal
argument evolved. It then presents considerations for the implications of the findings for
research and teaching. Finally, it suggests future research paths to investigate further
understanding how certain idea-types are tested and to investigate methods for helping
students develop and utilize ideas to move their arguments forward.
Summary of the Study
There is general agreement that the mathematician’s proving process involves an
attainment of ideas that are organized in a way to move an argument toward a
mathematical proof (Rav, 1999; Tall et al., 2012). Research is needed to document the
context surrounding how mathematicians formulate useful ideas and how these ideas
contribute to the development of the argument. The purpose of this research was to
describe the evolution of the personal argument in professional mathematicians’ proof
constructions, to describe the situations surrounding the emergence of ideas that moved
the argument forward, and to describe how those ideas are tested and used. Specifically,
this research sought descriptive answers to the following questions:
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Q1

Q2

What ideas move the argument forward as a prover’s personal argument
evolves?
Q1a

What problematic situation is the prover currently entered into
solving when one articulates and attains an idea that moves the
personal argument forward?

Q1b

What stage of the inquiry process do they appear to be in when one
articulates and attains an idea that moves the personal argument
forward? (Are they currently applying a tool, evaluating the
outcomes after applying a tool, or reflecting upon a current
problem?)

Q1c

What actions and tools influenced the attainment of the idea?

Q1d

What were their anticipated outcomes of enacting the tools that led
to the attainment of the idea?

How are the ideas that move the argument forward used subsequent to the
shifts in the personal argument?
Q2a

In what ways does the prover test the idea to ensure it indeed “does
work”?

Q2b

As the argument evolves, how is the idea used? Specifically, how
are the ideas used as the participant views the situation as moving
from a problem to a more routine task?

The research was framed in Dewey’s (1938) theory of inquiry, a conception of the
proof construction process as involving an evolution of a personal argument, and
Toulmin’s (2003) model of argument structure. I asked three mathematicians teaching or
doing research in the field of real analysis to participate in the study by solving three
mathematical proof tasks either while being video-taped or on their own time.
Participants recorded all their work in Livescribe notebooks. Participants chose
perceived to be problematic tasks, and I contributed one task. In the end, participants
worked on three or four total tasks among the seven total tasks included in the study.
After the mathematicians completed a task, they participated in follow-up interviews with
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protocols informed by my preliminary analyses and hypotheses developed from viewing
their submitted work prior to the follow-up interview. Informed by the complete data set,
I identified each idea that moved the argument moved forward, detailed the Toulmin
structure of the argument prior to and following the formulation of that idea, and the
inquirential context that contributed to that idea. Open iterative coding of the ideas seen,
problems, tools, and shifts in the structural argument preceded analysis for categories and
themes across participants working on the same task and then across tasks for the same
participant.
Major Findings
The three participants worked on seven total tasks. Results of open-iterative
coding discerned that they entered into solving nine types of perceived problems utilizing
ten categories of tools (see Tables 40 and 41 in Appendix F). Ideas that moved the
argument forward corresponded to structural shifts in the Toulmin diagrams of the
personal argument, provided the participant means to communicate their personal
argument in a logical manner, gave participants a feeling that their way of thinking was
fitting or unfruitful, or were explicitly referred to by the participants as a useful insight
into the resolution of an issue that they had identified as problematic.
The framework of logical inquiry was useful in describing the process of
generating and testing ideas that moved the argument forward. No tool category or
problem was indicative of a single idea category as problems and tools transcended idea
category. The interplay of problem, tool, previously articulated ideas, and the
individual’s perspective determined how ideas were generated.
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Ideas That Moved the Personal
Argument Forward
As the three participants worked on the proof construction tasks, they developed
feelings about how the proof development would go, identified key relationships, and
made decisions in order to make progress on the task. These feelings, decisions, and
moments of insight were the ideas that moved the argument forward. Some of the ideas
identified have been remarked upon by previous literature as “decisions” (Carlson &
Bloom, 2005), “resources” (Carlson & Bloom, 2005), and ideas or moments (Raman et
al., 2009). Other researchers have commented on the use of various resources, tools or
explorations by students and mathematicians to achieve the senses of understanding of a
proof situation that characterize some of the ideas that were identified in Chapter IV (e.g.,
Alcock, 2004; Alcock & Inglis, 2008; Lockwood et al., 2012; Watson & Mason, 2005;
Weber & Alcock, 2004). This work, however, contributes to the existing knowledge in
this area with the specific purpose of identifying the moments, decisions, and ideas that
moved the argument forward from the prover’s perspective, and makes its contribution
unique.
The ideas were grouped into 15 idea-types that were further grouped into three
idea categories according to their function in moving the personal argument forward.
The ideas that focus and configure which included ideas that inform the statement image,
task type, truth proposals, identified necessary conditions, envisioned proof paths, and
formal logic ideas provided insight into making decisions about how to begin, how to
proceed, and what tools and ideas to use in doing so. The ideas that connect and justify
included four types of warrants based on their paired backing as well as proposed
backings. These ideas were proposals for how to link the given data statements to the
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claim statement and how to validate those links. Deductive warrant-types were those
sought for the final written arguments, but the articulation, exploration, and utilization of
non-deductive warrants proved fruitful in the attainment of new information and ideas
that guided future explorations or helped participants assert truth. Participants utilized
monitoring ideas to evaluate their progress and to make decisions regarding their progress
toward a more efficient solution strategy, which were captured by four sub-idea-types.
Ideas that focus and configure. The ideas that focus and configure were those
that did work for the participant in terms of where to focus, how to begin, how to
proceed, and what tools to utilize. Ideas that inform the statement image were
statements, relationships, and proven claims that the participant deemed as relevant to the
personal argument but had not yet been utilized as a warrant, claim, or backing. These
ideas could have been the results of elaborating or connecting given conditions from the
task statement or previous knowledge brought into the conception of the task. I have
chosen to distinguish these ideas from general tools and conceptual knowledge. These
ideas could be wielded as tools (connecting and permuting ideas) and may have resulted
from applying conceptual knowledge, but, uniquely, they were statements of fact that the
participant deemed as potentially useful or utilized to inform his conception of the
personal argument.
Since most work in problem solving has been to identify useful strategies or to
describe the cognitive processes involved, the formulation of ideas that inform the
statement image have not been characterized by other literature as notable moments.
However, decisions about how to use these ideas and others in the focusing and
configuring category could be seen as falling into the much broader “resources” problem-
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solving attribute in Carlson and Bloom’s (2005) multi-dimensional problem solving
framework. Mason et al. (1982/2010) provide mathematical thinking strategies for
students breaking down the problem-solving process into three phases into entry, attack,
and review. In the entry phase, students are to ask the questions, “What do I know?,
What do I want?, What can I introduce?”. Ideas that inform the statement image seem to
fall under the “What do I know” question as it encapsulates what is known from the task
statement and from past experience. While in the literature these ideas inform how to get
started, this research has shown that these ideas can be formulated at every stage of the
proof construction process.
On the tasks that instructed to prove or disprove, participants developed proposals
of truth based upon intuition, experience, or examples. Other researchers have studied
the similar constructs of the formulation of conjectures or evaluations of truth (e.g., Inglis
et al., 2007; Lockwood et al., 2012; Pedemonte, 2007). More specifically, they studied
the reasoning activities involved with formulating these conjectures. This research
supports Lockwood and colleagues’ findings that proving and disproving are related in
that participants may work to prove or disprove simultaneously.
Participants developed ideas about the type of task that they were presented on
four of the seven tasks. These ideas were accompanied by feelings about what kinds of
approaches would be useful or appropriate. The problem solving literature has indicated
that identifying problem-type or problems similar to the current problem as potentially
useful heuristics (Pólya,1945/1957; Schoenfeld, 1985); mathematicians were noted to
perform this behavior as Carlson and Bloom (2005) stated that when orienting to a
problem, the mathematicians “scanned knowledge and classified the problem” (p. 67).
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The mathematicians in this study identified necessary conditions on the additive
implies continuous and extended MVT tasks. That is they identified conditions that they
would have to prove in order for the task claim or a claim they asserted to be true. These
ideas provided direction for their inquiry efforts and anticipated consequences should
they succeed or fail in fulfilling the conditions. The identification of this idea-type as
moving the argument forward did not occur on the other tasks. It is possible that this was
because the two tasks held the nature where participants worked syntactically (as
characterized by Weber and Alcock (2004) to connect given data to an algebraic
formulation of a definition. Identifying necessary conditions is related to understanding
and unpacking relevant definitions recognized by mathematicians and mathematics
educators as a useful step in constructing mathematical proof (e.g. Selden & Selden,
1995; Weber & Alcock).
Both Dr. A and Dr. B achieved moments where they could envision a proof path;
that is they proposed a series of statements that they could see leading to a solution while
looking for a warrant or backing for a warrant. These were identified when participants
were stuck on justifying some sub-claim. They had a sense of “if I can show this, then
I’m done”. Selden and Selden (1995) described how student provers could benefit from
unpacking the logic of a statement to develop a proof framework, essentially the series of
claims needed to be validated in order to achieve a mathematical proof of a given
statement. The proof framework nearly encompasses what is meant by an envisioned
proof path except that the achievement of an envisioned proof path may require more
than the unpacking of the logic of the statement and is accompanied by a sense of how
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one would justify all other claims provided he/she could justify an initial claim. These
envisioned proof paths gave participants a sense of “If I had this, then I’d be done.”
Ideas about formal logic and the representation system of proof were decisions
made about how to structure the mathematical argument and what logical tools to use
including proofs by cases, proving by contradiction, determining qualifiers, and making
decisions on what constituted mathematical proof. Ideas of this type are reflective of the
theoretical description by Selden and Selden (2013) who classify the proof problem into
two parts, the formal-rhetorical part and the problem-centered part. They state that the
formal-rhetorical part does not depend on genuine problem solving or a deep
understanding or intuition about the concepts involved. The mathematicians
demonstrated a fluid knowledge of formal logic and ways of communicating ideas within
the norms of the mathematics community. This most likely contributed to these ideas not
always being identifiable or seen as meaningful to the participant. While the
mathematicians did not encounter problems when making these decisions, a novice, most
likely would need to reflect upon these decisions.
The focusing and configuring ideas “did work” for the participants by informing
the participants’ focus and how to structure both the final argument and also their work
while still constructing. While these ideas relate to other constructs in the literature such
as resources for problem solving, formulating conjectures, unpacking the logic of the
definitions and statements, and the formal-rhetorical aspect of constructing mathematical
proof, this research is the first to characterize ideas that inform the statement image,
identified necessary conditions, and envisioned proof paths as moments that move the
argument forward. Implementation of these ideas influenced the statements of data and
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claims and the ways in which the participants structured their ideas. Additionally, this
study demonstrates that these ideas provided insights into what kinds of warrants and
associated backing would appropriately associate the data and claim.
Ideas that connect and justify. Ideas that connect and justify were the
statements that participants viewed or proposed could link the statement with the claim as
well as the ideas that could back them. As noted in Chapter IV, I adapted Inglis et al.’s
(2007) constructs to classify the types of warrants viewed. Inglis and colleagues
described how mathematics graduates formulated conjectures based on deductive,
structural-intuitive, and inductive backing. Participants in this study also proposed and
utilized warrants of these three types, but these findings expand on the work of Inglis et
al. by proposing a fourth warrant-type, describing the situation surrounding the
formulation of these warrant-types and how participants utilized these warrants as their
personal arguments evolved.
The fourth warrant-type was based on observations that Dr. A would propose
connections between statements based on symbolic manipulations without attention to the
mathematical objects with which they were associated; warrants of this type were termed
syntactic connections. An example was Dr. A’s series of algebraic manipulations to
𝑏

𝑏

connect the expression ∫𝑎 𝑔(𝑡)𝑓(𝑡)𝑑𝑑 to 𝑔′(𝑑) ∫𝑎 (𝑡 − 𝑎)𝑓(𝑡)𝑑𝑑 on the Extended MVT
for integrals task without attending to see if his manipulations were mathematically

justified. The naming of the warrant-type was inspired by Weber and Alcock’s (2004)
classification of a proof production by logically manipulating mathematical statements
without referring to intuitive representations as a syntactic proof production. A syntactic
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connection could be utilized in a syntactic proof production, but the proof production also
required its later being connected to a deductive backing.
Dr. A was the only participant to exhibit syntactic connections on the Extended
MVT task as well as the Lagrange Remainder Theorem task. Presumably, this was
because these two tasks involved specifically justifying symbolic equations. Dr. B, who
also worked on the Extended MVT task, did not exhibit this type of warrant, but also did
not find any means of warranting the statement to be proven. For Dr. C, the proof of the
additive implies continuous task did involve a syntactic (Weber & Alcock, 2004)
argument; however, he justified each step beyond the algebraic manipulation. Dr. C’s
work was therefore classified as utilizing deductive warrants.
In addition to warrant-types, on five occasions, participants proposed backing for
a previously generated warrant or a vague feeling about what would back a justification
for the claim. The backing ideas were proposed largely while participants were looking
for a warrant or a means of generally articulating a previously proposed warrant via
connecting and permuting data statements and properties. These ideas characterized as
proposed backings have not been previously identified in the literature as only few
research efforts have utilized the full Toulmin (2003) model that includes backing.
However, Raman (2003) referred to a mathematician identifying the “only one thing” that
could explain why the claim was true and could be translated into formulas. The
utilization of these proposed backings is discussed in a later section.
Participants developed structural-intuitive or inductive warrant-types when
specifically searching for conceptual reasons why the statement would be true. The
mathematicians formed (or attempted to form) syntactic connections when they suspected
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that they would need to connect the symbols in the “right way”. As will be discussed
later, upon articulating a warrant participants would set about the task of either searching
for justification for their non-deductive warrants or articulating them generally which led
to either formulating new warrants, proposing new backings, or the algebraic translation
of their warrant idea. The decisions about the usefulness of the warrants and
determinations about the participants’ progress were enveloped in the third category of
monitoring ideas.
Monitoring ideas. Monitoring ideas guided the mathematicians’ decisions and
gave them feelings as to whether their current line of inquiry was fitting or not. Two of
the monitoring idea-types were specific to the proof construction process, truth
convictions and feelings that one could write a proof. The other two, feelings that the
actions taken were fitting or would be unfruitful, are relevant to problem solving
processes in general.
The truth convictions displayed by participants were supported by deductive,
inductive, and structural-intuitive warrants. In one case, the conviction that the statement
was not true was supported by the participants’ inability to find a warrant to support the
statement. I purposely separated feelings of truth conviction from truth proposals. A
truth proposal was a means of getting started in proving a statement by providing a
direction in which to argue; truth proposals were not necessarily accompanied by the
participants’ belief. A truth conviction, on the other hand, was a feeling that the
connections that the participant had developed were enough to justify the assertion to
himself. This feeling of personal certainty also distinguishes a truth conviction from a
conjecture justified by non-deductive backing as described by Inglis et al. (2007) as well
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as the types of conjectures developed by the participants in Lockwood and colleagues’
(2012) study about how examples were used in conjecturing. Inglis et al. describe how
the conjectures made were accompanied by modal qualifiers that indicated incomplete
conviction. While the modal qualifiers that accompanied truth convictions in this study
often indicated that the participant’s argument was not a proof (“intuitively”, “I can see”,
“heuristically”), the participants expressed some sense of belief.
On three of the tasks, participants did not display moments where they developed
a truth conviction; instead, they displayed an implicit belief that the statement was true
and it was up to them to justify the connection. These three tasks were Dr. A’s work on
the Lagrange Remainder Theorem task, Dr. A’s work on the Extended MVT, and Dr. B’s
work on the Sequences and Limit Points task. On both the Lagrange Remainder
Theorem task and the Extended MVT, Dr. A expressed an idea about the type of task; he
determined upon reading the task that some series of correctly applied symbolic
manipulations should yield the desired result. Dr. B chose his individual task, the
Sequences and Limit Points task, from a list of homework tasks for his students. Dr. B’s
belief in the statement was possibly developed on a previous attempt at the problem.
The moment a truth conviction is attained is related to Raman and colleagues’
(2009) characterization of moments when provers identify a key idea or conceptual
insight (Sandefur et al., 2012). A conceptual insight is an idea that gives a sense as to
why the statement is likely to be true. Therefore, the truth conviction is not the
conceptual insight, but the warrant that engendered the truth conviction could be, if the
participant was able to express what it was that convinced him as sometimes the sense
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that a participant achieves could be vague and require more explorations to articulate it
(Mason et al., 1982/2010).
When participants’ moments of truth conviction were supported by deductive
warrants, the ideas that gave a sense of personal truth conviction were the same as those
that gave a sense that one could write a proof. In tasks where the truth conviction was
supported by ideas other than non-deductive warrants, the participants deemed that there
was still work to be done before they could write down a proof. The feeling of being able
to write down a proof accompanied the participants’ development of a deductive warrant
or a syntactic connection. In one case, Dr. C stated he could write a proof after proposing
a backing that “the inverse of an increasing function was increasing”; however, he was
not able to write a proof when he tried and needed to go back to continue exploring. The
formulation of these deductive warrants is further discussed in a later section.
Raman and colleagues (2009) term the idea that gives a sense that one can write a
proof as a technical handle. Technical handles are the “ways of manipulating or making
use of the structural relations that support the conversion of a CI [conceptual insight] into
acceptable proofs” (Sandefur et al., 2012, p. 6). Raman and others allow for the
conceptual insight that convinced the prover to be a different conceptual insight from the
one rendered into a technical handle. I will later discuss how the findings of this study in
regards to the evolution of the personal argument and the process of developing ideas that
move the argument forward relate to the conceptual insight and technical handle
constructs.
Truth convictions and feelings that one was ready to write a proof were
monitoring ideas unique to problem solving in proof construction tasks. Feelings that one
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was engaged in an unfruitful line of inquiry or that the results supported the current line
of inquiry were related to the metacognitive behaviors deemed necessary for success in
problem solving (e.g., Carlson & Bloom, 2005; Pólya, 1945/1957; Schoenfeld, 1985,
1992). Carlson and Bloom (2005) defined acts of monitoring as “the mental actions
involved in reflecting on the effectiveness of the problem-solving process and products”
(p. 48). They found that in solving problems mathematicians would “engage in
metacognitive behaviors” and “act on their monitoring in ways that moved them
forward.” Carlson and Bloom defined the actions or decisions made in response to the
monitoring behaviors as control decisions and self-regulation. The identification of
unfruitful lines of inquiry or support for a line of inquiry always accompanied a decision
to either abandon the line of thought or to keep pursuing it. Certainly monitoring actions
in the sense of Carlson and Bloom were present throughout the inquiry process as
monitoring is reflective of the ongoing reflecting and evaluating behaviors present in
active-productive inquiry. Ideas that move the argument forward that involved
monitoring were decisions or determinations made upon evaluating performed actions
against the problem one had entered into solving and the current personal argument.
Process of Developing Ideas
I observed that participants would proceed through the solving of the problem or
tasks of (a) understanding the statement or determining truth, (b) looking for a warrant,
(c) working to validate, generalize, justify, or articulate their warrant, and (d) writing the
formal proof (see Figure 26). Within this progression, participants could cycle back to a
previous problem or work to solve the problem with an enacted tool. Generally
participants did not find writing the formal proof to be problematic once they had
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identified a generalizable warrant. Specifically, the following aspects have been
identified as part of the proof construction process: Understanding the statement or
described objects (Alcock, 2008; Alcock & Weber, 2010; Carlson & Bloom, 2005; Savic,
2013); determining the truth of the statement (Sandefur et al., 2012); determining why the
statement is true (Raman et al., 2009; Sandefur et al., 2012); translating ideas into
analytic language (Alcock & Inglis, 2008; Alcock & Weber, 2010; Weber & Alcock,
2004); and justifying a previous idea (Alcock, 2008; Alcock & Weber, 2010). This
research is unique in its specific efforts to identify the problems encountered as
participants develop new ideas in the proof construction process at different stages.

Figure 26. Progression of problems as the personal argument evolves.
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Dewey’s (1938) framework of logical inquiry was useful in describing the process
of generating and testing ideas that moved the argument forward. Participants entered the
task focused on the problem of understanding the statement or determining the truth of
the statement. They reflected upon what was known, formed connections among the
information given in the statement of the task as well as their prior knowledge and
experience, and generated new ideas. The act of forming connections would involve
drawing pictures, imagining pictures, or connecting definitions. The initial ideas
formulated were ideas that informed the statement image, ideas about task type, truth
proposals or truth convictions based on structural-intuitive warrants.
Depending on whether the idea formulated solved the problem of understanding
the statement or determining truth, the participant would either continue working to
understand the situation or they would move to either look for a connection (warrant)
between the data and claim or work to generalize or deductively justify their structuralintuitive warrants. To look for a warrant, participants would again perform or imagine
actions of drawing and working through examples, performing symbolic manipulations,
connecting and permuting the definitions and data statements, and drawing upon
alternative instantiations of definitions of concepts and conceptual knowledge. They
would perform these actions until they had completed an action, formulated a new idea,
or determined that they were engaged in an unfruitful line of inquiry. If no idea was
found, participants would either perform more actions of the same type or would reflect
upon earlier generated relationships, pictures, and statement in the personal argument and
make a change. If a new idea was generated when solving the problem of understanding

232
the statement, it was either a proposed warrant, an additional datum to inform the
statement image, an envisioned proof path, or an identified as necessary condition.
The participants would evaluate the statements and relationships developed in
their personal argument in light of the new ideas generated, their own conceptual
knowledge, and experience. In this evaluation, they would determine if they needed to
continue pursuing a warrant and given the new information how they would do so, or
they would move on to test the warrant by trying to translate it into a general algebraic
form (if it was structural-intuitive or inductive) or to determine why the warrant had to
hold (if it was non-deductive). If a participant had developed deductive warrants to
connect the conditions of the statement to the claim of the statement, then they moved to
write up the proof formally.
The observation that ideas emerged as a result of engaging in genuine inquiry was
based on Dewey’s (1938) and others’ descriptions of the theory of inquiry (Hickman,
1990). As was described in Chapter III, knowledge is the outcome of active, productive
inquiry (Hickman, 1990). When engaged in the intentional process to resolve doubtful
situations, an individual intentionally and systematically invents, develops and deploys
tools (Hickman, 2011). The ideas that moved the argument forward were the tools
developed and deployed to resolve the perceived to be problematic situations within their
efforts to construct a mathematical proof.
The ideas were generated based on evaluations of the results of performing
actions or applying tools to a situation. Carlson and Bloom (2005), drawing upon the
work of Pólya (1945/1957) and Schoenfeld (1985, 1992), called these evaluations
“strategic control decisions” (p. 64). In their multi-dimensional problem solving
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framework, Carlson and Bloom formulated a problem solving cycle similar to Dewey’s
(1938) cycle of reflecting, acting, and evaluating where participants orient to a task, then
cycle through planning, executing, and checking actions. The three-part cycle could be
repeated to resolve a given issue prior to the participants’ cycling forward to repeat the
three-part cycle to resolve the next issue. Savic (2013) observed that for mathematicians,
the proof construction process was consistent with the multi-dimensional problem solving
framework with the exception of participants “cycling back to orienting” and not
completing a full planning-executing-checking cycle. The findings of this research
support the work of Carlson and Bloom and build upon it by describing the ideas
generated while engaged in the process.
Utilized tools. The types of tools deployed that contributed to the generation of
ideas (see Table 41) have previously been identified as useful in the proof construction
process. What I note here are the salient themes about how the tool-use contributed to
the generation of the ideas that moved the argument forward, relating the findings to what
has been noted in the literature. These themes included the utility of examples, the
connecting and permuting of data statements, and the usefulness of perceived to be
useless tools. Additionally, I comment on how the mathematicians made deft choices in
the tools they did deploy that could only be explained by their vast experience.
In this study, example-use contributed to the formulation of inductive warrants,
structural-intuitive warrants, ideas that informed the statement image, and in one case an
envisioned proof path. At times, the inductive and structural-intuitive warrants
developed due to the exploration of examples were enough to generate a truth proposal or
truth conviction. Dr. B was the only individual to employ examples with the purpose of

234
understanding the statement or objects involved with the statement and the purpose of
articulating his thinking. These findings support the work of a number of researchers
who have suggested and documented that example use can inform conjectures as to
whether a statement is true or not (e.g., Harel & Sowder 1998; Lockwood, Ellis, Knuth,
Dogan, & Willliams, 2013) as well as give insights into how to construct a proof (e.g.,
Lockwood et al., 2013; Sandefur et al., 2012; Watson & Mason, 2005). This work adds
to previous findings in further documenting how these ideas informed by examples are
tested and connected with other ideas within the personal argument and how they
contribute to the evolution of an argument into a formal proof.
Lockwood and colleagues (Lockwood et al., 2012) give a comprehensive
framework for describing mathematicians’ example activity when exploring and proving
conjectures. The framework includes the types of examples explored, uses of examples,
and strategies mathematicians employ when using examples. Both Dr. B and Dr. C
utilized examples with the purpose of understanding why the statement would be true to
get insight into proving and to validate, justify, or test a previous idea. The only example
generated by Dr. A was a counterexample successfully utilized to disprove a statement.
Examples were utilized in various ways including using a picture in conjunction with
generic symbolic explorations, exploring while constructing the picture, and using the
picture of a specific case to determine the underlying structure of the situation.
Dr. A’s non-proclivity to example-use could be explained by the specific tasks on
which he worked as opposed to the tasks that Dr. B and Dr. C completed. Two of his
tasks, the extended MVT and the Lagrange Remainder Theorem task, involved the
equating of symbolic expressions. Dr. A was able to propose and justify symbolic
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manipulations to connect the two expressions. The additive implies continuous task
involved a type of function that could be difficult to visualize or represent in a picture.
Dr. A pictured straight lines as a special case and utilized them to make progress but
knew that “weird things” could happen.
As documented by other researchers (Alcock & Weber, 2010; Lockwood et al.,
2013), successful utilization of examples in proof construction did not occur without
drawing upon other sources of knowledge. The tools of conceptual knowledge,
understandings rich with instantiations of concepts and definitions, and the connecting
and permuting of known statements not only informed the construction and exploration
of examples; they supported the development of ideas from every type. Carlson and
Bloom (2005) documented that these heuristics and resources were used and distinctions
between how they were used in each of the problem-solving phases.
In some instances of the current study, a participant would deem a tool to be
unhelpful in its original purpose. However, its deployment and exploration resulted in
added pictures, equations, or insights that contributed to the formulation of new ideas to
move the argument forward. I explain this occurrence within the perspective of the
theory of inquiry. The participant evaluated a line of inquiry to be unfruitful in solving
the perceived problem. This evaluation ended the cycle; the participant, then needed to
step back and reflect again on the situation and determine which problem to enter into
next. Either in pursuit of solving the same problem or a newly entered problem, the
participant would need to once again reflect on the situation (the personal argument and
the statement image that encompasses it) and imagine how to connect aspects of the
statement image together to apply to the problem. The previously deployed tool resulted
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in new data which alone did not achieve the original purpose. However, connecting the
data to other ideas or reflecting on the data for a new purpose could result in new
proposed actions to solve a problem. This reflecting again is reminiscent of Mason and
colleagues’ (1982/2010) advice to learners that going back to the “Entry” phase (or
reflecting) aspect after working on the problem and getting stuck may enable greater
understanding of the situation due to achieving more relevant experience.
Certainly, the decisions made by the mathematicians were influenced by their rich
experience and knowledge bases. Alcock and Weber (2010) noted student struggles with
choosing demonstrative examples to aid in their proving. The mathematicians deftly
chose examples informed by the imagined consequences they could evoke. For instance,
when choosing an example to test if the function he proposed to be a counterexample
fulfilled the additive property (𝑓(𝑥 + 𝑦) = 𝑓(𝑥) + 𝑓(𝑦)), Dr. C chose values of x and y

to be irrational but to have a rational sum not equal to zero because Dr. C had developed
the function to be continuous at zero and continuous on a domain restricted to rational
numbers but discontinuous on the real numbers. Lockwood et al. (2013) also found that
mathematicians’ choices of examples were informed by knowledge and experience.
Experience contributed to the participants’ flexible and rich understandings of relevant
definitions. On the additive implied continuous task, both Dr. A and Dr. C utilized an
instantiation of the definition of continuity that would capitalize on the additive property
of the function. Dr. C knew that showing lim𝑡→𝑥 𝑓(𝑡) = 𝑓(𝑥) would be equivalent to

lim𝜀→0 𝑓(𝑡 + 𝜀) = 𝑓(𝑡). This instantiation of the definition proved critical and useful to

their generation of ideas and Dr. C’s eventual proving of the statement. Individuals who
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were novice in real analysis could encounter struggles with these tasks that the
mathematicians in this study did not.
The role of affect and context. Although not overwhelmingly present in the
data, participants’ affect and perceptions about the context of the study played a role in
the decisions made. Schoenfeld (1985, 1992) described how an individual’s
mathematical belief system including what mathematics is and one’s role in mathematics
will contribute to their choices in whether or not they will enter or persevere in a
problem. A student problem solver may, due to an affective belief about one’s ability,
may choose not to enter a problem. The mathematicians in this study displayed affective
beliefs that they could solve the problems encountered knowing that if something they
tried did not work, then they could always try something else. Largely, the
mathematicians’ decisions based on affect were appropriate. However, there were times,
though, where even for mathematicians, frustration and exhaustion contributed to the
participants deciding to discontinue work on a task without completion or, in one
instance, writing and accepting an argument that was not mathematically valid without
checking it.
As detailed in Chapter III, Dewey’s (1938) theory of inquiry posits that decisions
made depend on how one perceives the situation and the resources available. The
mathematicians in this study held perceptions about how much time they should be
spending on problems, that the knowledge required to solve the tasks would be from the
realm of real analysis, and what theorems they were allowed to (and should) assume and
which ones they would need to prove. These perceptions affected the decisions that they
made. For example, even though Dr. A initially thought there could be a counterexample
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to the additive implies continuous task, he moved to try to prove the statement true based
on his perception that generating a counterexample would involve skills and difficulty
inappropriate for the tasks encountered in the interview. The participants’ sometimes
utilized their observations about the interview context to their advantage. On the
extended MVT task, both Dr. B and Dr. A determined that if a theorem was given, then it
would be utilized in some way in the proof. It may be that experience in mathematical
problem solving especially in solving “homework-type” problems has attuned the
participants to account for conditions on the situation beyond what is outlined in the task
statement.
Inquiry with no ideas. As described in Chapter IV, Dr. B worked on the
Extended MVT for Integrals task but achieved no insights into how to prove it beyond a
feeling that it would involve some set of symbolic manipulations. In working on that
task, the participant displayed the reflective and evaluative nature of active productive
inquiry, identifying a target goal based on observations about the situation, proposing and
enacting tools, and evaluating their effectiveness. Dr. B engaged in inquiry but yielded
no results. It is difficult to say why Dr. B achieved no success, but Dr. A did achieve
success utilizing the same overall strategy of finding a symbolic manipulation to connect
expressions. As a reminder to the reader, the task as given to Dr. B is restated below.
Given: Theorem1- MVT for Integrals: If f and g are both continuous on [a,b] and
𝑎
𝑔(𝑡) ≥ 0 for all t in [a,b], then there exists a c in (a,b) such that∫𝑏 𝑓(𝑡)𝑔(𝑡)𝑑𝑑 =
𝑏

𝑓(𝑐) ∫𝑎 𝑔(𝑡)𝑑𝑑.

Prove: Theorem 2 – Extended MVT for Integrals: Suppose that g is continuous on
[a,b], 𝑔′(𝑡) exists for every t in [a,b], and 𝑔(𝑎) = 0. If f is a continuous function
on [a,b] that does not change sign at any point of (a,b), then there exists a d in
𝑏
𝑏
(a,b) such that ∫𝑎 𝑔(𝑡)𝑓(𝑡)𝑑𝑑 = 𝑔′(𝑑) ∫𝑎 (𝑡 − 𝑎)𝑓(𝑡)𝑑𝑑.
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I looked to the literature for an explanation. Schoenfeld (1992) said the following
will help us analyze one’s success or failure in problem solving: the individual’s
knowledge, use of heuristic strategies, behaviors of monitoring and control, and belief
systems. Dr. B had a sufficient knowledge base as the task only required one to utilize
the given First MVT for Integrals in combination with knowledge from undergraduate
real analysis. Dr. B deployed a number of heuristic strategies including listing what was
known and applying symbolic manipulations that he knew to typically be useful in
integral problems (like integrating by parts and substituting with a limit definition). As a
mathematician, we could expect that his beliefs about mathematics would be conducive
to success in problem solving.
This leaves his monitoring and control, or the ability to recognize that the
participant was headed down an unproductive path. Comparing Dr. A’s work on the task
to Dr. B’s, both participants worked to symbolically connect the statements. Dr. A’s
focus was on making the left hand side of the equation to be proven to look like the right
hand side anticipating that some application of the given first MVT would be used. Dr.
B, on the other hand, seemed to focus on relating the two theorems, directly, letting the
two functions, f and g, in the first MVT for integrals be the same as the two functions, f
and g, in the extended MVT for integrals allowing for possibly swapping their names.
This way of thinking pervaded even the participant’s work with examples as Dr. B used
the same example functions when exploring the first MVT as he did on the extended
MVT. Dr. B did not recognize his pursuit as non-productive despite engaging in
monitoring or evaluative behavior. In order to move his students into better habits of
monitoring and control, Schoenfeld (1985) had his students work in groups, and Dewey
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(1938) posits that tools and the standards against which tools are evaluated are products
of the social context. Dr. B was working in isolation. It may be that Dr. B needed to
discuss this problem with another in order to illuminate that his way of thinking about the
two theorems would be unproductive.
Non-inquirential tool use. Participants also engaged in periods where they were
completing parts of the task without perceiving a problematic situation. This occurred
upon participants’ development of a deductive warrant when they moved to write the
argument formally. Selden and Selden (2013) described this aspect of the proof
construction process as the formal-rhetorical part; they indicate that no real problem
solving is needed when completing this part of the proof construction. Indeed once
participants had developed a general algebraic argument, writing the argument formally
posed no problem. However, this disengagement from the reflective and evaluative
nature of inquiry resulted in errors without recognition. Schoenfeld (1992) would term
this acting without “control”. The first two sub-sections of the major findings provided
answers to the first research question outlining the ideas that moved the argument
forward and the context surrounding the formulation of the ideas. The next section
answers the final research question: How were the ideas used and tested as the personal
argument progressed to a routine situation?
The Uses and Testing of Ideas
This study was not the first to utilize Toulmin models to document changes in
one’s argument (Pedemonte, 2007; Zazkis, Weber, & Mejia-Ramos, 2015). However, it
is the one of few to pay special attention to the types of backing involved which has
afforded the classification of warrants. This classification of warrants has given some
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insight into describing how the personal argument can evolve from the informal to the
formal; however the development of warrants was not the only structural change
informative in this study. Utilizing Toulmin diagrams in conjunction with the conception
of the personal argument enabled the identification of the trends of changing or deleting
claims, purposing data statements into warrants or backing, and changes to the overall
structure of the claim by adding sub-claims or reorganizing the format of the argument.
These structural changes informed the discernment of idea-types and idea categories and
how those ideas are used to move the argument forward. In an effort to answer the
research questions about how ideas were used and tested as the personal argument
evolved, I discuss the aforementioned observed structural shifts, but first I provide the
general overview of how the ideas from each category were used in the development of
the personal argument.
Participants generated ideas that moved the argument forward from each of the
three idea categories of Focusing and Configuring, Connecting and Justifying, and
Monitoring on every task. The ideas were tested and used together as the personal
argument evolved toward a final proof product. The focusing and configuring ideas
informed both the data and claim statements as well as the overall structure of the
argument in that the integration of some ideas from this category gave the
mathematicians insight to what sub-claims they would need to justify and into what
logical form to articulate the argument (proof by contradiction, by cases, and so forth).
Figure 27 demonstrates how Dr. A’s idea of an envisioned proof path on the additive
implies continuous task based on his statement that showing the function was continuous
at zero would be continuous informed the structure and provided a new claim statement.
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“How do I
show that?”
F(x+y)= f(x)+ f(y);
f(0)=0; getting a
counterexample
requires going
outside analysis; if
y is really small,
then f(y) must be

F is continuous at
0

F is continuous

“two or three
lines”

If y is really small then
f(y) must be really
small

Figure 27. Demonstration of how adding an idea that focuses and configures (envisioned
proof path) informs structure.

The Connecting and Justifying ideas included four types of warrants discerned by
their coupled backing and proposed backings. These warrant ideas provided the
connections hypothesized as needed from the focusing and configuring ideas.
Monitoring ideas would determine if the warrant was acceptable (translatable into a
formal deductive argument) or if it needed more exploration in order to validate,
generalize or justify the warrant. The work to test the idea sometimes resulted in new
warrants, new backing, or new focusing and configuring ideas. In light of these new
insights, monitoring ideas along with the structural decisions made from the planning
ideas would contribute to how the participant would proceed. Ideas were tested in this
manner until participants successfully developed a (perceived to be) deductive warrant or
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chain of deductive warrants to connect the data to the claim. These processes led into the
routine writing down of the final formal proof.
Moving non-deductive arguments into deductive ones. The process of
utilizing and moving an argument toward a final proof that originally was based on a
non-deductive warrant was demonstrated by all three participants on at least one task
each. The framing of their efforts in terms of the evolving personal argument described
via Toulmin models within Dewey’s theory of inquiry provides some insight into
answering the mathematics education research community’s questions to how and if
informal arguments can be converted into an acceptable proof form.
As detailed in Chapter IV, Dr. A moved an argument based on syntactic
connections into a deductive proof by first making the symbolic connections and then
going back to check if each step could proceed logically. Weber and Alcock (2004)
described process of constructing a proof within the representation system of proof
(syntactically) as involving choosing a proof framework, listing assumptions, deriving
new assertions by applying established theorems and rules of inference, and continuing
until reaching the appropriate conclusion. Dr. A’s production demonstrates a different
pattern specific to syntactic proof productions involving the equating of symbolic
expressions. The syntactic connections acted as an in-between tool establishing a path
between hypothesis and conclusion whose reasonableness would need to be backed
deductively. Dr. A’s practice of working to make the symbols look “nice” and then
going back to check the manipulations’ mathematical integrity seems to be a reasonable
practice.
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This study teased out this particular instance of a syntactic connection which
differed from the process described by Weber and Alcock (2004); however, it could be
viewed under the recent study conducted by Zazkis and colleagues (2015). Zazkis et al.
found that students who successfully translated informal into formal arguments either (a)
attempted to translate the argument into the representation system of proof which they
termed “syntactifying,” (b) tried to find a deductive reason for a claim that their informal
argument justified termed “rewarranting,” or (c) attempted to add more detail to the proof
which they called “elaborating”. Dr. A engaged in elaborating when moving his
argument based on syntactic connections into a deductive proof.
Using the language of Zazkis and colleagues (2015), on the own inverse task, it
appeared that Dr. B and Dr. C attempted syntactifying but were unsuccessful and
proceeded to inquire until they could rewarrant. Dr. B was first convinced of the truth of
the Own Inverse task by a structural-intuitive warrant. Testing that warrant empirically,
the participant gained new insights and a new warrant. Dr. B tested that second warrant
and found that his way of picturing the function was inaccurate. Reflecting again on the
situation in light of all he had done previously, Dr. B identified that he was not utilizing
the full implications of the given data statement that the function was its own inverse.
The missing implication was one Dr. B could symbolize and did so. The participant
proposed that this implication would underlie any successful warrant (contradiction).
The new proposed backing informed further exploration where Dr. B developed a new
warrant that he was able to render into a symbolic form. On the same task, Dr. C also
developed warrants based on inductive and structural-intuitive backing, worked to test
them, and was unable to render them into a symbolic form. When reassessing, Dr. C
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identified an implication of the function being its own inverse that he thought would be
the underlying reason for any warrant (contradiction). Dr. C, like Dr. B, was able to
articulate that implication symbolically. Exploring with symbolic statements, Dr. C was
able to produce a contradiction or warrant finally used in the final argument.
The summarized processes of Dr. B and Dr. C seem almost identical through the
lens of Zazkis et al.’s (2015) framing; however, their non-deductive warrants prior to
their final arguments were not the same. They drew very different pictures, and explored
justifying their warrants in different ways. Dr. B realized that he should be using the
implication of the function being its own inverse of 𝑓(𝑓(𝑥)) = 𝑥 implying both (x, f(x))
and (f(x), x) would be points on the same line and that would underlie his contradiction.

Dr. C, on the other hand, identified the implication involving how reflecting over the line
would move points above the line to below the line as being the key. This underlying
quality of the property of a function being its own inverse that the participants found
translatable into a symbolic form is reminiscent of the key idea as it was first described
by Raman in 2003. This key idea (not to be confused with the key idea that was later
renamed as conceptual insight (Raman et al., 2009; Sandefur et al., 2012) is a “heuristic
idea which one can map to a formal proof with appropriate sense of rigor”. A faculty
member in Raman’s study called the idea that she categorized as a key idea, was the
“only one thing” about the situation that provided both an explanation for why the claim
was true and was translatable into formulas that could demonstrate that the claim was
true.
Prof A: Let’s see, an even function. There is only one thing about it, and that is
its graph is reflected across the axis. Yeah, and you can be quite convinced that it
is true by looking at the picture. If you said enough words about the picture,
you’d have a proof. (Raman, 2003, p. 323)
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Raman (2003) did not necessarily implement Toulmin’s framework so did not
classify whether key ideas would serve as warrants or backing in an argument, but I
contend that the idea articulated by the faculty member in her study, that the function is
reflected across the axis, would act as a backing in a final argument because it does not
directly connect data and claim for the task which was proving that the derivative of an
even function is odd. The ability to identify that one thing about a given condition that
one could informally see as explaining why the statement would be true seems to be a
non-trivial task based on the number of researchers who have wondered about the process
of converting informal arguments into an acceptable mathematical form (e.g., Boero et
al., 1996; Pedemonte, 2007; Raman et al., 2009; Sandefur et al., 2012 Selden & Selden,
2013; Zazkis et al., 2015).
As previously mentioned, in her later work, Raman, in conjunction with
colleagues (2009), conceived of the constructs of conceptual insight (which was
sometimes also called key idea) and technical handle. A conceptual insight gives a sense
of why the statement is true (a truth conviction), and more than one conceptual insight
can be attained in proving a given claim. A technical handle is an idea that renders a
conceptual insight into a symbolic mathematical form (a feeling that one could write a
proof). Sandefur and colleagues (2012) have given some insight into how exploring
examples can potentially facilitate students’ development of conceptual insights and
technical handles, but the literature as of now has not been able to move beyond those
descriptions.
The conceptual insight and technical handle constructs seem to be difficult to
utilize in research practice. As seen in this study, moments of truth conviction and
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feelings that one can write down a proof can occur at the same moment, and feelings of
truth conviction may not be observed. Between articulating a truth conviction and a
feeling that they could write down a proof, participants in this study were sometimes seen
to move through multiple warrants, some not always generalizable or valid. If
researchers were to try to identify the conceptual insights and technical handles in a given
proof construction, would they identify all the proposed warrants as conceptual insights
and the means of translating one of those insights into a deductive warrant as the
technical handle? Or are warrants that cannot be translatable into a symbolic form
merely heuristic ideas (ideas that give personal conviction; Raman, 2003) and conceptual
insights are the warrants that an outsider could perceive as having potential to be
symbolically represented? Despite the difficulty utilizing the constructs when describing
process, the constructs of conceptual insight and technical handle have afforded
researchers language to speak about ideas that could move an individual’s proof
construction forward and provided the inspiration for this study.
Another vein of research regarding the movement of informal argumentation into
deductive proof regards cognitive unity which describes a situation where arguments
developed while evaluating or producing conjectures are translated into a mathematical
proof (Garuti, Boero, Lemut, & Mariotti, 1996). Of particular interest are the instances
where the initial arguments developed were based on reasoning outside the representation
system of proof. For this study, that would be truth convictions or truth proposals based
on structural-intuitive or inductive warrants. Researchers have contemplated the
conditions for and the obstacles to cognitive unity (Bubp, 2015; Pedemonte; 2007) noting
the ways of reasoning (deductively or abductively) when first formulating conjectures
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influencing whether or not cognitive unity occurred. Only one participant in this study
demonstrated cognitive unity for those cases of interest; Dr. A initially had an intuition
and memory that there was a possible counterexample to the additive implies continuous
task that involved the axiom of choice and eventually produced one. This study suggests
that cognitive unity can only occur when the prover happens to be first convinced by
arguments that are completely generalizable and translatable into symbolic notation
which may dissuade those teaching mathematical proof from trying to evoke this
practice. On a brighter note, this study shows that one can begin with a non-deductive
warrant, continue to reason outside the representation system of proof, and eventually
develop a non-deductive warrant or propose a backing that could support a symbolic
deductive argument.
Implications for Research and Teaching
In this section, I discuss the implications of these results for research and for
teaching. I argue for the continued use of full Toulmin models to document the evolving
argument and for attending to the ideas that the individual finds useful in moving the
argument forward. More research is needed in order for these results to inform teaching
practices, but I consider some preliminary implications including recommendations for
teaching problem-solving within introduction to proof courses and engaging students in
testing their arguments.
Value of the Full Toulmin Model
Mathematics education researchers have worked to analyze the mathematical
arguments of individuals using a restricted, ternary form of Toulmin’s (2003)
argumentation scheme, limiting to data, warrant, and claim (e.g. Krummheurer,1995;
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Pedemonte, 2007; Zazkis et al., 2015). I argue that in order to understand an individual’s
argument prior to the articulation of a formal proof and therefore their process in
constructing a mathematical proof, the constructs of backing, modal qualifier, and
rebuttal need to be included to capture the whole proof construction process. Inglis et al.
(2007) also argued this point focusing on the importance of qualifiers; Inglis and
colleagues found that the qualifier would signal if the mathematics graduates in their
studies were using a non-deductive or deductive warrant.
Authors have dismissed the need for the full model indicating that in
mathematical proofs the qualifier is implied as absolute and that a mathematical proof
would have no rebuttals. Work in the restricted model tends to try to incorporate the
backing into the warrant or assume the warrant is based on deductive reasoning.
Considering Dr. B’s idea on the own inverse task that he could see from the picture that if
a function was one-to-one, continuous, onto, its own inverse, and increasing, then it
would have to be f(x)=x, otherwise it would not be one-to-one. “I have this nice picture.
And on my picture I know, I can see that if I reflect this type of function, it’s not going to
be one-to-one.” Restricting to the ternary model would reduce the full statement to the
diagram on the left side of Figure 28. Incorporating the modal qualifier and backing in
the diagram to the right of Figure 28 provides the details about Dr. B’s personal argument
and its progression.
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“I can
see”

A function is
bijective, continuous,
its own inverse and
increasing

The function is
f(x)=x

Otherwise, it would not be
one-to-one because of
reflection across the line y=x

A function is
bijective, continuous,
its own inverse and
increasing

The function is
f(x)=x

Otherwise, it would not be
one-to-one because of
reflection across the line y=x

This nice picture

Figure 28. Discernment of Dr. B’s argument structure in the ternary versus full Toulmin
model.

In addition to providing more information and a better model of the prover’s
thinking, the full model has explanatory power in that it gave a reason why Dr. B was not
able to render this particular argument into an algebraic form. The proposed
contradiction that the function would fail to be one-to-one due to reflection is a
contradiction that could prove the statement. However, Dr. B’s formulation of this
contradiction was based on a picture that was not completely general in that it did not
capture why the function would always fail to be one-to-one due to its symmetry across
the line y=x. Recognizing this, Dr. B abandoned the picture and the one-to-one
contradiction and continued on a different path. My understanding of why Dr. B
abandoned the one-to-one idea was supported by my specific endeavors to include
attention to the backing and qualifiers. I am not suggesting that researchers using the
ternary model would ignore or overlook the fact that Dr. B’s warrant was based on an
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example, but if researchers were looking for patterns across large numbers of Toulmin
structures, the inclusion of the backing and qualifier could illuminate more patterns
explaining the participants’ decisions and thinking at various moments while constructing
proof.
Related to the recommendation that researchers utilize the full Toulmin model is
the recommendation of utilizing language to describe the types of warrants developed. I
found adapting Inglis et al.’s (2007) classification of warrant-types to be useful in
describing the insights formulated by the participants, how those ideas were tested as the
personal arguments evolved, and why participants made the decisions that they did.
Earlier in this chapter, I proposed that attending to backing may lend itself to explaining
how the understandings based on informal reasoning can be successfully translated into a
mathematical proof.
Attending to Ideas that Move the
Personal Argument Forward
The invention of the personal argument construct was necessitated by the desire to
talk about all the ideas, relationships, concepts, pictures, and so forth that an individual
personally judges as important to solving the problem and the perceived relationships and
importance of those elements at various points in time. More specifically, it was
developed to test and elaborate the hypothesis that there are critical moments where the
nature of individual’s thinking shifts. Previous proof researchers have used Toulmin
models to describe arguments at various moments such as upon the articulation of a
conjecture (Inglis et al., 2007; Pedemonte, 2007; Zazkis et al., 2015), at interactive
moments within a classroom situation (Prusak, Hershkowitz, & Schwarz, 2012; Wawro,
2011), and upon writing a final proof (Pedemonte, 2007; Zazkis et al., 2015).
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Raman and colleagues (2009) have documented that students can come close to a
proof from an outsider’s (instructor’s or researcher’s) perspective but not recognize their
ideas as useful suggesting that the judgment of whether progress is made is subject to the
individual. When investigating an individual’s process in constructing mathematical
proof alone, we as researchers cannot anticipate all the moments and insights generated
that would be significant for the proof construction process. I argue that attending to the
moments when ideas are generated that the individual sees as useful breaks the proof
construction process into significant events all of which are needed to illustrate the story
of the process.
Further Research into the
Development and Testing
of Ideas
Conceiving of the ideas that move the argument forward as a means of describing
the proof construction process is relatively unexplored. Therefore, many avenues of
research are open to explore how these ideas develop, how they are tested, and the
consequences their development provides for the evolution of the argument. The
findings of this study were descriptive and exploratory. Within the realm of these tasks,
in the field of real analysis, I found 15 idea-types falling into three major categories
according to their function within the conception of the structure of a personal argument.
The process of developing and testing these ideas was interpreted within Dewey’s theory
of inquiry and described in the findings in prior sections.
This research gave descriptive accounts of the tools deemed useful and the
purposes and anticipations of the deployment of these tools. Among these tools were
conceptual knowledge, rich instantiations of concepts and definitions, the connecting and
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permuting of known ideas, and the use of examples. Further research into how
participants specifically utilized one of these types of tools in developing ideas would
provide further insight into the proof construction process. Utilizing a comprehensive
framework like Lockwood and colleagues’ (2012) categorization of types of examples,
uses of examples, and example-related strategies would provide both insight into how
ideas evolve but also contribute to the example-use literature. This research would be
especially useful if one continued to explore content areas such as real analysis since
many studies involving the example-use of mathematicians focus on tasks related to
number theory.
Dewey’s (1938) theory of inquiry was useful in describing the problem-solving
context surrounding the emergence of these ideas. However, other cognitive frameworks
may provide more information. For example, instead of describing the problem situation
and application of tools surrounding the emergence of ideas, one may be interested in
how individuals recognize what knowledge they already possess would be useful and
how that contributed to the creation of new ideas. In which case, theories of transfer may
be appropriate.
Other variations of studies would include work trying to refine the idea-types or
further characterize their development by focusing specifically on one of the idea
categories of Focusing and Configuring ideas, Connecting and Justifying ideas, or
Monitoring ideas. Varying across mathematical content areas may yield new and
clarifying findings to what ideas are useful, how they’re developed, and how they are
tested, as well as providing insight as to how the proof construction process compares
across mathematical content.
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Implications for Teaching
Better understanding the practice of professional mathematicians can inform
mathematics educators in determining the activities in which students should engage and
in making recommendations for goals for student learning. However, precisely how to
teach and facilitate the development of these practices and the achievement of these
learning goals requires knowing where students start in relation to those goals and what
kinds of activities facilitate their progression toward those goals. In the context of the
development and utilization of ideas that move the personal argument forward, we know
that when constructing proof students struggle in effectively utilizing tools to develop
useful ideas (e.g., Alcock & Weber, 2010), may generate new statements or relationships
but not recognize their usefulness in moving the argument forward (e.g., Raman et al.,
2009), or may utilize ideas in ways not appropriate for the mathematics community (e.g.,
Harel & Sowder, 1998). More research is needed to recommend best practices for
actively facilitating students’ abilities to develop, recognize, and utilize the ideas that
they can see as useful in moving their arguments toward a mathematical proof. However,
I present some preliminary suggestions from this study. .
As found by Carlson and Bloom (2005) in their study of mathematicians engaged
in problem solving, I found rich conceptual knowledge greatly influenced the
participants’ generation of ideas to move the argument forward. There is disagreement
amongst those educating mathematics undergraduate students as to whether or not
mathematical content should be taught in conjunction with an introduction to proof or if
transition to proof courses should only involve content in which all students have
workable understandings. Policy documents regarding best practices in mathematics
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education (CCSM, NCTM) contend that the development of the practice of
argumentation should be present in all mathematics classes. Therefore despite where
students first learn about proof; instructors of advanced mathematics undergraduate
courses should continue to devote some instructional time to developing student capacity
to construct proofs. This would not be time wasted as engaging in argumentation can
reciprocally facilitate the development of richer conceptual understanding (Harel &
Sowder, 2007).
The design of this study was based on the perspective that the formulation and
subsequent application of ideas to move an argument forward were acts of creativity that
could only emerge from experiencing periods of ambiguity. As such, we cannot expect
students to develop the propensity formulate and utilize ideas unless we provide proof
construction activities that involve their entering into genuinely problematic situations in
the sense of Schoenfeld (1985). Selden and Selden (2008, 2013) assert that mathematical
proof has a problem-centered part (the solving of the problem of getting to the given
hypothesis to the conclusion) and formal-rhetorical part (unpacking the logical statements
and definitions and converting a solution into an acceptable mathematical form), and for
students, problem solving can occur in both realms. I suggest that students should
experience problem solving in both aspects as the mathematicians in this study not only
generated ideas about how to connect the mathematical statements but also about how to
communicate their reasoning effectively.
This research suggested that there is value in continuing to teach heuristic
strategies for problem solving and proving such as identifying task type, unpacking the
logic of a given statement, listing what is known (broadening the statement image), and
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drawing pictures (to narrow the statement image). All these strategies were employed
more than once to result in perceived to be useful ideas. Specifically, they were deployed
when the mathematicians were working on the problems of understanding the statement
or objects and determining statement truth. Dr. A offered a lesser known heuristic when
encountering “prove or disprove” tasks of “being aBeysian”, that is being flexible in
moving back and forth between trying to prove or disprove a statement.
When teaching students about proving, it may be of value to attune students to the
possibilities of formulating some of the idea-types found in this study so they can
hypothesize roles for the ideas that they generate and make evaluations about how to
proceed. Having students attend to feelings of personal truth conviction versus feelings
of being able to write a proof may require ongoing enculturation of students into the
sociomathematical norms of the mathematics community. However, this study suggests
attending to and utilizing the reasoning that convinced them of the truth of a statement
can be a starting point for finding a warrant that can move the argument forward.
The mathematicians in this study envisioned proof paths and identified necessary
conditions while engaging in the task. They also recognized when to purpose elements in
their collection of known statements. These ideas necessitated the already explicitly
taught practices of reflecting and evaluating as well as attention to understanding the
relevant objects and definitions. Opening students to the potential of formulating these
ideas that the mathematicians did may provide purpose to the already taught strategies.
Previous literature supports having students engage in working in small groups to
solve problems (e.g., Schoenfeld, 1985, 1992) and developing argumentation through
classroom discourse and peer interaction (e.g., Prusak et al., 2012). Explicit further
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research is needed to understand how idea generation and testing patterns would play out
in the classroom situation as these findings are limited to an individual context.
Limitations
The findings of the study provided implications for both research and teaching;
however, there are limitations to how the findings can be interpreted. I note some of the
surprises in data collection and known limitations below including imprecise
formulations on two of the tasks that Dr. A worked on, the small sample size, the
delimited content area, and the inconsistencies with typical practice for professional
mathematicians.
While participants did choose rich tasks for their colleagues to work on, in two
cases, the participants provided imprecise formulations of the task statement. One of the
formulations of the Extended Mean Value Theorem Task provided by Dr. C did not
provide enough conditions for the statement to be true. Dr. B provided a formulation of
the additive implies continuous task that he said he knew to be true, but without a
necessary condition, the statement was actually false.
I did not identify the issue with the Extended Mean Value Theorem Task prior to
presenting the first participant with the task. This participant identified the issue and I
rectified the problem for the next participant to work on the task. The first participant
also identified that in order for the additive implies continuous statement to be true, the
function would also need to be continuous at zero. The participant also identified the
formulation of the counterexample would require going outside the realm of real analysis.
I decided to rewrite the task to include the necessary condition so that the statement
would be true.
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As a result of these initially imprecise formulations, participants worked on
slightly different versions for two of the three common tasks. Dr. A ended his proof of
the Extended Mean Value Theorem for Integrals with a possible rebuttal and not a proof
with which he was completely satisfied. Dr. A did eventually formulate a
counterexample to his version of the additive implies continuous task but deemed its
generation as involving ideas outside the realm of real analysis. Dr. A ended up
remembering how to construct the counterexample while on a long driving trip and later
wrote it up. This was the only task that had the potential to be correctly solved by a
counterexample, and its development was not captured. More research is needed to
describe the ideas that would move a personal argument forward when one was
developing a counterexample.
An unexpected outcome to the research design of how tasks were chosen and
given to participants was that one participant, Dr. A, did not engage in tasks conducive to
reasoning outside the formal representation system of proof. Two of the tasks that Dr. A
worked on could be solved by making symbolic connections among statements. On the
third task, Dr. A worked to both prove and disprove the statement. The work in proving
the statement supported by Dr. A’s imagining graphical instantiations of concepts and
definitions was largely deductive in nature. The interview and Livescribe notebook only
captured his memory of the potential of a counterexample and the writing of the formal
proof by counterexample. While not a primary focus of this study, the findings related to
converting argumentation based on inductive data into formal arguments were based on
only two of the participants.
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This study does not presume to generalize the findings beyond the context of the
interview situation. Since the sample was restricted to three male mathematicians, I
provide only descriptive answers to the research questions. I purposefully limited data
collection to one mathematical content area, real analysis, to ensure the participants in the
study would in fact be able to exhibit expertise not only in proving and problem solving
but in proving and problem solving within that realm. Therefore, it may be that themes
salient in this study may be less prevalent in other fields of mathematics.
The context of the interview situation provided limitations on the interpretation
and generalization of the findings. Working on tasks presented by an interviewer in front
of a camera, while speaking aloud, and in the time constraints provided are not
representative of a research mathematician’s typical practice. The tasks presented
genuine problem solving situations for the participants, but they were still “school tasks”.
As such, participants, informed by their training in school mathematics, brought in their
own conceptions about “hints” given by the statement formulation, what were reasonable
expectations for a solution, and what theorems they were allowed to assume and which
ones they would need to prove. The context was also limiting in that participants worked
in isolation. They did not interact with peers and limited utilization of written resources.
This is not normative practice for mathematicians or for students.
Further Research
Related to the implications for research noted above, I am interested in designing
further studies that utilize the findings of this research effort. Specifically, I wish to
continue pursuing how mathematicians develop, test, and reformulate their ideas that
Connect and Justify, and I would like to work with others to design teaching experiments
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where students are guided to move their understandings based on non-deductive warrants
into understandings that can be rendered into deductive mathematical proof.
The mathematicians sometimes formulated ideas about what “task type” they
were working on and chose either symbolic or informal modes of reasoning in
accordance with those judgments In this study, participants pursued or generated
syntactic connection warrant-types on two of the seven tasks and inductive warrants and
structural-intuitive warrants were found to be useful on multiple, but not all tasks. The
formulation of the Own Inverse task, in particular, lent itself to informal argumentations
that gave participants a personal sense of why the statement was true but proved
challenging to translate into deductive proof. Based on this observation, I hope to design
studies that narrow to certain task-types to further study the use and testing of inductive
warrants or syntactic connections and how they contribute to the development of a
deductive warrant and an eventual formal proof. As part of that research, I would like to
further investigate the structural shift where data statements are purposed into warrants or
backing as that was seen to be a critical moment for both Dr. A and Dr. C developing an
idea that could be translatable into a deductive warrant.
The findings of this research will be useful if eventually, they can inform the
teaching of students. It has long been described that a beginner prover struggles with
providing arguments based on deductive reasoning as they may find non-deductive
arguments to be more convincing and explanatory (e.g., Harel & Sowder, 1998; Healy &
Hoyles, 2000; Weber, 2010). More research is needed to lead to a design of a teaching
experiment where students are guided to move their non-deductive warrants into
deductive warrants that can be translated into a written proof. This would involve
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instruction where students would encounter a proof problem, formulate an understanding
or warrant that they personally find convincing and the teacher and students together test
to move students’ personal arguments based on non-deductive warrants.
Concluding Remarks
Informed by the writings of mathematicians and mathematics educators that the
construction of proof for mathematicians involves the formulation and utilization of ideas
this research aimed to provide descriptions of the ideas that mathematicians find useful in
moving their arguments forward. More specifically, this research proposed to describe
the context surrounding the formulation of those ideas and the subsequent consequences
of the incorporation of those ideas into the personal argument.
The utilization of Dewey’s (1938) theory of inquiry in conjunction with Toulmin
models to describe the progression of the personal argument provided descriptive
answers to how ideas are developed and tested and how they were utilized.
Mathematicians were found to develop ideas to inform their planning, ideas that served to
connect and justify statements, and ideas about their progress. Ideas formulated were
tested against their ability to solve the four major problems of understanding the
statement or determining truth, providing a warrant, justifying or generalizing a warrant,
and writing a final proof. Mathematicians deployed various tools do develop and test
ideas including conceptual knowledge, heuristics, exploring specific examples or
pictures, and utilizing heuristic strategies.
This work contributes to the proof literature by conceiving of and providing
empirical evidence of ideas that move the personal argument forward opening new
avenues for research into the process of constructing mathematical proof. Additionally, I
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describe instances of mathematicians moving their non-deductive arguments into a final
deductive proof and provide descriptions of the inquirential activity surrounding those
progressions. More research is needed to apply these findings to the introduction to proof
classroom, but preliminary suggestions are to engage students in proving activities that
present opportunities for problem solving, to continue the teaching of heuristic strategies,
and to define some possible purposes of these strategies such as looking for necessary
conditions and envisioning a proof path.
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Example Initial Contact Email/ Participation Request
Dear Dr. _______,
I obtained your name from your department as well as the fact that you are currently
teaching or have previously taught the course __________________.
As a doctoral candidate in the field of mathematics education, I am interested in
observing how expert mathematicians like you engage in the processes of solving
mathematical proof problems in the field of real analysis. As such, I would like to
conduct a series of 3 interviews with you to learn about how you construct proofs. Two
of the interviews will last thirty to sixty minutes, and one interview will take 90 minutes.
You will be asked to solve 3 proof problems all together; I will request that you think
aloud as you prove and then answer questions about your process after you have
completed the proving tasks.
If you are willing and available, we would appreciate your participation. Please let me
know if you have more questions.

APPENDIX B
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In the spring of 2012, I collaborated with a colleague, Jeffrey King (who will be
referred to as King in the rest of this chapter) to conduct task-based interviews with three
mathematicians. This data collection and the following analyses served as an exploratory
study for the proposed study. The purpose of the phenomenological study was to
describe the nature of professional mathematicians’ proof construction and proof writing
processes. Harel and Sowder (2007) called for a comprehensive perspective on the
teaching and learning of mathematical proof; they stated that the goals on the teaching of
proof were to “gradually help students develop an understanding of proof that is
consistent with that shared and practiced by the mathematicians of today” (p. 47). If
these are the goals in teaching proof, then it is necessary to have an accurate and
comprehensive understanding of the mathematicians’ proof construction processes and
the reasoning techniques by which they construct proof. We sought to give insight into
these processes by focusing on understanding the mechanisms that lead to new insights.
More specifically our research questions in the exploratory study were:
What is the nature of the process of constructing and writing proof for
professional mathematicians?
a. What tools and reasoning techniques are used by mathematicians to
construct proof?
b. How do professional mathematicians use key idea and technical
handle in constructing and writing proof?
c. To what purposes are the identified tools applied?
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Theoretical Framing of the Exploratory Study
This exploratory research was guided by the epistemology of social
constructivism (Crotty, 1998). We, the researchers, believed we construct knowledge
through our interactions with our environments and experiences and these constructions
were negotiated in our interactions with society and the community at large. Since this
research was intended to explore how individuals think about and talk about
mathematical proof under the social constructivist epistemology, interpretivism (Crotty,
1998) was the theoretical perspective for this study.
We applied Dewey’s theory of inquiry and tool-use (Dewey, 1938; Hickman,
1990) to analyze mathematicians’ proof construction process. Dewey defines inquiry as
the intentional process to resolve doubtful situations, through the systematic invention,
development, and deployment of tools (Hickman, 2011). A tool is a theory, proposal, or
knowledge chosen to be applied to a problematic situation. Throughout the entire inquiry
process, there is an “end-in-view” (Garrison, 2009; Glassman, 2001; Hickman, 2009).
These ends-in-view provide tentative consequences which the inquirer must seek the
means (tools and ways to apply tools) to attain. These ends-in-view may be modified and
adapted as the inquiry process proceeds.
The process of active, productive inquiry involves reflection, action, and
evaluation. Reflection is indeed the dominant trait. The inquirer must inspect the
situation, choose a tool to apply to the situation, and think through a course of action.
After this initial reflection of what could happen, the inquirer performs an action, applies
the tool. In these actions, the inquirer operates in some way on the situation; she applies
a tool to the situation, thus altering it. Reciprocally, during or after the fulfilling
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experience, the inquirer evaluates the effects and appropriateness of the application of the
chosen tools (Hickman, 1990).
We attempted to focus on understanding the mechanisms that lead to new
insights. Raman and colleagues (Raman, Sandefur, Birky, Campbell, & Somers, 2009;
Raman & Weber, 2006) have developed a model for describing student difficulties for
proof production, including the moments of finding a conceptual insight (sometimes
termed key idea) and a technical handle. Attaining a conceptual insight gives the prover
a sense of conviction and why a particular claim is true. A technical handle is an idea
that renders the proof communicable; discovering a technical handle gives the prover a
sense of “now I can prove it” (Raman et al. 2009). These constructs characterize
moments when the prover creates a new insight, an instance of the invention and
deployment of a tool.
Dewey’s theory of inquiry and Raman and colleagues’ framework of conceptual
insight (or key idea) and technical handle provided the primary framing for the
exploratory study. As will be described in a later section, the theoretical perspective of
the exploratory study needed to be expanded in order to more fully characterize the
processes exhibited by the participants. Therefore, a detailed description of the
theoretical perspective that will guide the proposed research is given following the
description of the exploratory study.
Methods of the Exploratory Study
Participants
The participants, Drs. Nielsen, Heckert, and Kellems (pseudonyms), were chosen
according to their diversity among several factors, including years of experience, gender,
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pure versus applied mathematics research, and primary field of study. Two of the
participants were faculty members at a Rocky Mountain region university, which had a
department of mathematics that included both mathematicians and mathematics
educators. One of the participants was a faculty member at a Pacific Northwest region
university, which included mostly research mathematicians but included a small portion
of mathematics educators.
Data Collection
Data were collected from a pre-interview questionnaire and task-based interviews
(Appendix C). After soliciting participation, we sent an open-ended questionnaire to
participants via email. The questionnaire served to elicit routine demographic
information, as well as primary field of study, applied versus pure nature of their
mathematical research, and teaching experience. The task-based interviews included
three proof construction tasks and follow-up questions. These included one task from the
field of analysis, one task from the field of abstract algebra, and one task from linear
algebra. Having diverse tasks enabled researchers to describe a variety of proof tools and
reasoning techniques, as well as the topic-dependence of these tools and reasoning
techniques.
To determine the tasks, we generated a list of seven statements requiring proof.
The statements came from beginning graduate and upper level undergraduate text books
and also tasks used in other studies. We attempted to construct proofs to the tasks
individually and piloted the tasks on graduate students studying mathematics education as
well as mathematician colleagues. I then created task analyses for each of the tasks
noting hypotheses for tools applied to the phases of manipulating, getting a sense,
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looking for conceptual insights and technical handles, and writing formal proofs. We
focused on these aspects because according to Sandefur et al. (2012), during these phases
of inquiry in to the development of proof, students were observed to draw upon different
tools including the exploration of examples. The three final proofs were decided upon
based on varied content area and aptitude for multiple tools used. The tasks are given in
the bulleted list below.
•

Linear Algebra Task: If two 3 × 3 matrices are similar, then they have the same

characteristic and same minimal polynomials.
•

Analysis Task: Let f be a continuous function defined on 𝐼 = [𝑎, 𝑏] f maps I onto

I, f is one-to-one, and f is its own inverse. Show that except for one possibility, f
must be monotonically decreasing on I.
•

Abstract Algebra Task: Prove or disprove: 𝑆4 is isomorphic to 𝐷12 where Sn

represents the set of permutations of n elements, and D12 the dihedral group with
order 24. Note: The members of Sn are bijective mappings from the set {1, 2, . . .
, n} onto itself. The group operation in Sn is composition.
We chose tasks from three fields: linear algebra, real analysis, and abstract
algebra. The linear algebra task held potential for the participants to use various tools
while getting a sense of the situation (equation manipulation, application of definitions,
and exploration of examples) and both finding the key idea of the proof as well as
developing a technical handle could require the application of various tools as there are
multiple ways to solve the problem. We anticipated participants with expertise within the
field of linear algebra would use a semantic property-based approach, having a greater
interest and more experience. We expected participants whose fields of study were not
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abstract algebra to pursue more syntactic approaches of equation manipulation due to
lack of familiarity or lack of recently constructing similar proofs.
On the analysis task, we anticipated the potential for both symbolic manipulation
and the exploration of pictures and examples when participants searched for a conceptual
insight. We anticipated the rendering of the ideas into a mathematical proof as potentially
problematic.
We chose the abstract algebra task due to its potential to necessitate the use of
various tools to enable understanding of the two groups and to discern properties of the
groups if the individual is unfamiliar with the two groups in question. We supposed the
prover would most likely search for a property that one group had and the other did not
that should be preserved under isomorphism and this could require the application of
various tools. The order of the tasks was the same for all interviews. Interviews took
approximately 90 minutes, where interviewers invoked the think-aloud protocol as
described by Patton (2002). The interviewers, King and myself, asked clarifying
questions consistent with those described by Weber (2008), as well as reflective followup questions pertaining to specific actions taken by the participants or comments they
made.
Data Analysis
Interviews were recorded, video-taped, and transcribed, and observation notes
were taken by each interviewer. Both interviewers watched all three interviews prior to
coding. We noted moments where participants appeared to be applying new tools. In
initial analysis, we attempted to describe the tool, the purpose of the tool, and develop
codes for each tool. These analyses were not conducive to answering the research
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questions. Therefore, we developed a coding scheme based on Dewey’s theory of inquiry
(Dewey, 1938; Hickman, 1990) and Raman and colleagues’ characterization of
conceptual insight and technical handles (Raman et al., 2009; Raman & Weber, 2006).
The coding scheme was largely deductive (Patton, 2002). We included Dewey’s theory
of inquiry as the research questions regarded individual’s tool use in the sense described
in that framework. The constructs of conceptual insight and technical handle were
included as well due to the purpose of looking for how these ideas are developed and
used by participants when constructing proof. Of course, since we had already conducted
preliminary analyses, the execution of the coding scheme was informed by the data we
had. For example, since instantiation of example objects had been observed, we included
potential purposes for the use of examples informed by the literature. If the deductive
coding scheme was insufficient in characterizing an event, we generated new codes based
on the data. The coding scheme is given in Appendix D.
In applying the coding scheme, we parsed transcripts into “major events,” or
individual actions or groups of actions involving one purpose or one problem. We coded
each major event by type of experience, problem, tool-used, purpose of tools-used, and
type of evaluation. We described problems and tools in context for clarity. We then
further subdivided major events if we determined that more than one purpose or more
than one problem occurred in its duration. Coders added additional codes for problems,
tools, and purpose of tools as needed. The researchers coded the interviews individually
and then met to discuss and agree upon codings. After we coded the data together, I
synthesized the data and provide the summary of results below.
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Results from the Exploratory Study
The main themes that seemed to emerge from the data were that there is a
progression of problems, and ideas may stem from “failed” tool applications.
Mathematicians seemed to progress through the pattern of trying to understand a
statement, look for a reason why the statement would be true (key idea), looking for a
reason why the statement would be true that could easily be translated to a formal proof
(key idea that can be translated to a technical handle), and looking for a means to
communicate the proof. The articulation of ideas often required re-checking the
arguments that originally convinced them. Also, ideas that the prover deems useful may
emerge from actions taken even if the outcomes of the action do not match the
mathematicians’ expectations.
The Progression of Problems
As consistent with the problem solving literature (Carlson & Bloom, 2005), the
mathematicians began their proof constructions by working to understand the statement
to be proven and the definitions of the terms given in the proof statement by symbolizing
the statement, or instantiating the objects in questions via graphical examples. For
example, in the linear algebra task, participants gave instantiations of the term similar by
giving their own definitions using symbolizations. From the codes, it was apparent that
the participants began each problem first attempting to manipulate the premises they were
given in order to get a sense of the mathematics they were using. Then, participants
generally began applying tools with the purpose of looking for a sense of belief and
insight into the reason why the statement is true or false or a key idea.
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As a case of this, after reading the analysis task, Dr. Kellems stated, “What I’m
puzzled by is why it has to be decreasing.” We interpreted this as articulation of a
problem of not knowing why the statement should be true. Dr. Kellems applied the tool
of turning “it into a geometry problem” by drawing a picture. He informed his picture by
his conceptual knowledge of what it would mean pictorially for a continuous function to
be one-to-one and onto: “it can’t go up and down” and for a function to be its own
inverse: “it has to be symmetric when I flip it over the line.”
He deemed his picture as fitting the hypothesis and the conclusion but he still
needed “to think about why that’s true.” He then drew the identity function and deemed
that it was the one exception. Finally he drew another picture including a single point and
the line y = x. He applied the found property of knowing the one exception and his
graphical conception of the graph needing to be symmetric about the line y = x. Using
these ideas he reasoned,
I have to have the geometric reflection of that point on my graph, and that forces
it to be decreasing, because when I flip a point, well, if I flip a point above that y
equals x line across that line, it moves to the right and down. And so there's a
geometric argument that it has to be decreasing.
After this geometric reasoning, he asserted, “I think I’m done.” He shifted into
articulating an informal argument that consisted of captioning his picture with the
thoughts he articulated previously. He made the active choice to not construct an
algebraic argument.
You're asking a very tough question for me, because I would at the moment regard
it as a challenge to make this geometric argument rigorous without switching to
an analytic argument. And that's because I repeatedly get students in calculus
classes and most recently last week in a non-Euclidean geometry class who give
me a beautiful geometric argument, short and sweet, start a new paragraph, and
say, “mathematically this means that” and give me the algebraic argument. I have
no quarrel with saying algebraically or analytically this means that. But to claim
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that the geometric argument is not mathematical really bugs me. And so
motivated by that, I would attempt to avoid doing what you're pushing me
towards, which is to write down the analytic argument.
Once participants acquired a key idea (or conceptual insight) about the problem,
they switched to applying tools with the purpose of looking for technical handle, or a way
to communicate the proof (Raman et al., 2009; Raman & Weber, 2006). Consider the
following example. Dr. Nielsen had been working on the analysis task.
Ok so, on the other hand if we start here and if we do something like that,
can we make it be its own inverse? It just has to be symmetrical about that
point. Ok, now at least I believe the statement. [pause] Ok so it must be
monotonically decreasing, so now what could I do to give a proof of that?
Well, I could try to just kind of do a straightforward thing, say let c be less
than d, and I want to show that, see decreasing, that f of c is greater than f
of d.
Dr. Nielsen had grasped a key idea by generating pictures of graphs. His idea was that no
matter how the graph looked, if a one-to-one function was not monotonically decreasing,
it would not be its own inverse. When he switched to asking himself how to give a proof
of that idea, we interpreted it as moving to searching for a technical handle. He
proceeded to inquire into symbolic statements to communicate his pictorial idea.
For two of the participants, Dr. Heckert and Dr. Kellems, converting a pictorial or
numeric argument to an analytic argument was not always deemed necessary. On the
analysis task, Dr. Heckert claimed he would not have continued with a proof beyond his
confirmation with a numeric example if we had not asked for such. As described earlier,
on the analysis task, Dr. Kellems claimed he was finished after his pictorial argument and
did not need to write any more for his geometric argument to be an acceptable proof.
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Ideas May Stem from “Failed” Tool Applications
The linear algebra task asked participants to show two similar 3 × 3 matrices

would have the same characteristic and minimal polynomials. Dr. Heckert set about the
problem of determining why the statement should be true by thinking through a number
of possible tools. He contemplated the feasibility of using the following tools: 1) if he
had a theorem for determinants, 2) if he could argue that the polynomials are a property
of the transformations in the change of bases, or 3) if he could “do something about row
reduction preservation”. However, he did not deem any of the tools as being immediately
helpful. He transitioned into working a numeric example where he generated two 2 by 2
similar matrices and went about computing their characteristic polynomials to see why
they would be the same. He wrote out what the characteristic polynomials were for each
of the two matrices; however, the polynomials did not turn out to be the same. Dr.
Heckert decided that he must have committed a computation error which was later
confirmed by the researchers when analyzing his written work. Dr. Heckert chose not to
inquire into where the error occurred because “even without looking for my error, I don’t
think that that’s promising to do it from the definition.” (He had viewed manipulating
example instantiations of the definition of “similar matrices” as working from the
definition.) Dr. Heckert thought back on his past idea on how the polynomial is a
property of the transformation itself, but he asked himself, “Why would you even believe
that?” He then looked back upon the polynomials which were written in standard form.
Think of the polynomial as a property of the transformation itself. So how would
you make that a proof? Why would you believe that? Certainly it’s clear that if
this thing has roots, oh I see, so you could go to a field where all the roots are
there and then you would do it by eigenvectors - or eigenvalues. Eigenvalues have
to be the same, okay, alright.
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He recognized the roots would be eigenvalues and that the eigenvalues would be
the same for the two matrices. He determined he could construct a proof by reasoning
about the eigenvalues. Dr. Heckert then constructed an argument that proved the two
characteristic polynomials would be the same, if all the eigenvalues of the matrices were
distinct. Dr. Heckert then constructed an argument that required the eigenvalues to be
distinct in order for his proof to work, and claimed that he did not care enough to worry
about the case where the matrix held repeated eigenvalues.
At the time of formulating the idea of arguing by eigenvalues, Dr. Heckert had
chosen to argue that the polynomials were a result of a property that was independent of
the bases of the matrices. He had entered into solving the problem of finding a warrant
for such a claim. On his paper, he had an example of a characteristic polynomial that was
previously generation in the specific example exploration. He referred to that
characteristic polynomial when he stated, “Certainly, it’s clear if this thing has roots.” It
seemed that the failed example did in fact play a role in his formulation of the idea. Prior
to trying the example he did articulate the thought that he may be able to argue that the
characteristic polynomial of a matrix was dependent on the linear transformation and
independent on the bases, but he abandoned it because he could not immediately identify
some sort of backing for his claim. He appeared to have the conceptual knowledge that
two similar matrices have the same eigenvalues. He did not, however, mention
eigenvalues until he had written out the characteristic polynomials of his example
matrices that he had earlier determined were “not going to be useful”. Upon completion
of the problem Dr. Heckert explained why he originally determined the example would
not be useful.
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It’s not because the example didn’t work out. It’s because there’s nothing
promising in the pattern here. There’s nothing that’s telling me why this operation
is connected to this operation. I mean for getting the 32, the 𝜆2 − 5𝜆. There’s no
easy way for me to see why that’s going to be the same in these two cases.
The example was not useful for his purpose of deducing some structure from the

operations performed. The example was useful for finding a warrant for the argument that
the characteristic polynomials resulted from a property that was independent of the bases
in that having the polynomial written out may have brought to mind other uses for
characteristic polynomials, namely the determination of eigenvalues. At the time of the
pilot study, we did not follow up with Dr. Heckert to confirm that the written polynomial
played that role that we hypothesized. This episode does point to how a tool may be
deemed unhelpful for one purpose but may aid in the generation of new ideas if used for
a different purpose.
It also bears noting that Dr. Heckert drew upon a significant amount of content
knowledge. His instantiations of what it meant for two matrices to be similar included (a)
similar matrices occur from changes of bases, (b) similar matrices have equivalent
eigenvalues, and (c) similar matrices determine the same linear transformation. Despite
the rich content knowledge, the task appeared to be problematic. The content knowledge
may have informed him as to why the statement probably should be true; he immediately
called to mind that the characteristic polynomials were probably a consequence of some
intransient property of a change of basis. However, he needed to perform some
investigation in order to determine what that property would be.
Discussion of the Exploratory Study
The exploratory study set about to describe what tools and reasoning techniques
were used by mathematicians to construct proof and to specifically describe how the
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mathematicians used the tools of key idea (or conceptual insight) and technical handle.
We observed participants using a combination of semantic and syntactic reasoning when
developing proofs. They relied on significant content knowledge, notably rich
instantiations of definitions. They drew of pictures and explored examples to familiarize
themselves with the mathematical statements and to search for reasons why the statement
would be true. Notably the tools applied were meant to address the problems of
understanding a statement, looking for a reason why the statement would be true (key
idea), looking for a reason why the statement would be true that could easily be translated
to a formal proof (key idea that can be translated to a technical handle), and looking for a
means to communicate the proof. We, at times, found that participants developed an
initial idea that could have been viewed as a conceptual insight but then they searched for
additional ideas that could help them communicate why the statement would be true.
For two participants, translating a geometric (or pictorial) argument or an
argument using a numeric example to an analytic or formal, deductive argument was not
always deemed necessary. On the analysis task, Dr. Kellems made it a point to stop at his
geometric argument. Dr. Heckert felt satisfied enough with his argument on the linear
algebra task that did not generalize to all cases to not pursue further, and he only wrote a
generic, analytic argument for the analysis task because he knew we wished it. Finally,
we found that Dr. Heckert explored a pair of similar matrices to determine why they
should have the same minimal and characteristic polynomials. Making a computation
error and determining the exploration as not useful, he chose to abandon the exploration.
However his doing the exploration informed his ways of thinking about the situation
which in turn led to a useful idea that he used as the technical handle of his proof.
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We at times found that ideas participants found useful were not easily classified
as either technical handles or conceptual insights. In the next subsections, I elaborate on
issues faced with this particular classification and other observations from the exploratory
story that specifically needed more exploration, which I propose to address in this study.
Additionally, I discussed some observed limitations in the design of the exploratory study
and follow up on how I intend to circumvent these limitations in the proposed study.
Lesson Learned 1: Conceptual Insight (Key Idea) and Technical Handle Constructs
In the exploratory study, the goals were specifically to describe how
mathematicians developed and used conceptual insights and technical handles. We
found, however, that those two constructs’ definitions were not clear enough to be
utilized in ways that we could find standards of evidence that would clearly identify an
idea as a conceptual insight or a technical handle. We defined a conceptual insight as an
idea that gave the prover insight as to why the statement would be true. A technical
handle was defined as an idea that enabled the prover to communicate the argument. We
were not sure if these two constructs should encompass all insights that were granted
from exploring the objects. For example, in Dr. Heckert’s construction of the proof of the
analysis task, the exploration of the numerical example provided a structure for his final
argument. However, it is unclear what would have been classified as the technical
handle. In the abstract algebra task, Dr. Kellems spent time exploring the object, the
group S4, it was unclear whether he was looking for a conceptual insight (a reason why S4
would not be isomorphic to D12) or if he was just familiarizing himself with the object.
Either way, he was looking for ideas that would help him proceed into solving the task.
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A conceptual insight may appear to be articulated however it is not always enough
to convince the prover or it may not be utilized if it is not apparent how it can be rendered
into a formal proof. For example, in the abstract algebra proof, Dr. Heckert cited possible
reasons why the two groups, S4 and D12, would not be isomorphic: D12 has a non-trivial
center and S4 does not. However, he did not view this idea as being easy to prove. He
instead proved the theorem via the argument that D12 has an element of order twelve but
S4 does not.
Obtaining a technical handle was not always viewed as necessary, especially if the
mathematician felt a geometric argument was sufficient. As described earlier, Dr.
Kellems chose to use his informal, pictorial argument as proof citing it as a geometric
argument. He did note that translating the argument into a symbolic one would be
difficult for him. Dr. Heckert, similarly, stated that on the analysis task, he only wrote out
a detailed, symbolic argument for the sake of the interview.
Interviewer: Well after that you sort of said, okay now I guess I’ll go through the
details of doing this up. Were you thinking that way because you
were pretty convinced by..
Dr. Heckert: Oh yeah, I was totally done here in my mind.
Interviewer: So, as a proof, when you’re thinking of this as a proof, is that sort of
saying like okay because you feel like you have a good sense of the
answer or is it because you know if you are trying to present this to
somebody else,
Dr. Heckert: Well because there’s so many different levels of proof. If I’m trying
to get students to be able to go from the concept to the proof which is
hard then I really want to do more of this to show them the details
but yeah I mean if I was working with somebody and we wanted to
check if are we off base here, is this right? We would have been
done back there.
Interviewer: So yeah, even if you were doing research, you would have been like
good we’re done.
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Dr. Heckert: Oh yeah, and we wouldn’t have written the stuff down. Yeah so this
is all about trying to have people be able to write it or have you
watch how I would write it up, but I didn’t, I didn’t need any of this
to convince myself from here.
Interviewer: So since you’re in an interview with us you’re like okay I’ll write it
up, but if you were by yourself you wouldn’t write it up then.
Dr. Heckert: Oh yeah yeah yeah.
Dr. Heckert recognized that “going from the concept to the proof” is a difficult
task for students, but he stated that in his personal research, he would not worry about
writing the detailed proof for a small result such as the one that we asked him to prove.
Conceptually convincing oneself of the truth of a statement would be what mattered. We
did not follow up on what situations would promote the need for the writing of the formal
proof beyond this conversation; it appeared that the audience of the proof mattered when
it came to if he would write out the details of the proof. For the proposed study, it may be
important to choose tasks that necessitate the mathematicians’ writing of some form of
formal proof or to specify that the goal is to have them to work to not only understand the
concept and why the statement should be true (the conceptual insight) but also to work to
write out the details of the proof so that a student of the course in question would be able
to read and understand it.
In algebraic arguments, it was sometimes unclear if an idea was a conceptual
insight or a technical handle. Dr. Nielsen completed the linear algebra task by discerning
certain manipulations that would enable him to get the equivalence, det(𝐴 − 𝑥𝑥) =

det(𝑃−1 𝐴𝐴 − 𝑥𝑥). It is unclear whether we should have classified the manipulations as

conceptual insights or technical handles as the manipulations both gave him insight as to
why the statement would be true as well as a means for writing out the proof.
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The identification of conceptual insights (or key ideas) and technical handles was
not always a straight forward process. Additionally, there seemed to be insights gathered
by the individuals that were meaningful to the participant but did not fall into the two
categories. The proposed study will look into the ideas that the mathematician deems as
useful even if it does not fulfill the specific purposes of giving insight as to why a
statement is true or direct insight into how to prove the statement without focusing on the
categorization into conceptual insights and technical handles.
Lesson 2: Example of an Evolving Personal Argument
Even though describing the evolution of the personal argument was not the
purpose of the exploratory pilot study; the data provided insight into how I could describe
the progression of an argument into a mathematical proof. I will discuss Dr. Heckert’s
construction of the proof for the analysis task, and I will explain how certain ideas
seemed to emerge that Dr. Heckert viewed as important and helpful, and provides a
rational for conducting the proposed dissertation study.
Upon reading the problem, Dr. Heckert drew a picture of a function that matched
the problem’s criteria. The purpose appeared to be for him to familiarize himself with the
situation and to confirm that such a function exists. He stated, “So there is such a
function.” The domain and range of his initial instantiation was [0, 1]. He then began to
draw another set of x and y axes and placed brackets indicating an arbitrary interval
because he was not certain the “one exception” could be found on the interval [0, 1], but
soon he hypothesized that the interval did not matter. He noted that he had not yet
thought of the one exception, “I can’t imagine what the exception is now but maybe when
I prove it, I’ll find it.”
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He stated his plan would be to prove the statement by contradiction beginning
with the assumption: There exists a, b such that f(a) is greater than or equal to f(b) and a
< b. He determined proving by contradiction would be useful; therefore it is an idea that
can move the proof forward. We did not follow up on his decision process for choosing
to prove by contradiction; so we could not determine what about the situation contributed
to the choice to argue by contradiction.
On his picture from before (the x and y axis with the arbitrary interval), he drew
the line “y = x”. After the interview, he stated that he drew the line because the
conditions of the statement were that the function be its own inverse and that meant the
function would need to be symmetric along the line “y=x”: “Well, this is because it’s its
own inverse. I just wanted it to be symmetric about that and I knew it had to take the
interval into itself.” After drawing the line, he identified it as the one exception
mentioned in the statement of the problem. “Oh, ha! That’s the one exception. Okay, so,
I don’t know why that suddenly came from that picture.”
The discovery that the identity function was the one exception was another idea
that moved the proof forward. Dr. Heckert was not actively engaged in solving the
problem of determining the one exception when he had the idea; he had previously put
the problem aside. At the time he was beginning to draw a picture to inform his argument
by contradiction. He actively checked each assumption of the problem statement to
confirm that the identity map was indeed the one exception.
He returned to his picture, informed that he would be excluding the identity map
from the contradictory argument. “Okay, I see if we’re not the identity map, we have a
here and b here. And there’s something wrong with that because if f(a) = c, f(b)=d, the
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problem with that then is c and d have to map in reverse. These two connect in some
way…It’s going to violate one-to-oneness in some way.”
The discovery that he would not be considering the identity map informed the
conditional. “It seemed clear somehow that what was going on that if I can’t stay on that
line, then the fact that I’m my own inverse is going to do that to me. And that’s going to
be the basis of the one-to-one violation.”
Here, we see an idea that if the function increased and deviated from the line y =x
(did not “stay on that line”) on some portion and the function was its own inverse, then
the function would not be one-to-one. After the interview, Dr. Heckert stated that this
drawing had contributed to a vague picture in his mind of what would happen. “I didn’t
have this picture in my head yet, but I was picturing that it would do this.”
So, it appeared that the personal argument contained a mental picture that the
function would have to change direction leading to a violation of one-to-oneness. It is
unclear from the transcript if Dr. Heckert had the mental picture prior to his physical
drawings or if it came simultaneously with the drawing. If he had the picture before the
drawing, the physical actions enabled him to confirm and articulate his hypothesis. If the
mental picture emerged as he drew the physical picture, then the picture aided in the
generation of the idea. It is probable that the mental picture coincided with his
manipulations of the drawing because Dr. Heckert felt the need to “go to the numbers and
come back.” Later, he explained why he went to the numbers. “Partly, I’m tired and the
letters were irritating me, and I wanted to make sure that I was putting them in the right
place.”
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He moved to a numeric example. He created a situation where f(2) = 1 which was
less than f(3)=4. He worked through the situation, finding that f(1) = 2 and f(4) = 3 since
the function was its own inverse. He then applied the Intermediate Value Theorem (IVT)
to the situation to get the result he wanted, namely that the function would not be one-toone. “In this case, we’re already done because by the intermediate value theorem
something between hits this point and something between here hits that point.” Prior to
working through the numeric example, Dr. Heckert did not mention IVT, but we do not
have evidence that he was not thinking of it specifically in the previous mental pictures.
Regardless, IVT became a technical tool to ensure that the function would need to pass
through a given y-value twice and hence violate one-to-oneness.
At this point, it appeared Dr. Heckert’s argument included his vague picture which
was confirmed by his numeric example and backed by the intermediate value theorem.
He was personally convinced. He knew what the basic idea of the proof would be.
So the basic idea of the proof is that if we are not the identity, what happened here
is going to happen. We’ll have the intermediate value theorem. Any point in here
could be here. Your counterexample to being one-to-one. So something in here
has to hit that point, and something in here has to hit that point. Since it’s
continuous. So, I’ll write up the annoying details on this one.”
Dr. Heckert transitioned his inquiry to writing an analytic argument that
generically translated his mental and numeric pictures into a formal proof. He began by
changing his numeric example to one involving general values a and b. In his numerical
example, f(a) < a. He chose to argue by cases and this was his first case. Even though he
described this step as writing up “the annoying details”, the task required him to think,
going back to his pictures in order to describe what was happening.
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For the analytic argument, he decided to argue by cases. Sometime during the
inquiry into the proof whether f(c) was above the identity function or below it became
important or useful to him. In the numeric example, he had made f(a) be below the line
and f(b) be above the line. The first case maintained that f(a) was below the line, but he
only stipulated that f(b)>f(a). So, whether f(b) was above or below the line did not appear
to matter. He maintained the use of IVT, just as in the numeric example and the pictorial
example that preceded it. In fact he formalized the use of the theorem by using it as a
warrant for his claim that the function will violate one-to-oneness. ("So any y
between...f(a) and a is the image of some point in [c, a].") Alternatively, the formalized
use of the theorem may have been backing for the warrant that the function would need to
violate one-to-oneness.
From here, Dr. Heckert continued to work on formulating an argument that
incorporated the ideas of (1) arguing by contradiction that one-to-oneness would be
violated, (2) the IVT would be necessary to show this violation, (3) using the case where
f(a) < a (which was informed by his picture that assumed the function was not the
identity). Dr. Heckert identified that the second case where f(a) > a would have an
argument “identical to this one.” He stated the third case where f(a) = a was the case of
the one exception.
Dr. Heckert’s argument did evolve. He began with a picture or instantiation of the
situation to convince himself that such a function existed. He happened across the one
exception, but recognizing it helped him to think about cases that were not the identity
giving him a picture that a function that was not decreasing and its own inverse would
have to violate one-to-oneness. So he knew he would argue by contradiction showing the
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violation of one-to-oneness. Moving to a numerical example was a means of giving a
structure to how the proof should go. While working through the numeric example, he
articulated the use of the IVT. His generic argument was a translation from the numeric
example into general terms; in his generalizing, he saw the need to differentiate between
cases: where f(a) < a, f(a) > a, and f(a) = a. This particular episode highlights the need
for exploring the experienced mathematician’s proof construction in-depth with a focus
on personal argument evolvement.
Lesson Learned 3: A problem is an Individual Determination
Despite having more content knowledge than the students for which the tasks
were originally written (upper level undergraduates and lower-level graduates), the
mathematicians did seem to engage in genuine inquiry. We had evidence that the
individuals did need to reflect upon the problem situations and for the analysis and linear
algebra tasks did not immediately know why the statement would be true, and, in the case
of the analysis task, Dr. Nielsen and Dr. Heckert both needed to spend time thinking
about and trying different approaches to converting their conceptual understandings of
why the statement would be true to a symbolic proof.
Dr. Nielsen and Dr. Heckert did not appear to view the abstract algebra task as
problematic. Both Dr. Nielsen and Dr. Heckert knew that it would be easier to show the
two groups were not isomorphic, most likely through experience. They both appeared to
go through a checklist, checking the order of the group, noting properties they knew
about the group, and finally choosing to use the fact that D12 has an element of order
twelve but S4 does not. The creation and emergence of ideas for these two individuals
was not apparent to us because they were able to apply techniques that they had used in
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the past. Dr. Kellems did not appear to view the linear algebra task as problematic. He
began by trying what he termed and advanced formula for determinants.
I know a property of 3 by 3 determinants that you probably don't, which I'll write
down here, which is that for 3 by 3 matrices, the determinant of A is a triple
product, it's a trace of something called the Freudenthal product and a Jordan
product. So this is fancy algebra that I use in a completely different context,
which is really the statement in traditional linear algebra terms that the
determinant is related to, and again I'll get this wrong as I've not done basic linear
algebra in a long time, but something like the minor, I don't even know how you
write the minor. But the determinant is A times something.
He applied the tool of the advanced property but could not recall all the coefficients of
the formula. Therefore, he switched to the definition of characteristic polynomial being
the determinant of the matrix. A-xI.
And so I know that A cubed minus A squared trace A plus some coefficient which
I don't remember the name of, A minus determinant A equals zero. So I'm going to
switch gears, and start all over. I'm being much too fancy. Characteristic
polynomial... and I'll do it for A is determinant A minus x I [𝑑𝑑𝑑(𝐴 − 𝑥𝑥)]. And I
know what A is; so that determinant of P inverse B P minus x I [𝑑𝑑𝑑(𝑃−1 𝐵𝐵 −
𝑥𝑥)], and that's determinant P inverse B P minus x P inverse P [𝑑𝑑𝑑(𝑃−1 𝐵𝐵 −
𝑥𝑃−1 𝑃], and now I'm getting to the same place I was trying to get without all the
fancy. This comes from doing determinants of 3 by 3 matrices over non
associative algebras which is related to my research, so that's why that came up
first.
After applying this definition, he seemed to know the manipulations he needed to
perform in order to get the equality det(𝐴 − 𝑥𝑥) = det(𝐵 − 𝑥𝑥) because he did not

appear to propose manipulations. Breaking the identity matrix, I, into 𝑃−1 𝑃 seemed

merely natural. He stated that the algebra technique was one he used in many contexts
and was second nature for him. Although he viewed that we presented the problem as
algebraic, the manipulations he performed had conceptual meaning for him.
That is an algebraic technique that I have used in many contexts, and therefore is
second nature for me. In addition, and you heard me use that language from the
beginning, you have presented this as a straight algebra problem, but I see
immediately that it is about invariances of linear transformations under change of
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basis. And the reason that linear, that that um... well in this case polynomials, that
this category of problem is invariant under change of basis is precisely because of
that algebraic property. And so for me, the connection between that algebraic
statement and the um, the invariance that is associated with the, the geometry if
you will of that invariant statement, those are things that are very imbedded in my
thinking of linear algebra.
Dr. Kellems’s professional practice had dealings in matrix algebra, Dr. Nielsen
and Dr. Heckert’s research did not reside in that area. Dr. Heckert did not produce an
algebraic argument but spent time thinking about properties of linear transformations and
eventually gave an eigenvalue argument that worked only if all the eigenvalues were
distinct. Dr. Nielsen did give an algebraic argument, but he needed to explore algebraic
manipulations and properties before arriving at the manipulation that gave him the
equivalence he sought.
A task that is problematic for one mathematician may be routine or familiar to
another as observed in the exploratory study. Problems are an individual construction,
and the individual is the one who can determine if the task is problematic or not.
Professionals in a given field of mathematics may be able to identify if a problem is one
he or she can solve easily or if it will require him or her to reflect upon the situation and
think through proposed actions. For these reasons, selection of tasks for the proposed
study needs restructuring.
Lesson Learned 4: Units of Analysis
The protocol for coding involved looking at each action taken, noting problem
perceived at that time if any, the purpose of the action, and the participants’ evaluation of
the action as being helpful for achieving said purpose. The analysis resulted in a list of
actions which was useful in answering the question of what tools are applied. However,
using actions as the unit of analysis would not be useful in fulfilling the research
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purposes of describing what ideas the individuals perceive as useful and in what ways the
ideas are used. The proposed study needs to focus on the moments where ideas emerge
as opposed to noting what the tools are.
Limitation: Presence of the interviewer. In the pilot study, we performed
interviews using the think-aloud protocol (Patton, 2002). We chose to have participants
think aloud because we were interested in their thought processes as they occurred. We
chose to be in the room with the mathematicians as they worked so that we could observe
their actions in real time. By focusing on their actions as they occurred, we strived to
minimize having pre-formed hypotheses as to the motives for the mathematicians’
actions. The format of the interview did allow for questions from the researchers while
the participants were working. Our interrupting questions were limited and usually
occurred during a break in the participants thinking or when they were switching between
plans of attack. The purposes of these questions were to bring closure to the abandoned
plan of attack and to learn motivations for moving on to a new plan. The protocol also
included follow-up questions that occurred at the end of each task. We had made notes
during the task about what we wanted to ask about as they occurred.
Our questions or the think-aloud protocol may have played a role in how the
problem solving evolved. In the linear algebra task, Dr. Nielsen had worked on showing
the characteristic polynomials of two similar matrices were equal, but he had reached an
impasse. He moved on to the second part of the problem that required him to show the
minimal polynomials of the similar matrices were equal. He completed that portion by
discerning a property of taking powers of matrices. He returned to the characteristic
polynomial portion. One of the interviewers asked him if moving to the minimal

306
polynomial gave him any clarity about what to do for the characteristic polynomial. Dr.
Nielsen responded that he did not see something directly related and thought about
abandoning the algebraic approach and switching to thinking about it conceptually.
But there's a big difference; characteristic polynomial you're not plugging in the
matrix in for the variable, in for x here, and the minimal polynomial you were. I
definitely used that fact here. Perhaps a better reason to move on to minimal
polynomial case was just to give myself some time to not think about the other
one for a while. And I think that maybe now I would stop doing it algebraically
and use facts that I may or may not remember correctly about characteristic
polynomials and try a different approach. And they say something or try
something like I know something about the roots of the characteristic polynomial
and eigenvalues and I know something about similarity there, and that might be a
more reasonable approach to try to answer the first one. But that would definitely
take some trying to remember my basic linear algebra facts. I don't know if there
is anything else. I suppose I could look at the algebraic one more time. It
definitely, would think it should work.
However, Dr. Nielsen then decided to look at the algebra “one more time” because “it
should work.” He thought about the problem algebraically again noting that A-xI was a
matrix that he wanted to relate to the matrix, 𝑃−1 (𝐴 − 𝑥𝑥)𝑃 which was an approach

different from those he had tried earlier for the characteristic polynomial but related to
the manipulations he learned from his explorations of the minimal polynomial as he had
earlier discerned that for any matrix A, (𝑃−1 𝐴𝐴)𝑘 = 𝑃−1 𝐴𝐴. The interviewer’s questions
that asked Dr. Nielsen if he perceived that the minimal polynomial portion would help
with the characteristic polynomial portion may have played a role in Dr. Nielsen’s
decision to think more about the algebra. His articulation of the situation, specifically,
that he would need to think about some possibly forgotten facts from linear algebra and
that perhaps there should be similarities between the two pieces may have contributed to
his not pursuing the conceptual approach. After completing the task, he did state that he
realized that it would be more work to think about properties of eigenvalues.
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I didn't see immediately how doing this sort of a... how using the second problem
helped me with the first problem at all. So I really just said ok well, this isn't
going to work, I gotta try something else. Although, a second later I realized this
did help me. And I was able to use the same trick to get the other one
algebraically. And the reason I probably came back to that is I realized that it was
going to be perhaps more work to go look up properties of eigenvalues, to remind
myself of those facts... It seems like that it was actually harder than I thought it
would be.
It is not certain that the nature of the protocol or the question influenced how Dr. Nielsen
thought about the problem, but in the future study, I would like to minimize the
possibility that the researcher would influence the problem-solving process.
A limitation of the protocol of the exploratory study was that the questions asked
during the interview were restricted to what the researchers noted at the time. We
concurrently were focusing on the actions and comments made by the participant. We
missed opportunities to ask about interesting aspects. Patton (2002) described this
limitation of the task-based interview. After viewing the video, transcripts, and written
work from Dr. Nielsen’s linear algebra task, I noted actions and situations where it was
unclear what the purpose of the action was or what he viewed as problematic. For
example, Dr. Nielsen proposed a property of minimal polynomials that he said “would be
nice”. For 𝑝(𝑥), the minimal polynomial of a matrix B. Dr. Nielsen was trying to show
𝑝(𝑃−1 𝐵𝐵) = 0. He stated it would be nice if 𝑝(𝑃−1 𝐵𝐵) = 𝑝(𝑃−1 )𝑝(𝐵)𝑝(𝑃) but then

created and worked through a counterexample which eventually led to a discernment of a
property involving taking powers of the matrix, 𝑃−1 𝐵𝐵.

But I'm not sure if we can do that easily at all, because we might have things like
P inverse of B P squared plus stuff equals zero. And when you do that, that's
doing P inverse B P, so that looks good. Those would be identity matrix, so you
would get P inverse B squared P plus stuff equals zero. So that's exactly the thing
that we want.
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(𝑃−1 𝐵𝐵)2 + ⋯ = 0
𝑃−1 𝐵𝐵𝑃−1 𝐵𝐵
𝑃−1 𝐵2 𝑃 + ⋯ = 0

He extracted the property 𝑝(𝑃−1 𝐵𝐵) = 𝑃−1 𝑝(𝐵)𝑃. During the interview, we

were preoccupied by the fact that Dr. Nielsen discovered a property that allowed him to
get the result he wanted. We did not ask him clarify his purpose in creating the above
counterexample that led to the property. In analyzing the event, it was unclear if the
purpose of exploring the example was to convince himself why his proposed property
was untrue or if he had already convinced himself that it was not true and was squaring it
out to find some other insight into the problem. Understanding the purpose of his
exploration of the counterexample would be important to answering the research
questions of the proposed study, specifically to answer the questions about the situations
surrounding the emergence of new ideas. It is likely that situations like the above, where
individuals perform actions without articulating the purpose of the actions, would occur
in another task-based interview. In the current study, I will seek methods that encourage
the mathematicians to clarify purposes behind actions taken but minimize potential
interference with their problem-solving processes.
Limitation: Graduate Student, Faculty Member Relationship
The participants of the pilot study were professors and the interviewers were
graduate students. At times, it appeared that the mathematicians were teaching the
interviewers as opposed to articulating their thought processes. The graduate student to
faculty member relationship coupled with the researchers’ introduction statement to the
interview, “We are interested in understanding how you construct proof,” may have
contributed to the mathematicians taking on a teaching role during the interview.
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Rephrasing the introduction to the interview to “I wish to document your thought
processes as you construct proof.” may help in preventing the “teaching” issue.
Additionally, the mathematicians perceived that there were actions that the
student researchers were hoping that the participants would take. The linear algebra task
required mathematicians to prove a property of 3x3 matrices. Dr. Heckert suspected that
we had crafted the item so that participants would move to exploring the simpler case of
2 by 2 matrices which is just what he did. “Okay so I do have to do what you probably
want me to do, which is- So I don’t like the three by three because that’s too much work,
so I’m going to go to the two by two.” The other participants also may have suspected
there were choices that we expected them to make.
Limitation: Interview Situation Influencing Inquiry Choices
Because of time considerations, the interview situation may have prevented
inquiry into certain unresolved issues and influenced what situations were deemed
problematic. Dr. Heckert’s proof in the linear algebra task showed that the characteristic
polynomials of two similar matrices were equivalent only in the case that the matrices
had distinct eigenvalues. Dr. Heckert stated that he was not very concerned with
resolving the issue for repeated eigenvalues. “If the eigenvalues aren’t distinct, I’m not
sure I care much, but do you care? But if the eigenvalues are not distinct, I don’t care.
Because now there’s probably some trick I should think about and I probably would just
look in a linear algebra book. But, um, but this is the idea.”
On the analysis task, Dr. Kellems gave a picture and an oral argument; it served
the purpose of communicating his conviction to the interviewers so there was no need for
him to write out his proof. He did state that it would be difficult to translate the picture
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into a symbolic proof. His argument was informal in that he pointed to and motioned
with his pictures as he spoke through the argument, only writing down his conclusions.
The fact that the interviewers were in the room with Dr. Kellems may have played a role
in his choice not to give a formal written argument.
Significance of the Exploratory Study
Despite the above limitations, the results of the exploratory study provide some
implications for the teaching and research of proof construction. Participant
mathematicians were observed to begin by orienting themselves to the problem,
persuading themselves of the reasons why the statement should be true, searching for
ideas that may be rendered into a proof, and then finally proceeding to write a formal
proof. As such, practitioners may consider introducing proof as the development of an
argument. Instead of solely teaching students to write arguments regarding known
content and teaching proof techniques, it would be valuable to provide opportunities for
students to wrestle with statements whose truth or warrants for truth they do not yet
know. As was observed, if a prover is given opportunity to explore the problem,
applying various tools, even unsuccessfully, may enable the individual to develop useful
ideas.
For the mathematicians, arguments that convinced themselves and proofs that
would be acceptable to a general community did not seem to be the same;
mathematicians made shifts from convincing themselves to looking for proof ideas.
However, they always considered if the ideas that showed them why the statement would
be true could be rendered into a formal proof. At times, their ideas could be formalized;
other times, mathematicians needed to search for another idea that could be more easily
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formalized. This confirms the research of Raman and colleagues (Raman, 2003; Raman
et al., 2009) who argued that mathematicians are aware of how their personal arguments
have the potential to be connected to more formal proof. Encouraging students to search
for ways to connect their private arguments to a more public one would be in keeping of
developing mathematical habits consistent with the mathematicians of today. It is also
necessary to point out to students that some mathematical proofs have more than one
possible key idea and some ideas are more easily rendered into proof than others.
As an expansion of the key idea and technical handle framework (Raman et al.,
2009; Sandefur et al., 2012), this study has shown that while these two constructs may be
observed in the proof constructions of mathematicians, classifying each idea developed or
each purpose of an investigation into these two terms can be difficult. It may be more
beneficial for researchers to identify ideas that the provers find useful and provide apt
descriptions of what the ideas are and how the individual sees them as useful. Instead of
classifying the purpose of an action as to search for a conceptual insight or technical
handle (Sandefur et al., 2012), researchers may analyze actions surrounding the
generations of ideas for their purpose and the problems the applications of such tools they
may seek to solve.
This research has served to confirm the ways in which proof construction can be
viewed as a special type of problem solving as participants were observed to orient
themselves to the task, plan, execute, and check their strategies (Carlson & Bloom, 2005).
However, where Carlson and Bloom viewed one task as a problem, we noted multiple
problems within one proof construction task as proving requires not just the development
of an answer but the development of a personal argument (the development itself may
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require the resolution of several problems) that also must be translated into a written,
logical proof. The study suggests that if researchers seek to describe the development of
mathematical proof through the multidimensional problem solving framework of Carlson
and Bloom, researchers may wish to consider the existence of multiple problems within
the proof construction task. In the following section, I describe the explicit ways in
which the exploratory study has informed the methodology of the proposed study.
Implications for Data Collection and Analysis
The lessons learned from and the observed limitations of the exploratory study
can inform the design of the proposed study. In this section, I will briefly describe
methodological decisions that were directly influenced by the exploratory study including
decisions to have the participants choose their own problems, incorporate a follow-up,
stimulated recall interviews, and to redefine the units of analysis.
The exploratory study showed that if the researcher chooses the tasks, the tasks
may or may not present problematic situations for the mathematicians. For the proposed
study, a problem is a situation where the individual cannot recall a situation and resolving
the situation requires a “going outside” the situation to think about possible solutions
(Hickman, 1990). The definition of problem and problematic is further expanded in the
Theoretical Perspective. Only the individual is able to identify a situation as being
routine or not. Consequently, the individuals will choose the proof tasks that they will
solve.
The presence of the interviewer and the interview situation played a role in how
the problem-solving situations unfolded. As opposed to a task-based interview with a
think-aloud protocol, the proposed study will involve the researcher video recording
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mathematicians working on problems as the mathematicians think-aloud. Contrary to the
exploratory study, the protocol for the proposed study will not allow for interrupting,
clarifying questions or follow-up questions during the proof construction recording. I
will act as an observer and recorder of the mathematicians’ thought processes. This
decision to minimize the researchers’ presence is an effort to downplay the possibility
that the mathematician will attempt to “teach” the researcher as well as minimize
interrupting and changing the mathematicians’ thought processes as they unfold. I will
still seek to understand the participants’ thinking behind their decisions in constructing
the proof. This will be partially accomplished by asking the mathematicians to thinkaloud as they prove the statements; additionally, I will ask the mathematicians to
participate in a follow-up, stimulated recall interview. After the initial, proofconstruction interview, I will review the video noting moments where clarification is
needed to discern the purposes of actions, what in the situation contributed to choosing an
action or not to take an action, what ideas or properties seemed important, and so forth.
In the follow up interview, I will play back these moments for the participants, have them
watch it, and explain the situation and answer questions I have noted. The stimulated
recall protocol will be elaborated in a later section.
The purpose of the proposed research is to describe how personal arguments
evolve. For this reason, analyzing by each action taken may not be the most appropriate
unit of analysis. Instead, I will begin by noting moments where new ideas are
incorporated that the prover sees as useful for moving the argument forward and describe
what the ideas are. For each idea, I will describe the problem(s) perceived by the
mathematician when the idea is articulated and when it is implemented, the anticipated
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application of the idea, the other tools that the mathematician used as the idea emerged,
and how the idea relates to other ideas. The definition of an idea that moves an argument
forward will be further described in the theoretical perspective.
The proposed study focuses on individual’s construction of solutions to
mathematical proof problems; therefore, theoretical perspective that will be used for this
study is a constructivist perspective within an interpretivist framework (Crotty, 1998)
utilizing John Dewey’s Theory of Logical Inquiry (1938) using argumentation theory
(Toulmin, Rieke, & Janik, 1979) and a perspective on creative thinking. The data for this
study will consist of data from 3 mathematicians, completing 3 tasks over the course of 3
interviews. Each interview will include a follow-up, stimulated recall of the
mathematician’s work on the task(s) from the previous interview. Data for this study will
be the written work, transcripts, video recordings, and Livescribe recordings of
participants’ work on the 3 tasks in the interview setting. Participants will complete
additional work on tasks outside the interview setting. This work will be recorded via
Livescribe pen. Follow-up, stimulated recall interviews will be conducted as well.
The data analyses will proceed in two major phases. The purpose of the first
phase of preliminary analyses will be to identify the ideas that move the argument
forward, to hypothesize the situations or actions performed by the participant that
effected the generation of these ideas, and to create questions for the stimulated recall
interview. In the second phase of analysis, I will create descriptions of the individual’s
proof construction of each task focusing on each idea that moves the argument forward as
the unit of analysis. The descriptions will describe the idea, the perceived problem when
the idea was articulated, the mode of inquiry entered into when the idea is articulated, and
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the tools that the participant utilized leading up to the articulation of the idea.
Additionally, these descriptions will describe how the ideas are used subsequent to their
articulation. After I have given case descriptions of each idea and each task, I will
conduct open coding on each task and cross-case analyses across tasks to generate
categories and themes to answer the research questions.

APPENDIX C
TOOLS OF DATA COLLECTION FOR
EXPLORATORY STUDY
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Pre-interview Questionnaire
1. What would you describe as your primary mathematical field of study?
2. What courses have you taught in the past?
3. How long have you been in your current position?
4. Please give a general description of your research, including whether you would
consider your research to be applied mathematics or pure mathematics.
Task-based Interview Protocol
•

Preliminary Statement
◦ Thank you for taking the time to participate in this interview. The purpose
of this interview is to explore how you construct and write mathematical
proofs.
◦ During this interview, we will ask you to construct two proofs. While you
are completing these tasks, we will ask you to think aloud. We will also
ask clarifying questions as you are working. After you have finished these
tasks, we will ask a few open-ended questions.
◦ If at any time you feel uncomfortable with the interview, we will stop.
Are you ready to begin?

•

Observations
◦ Evidence of informal reasoning.

•

Probing Questions
◦ If quiet, ask “What are you thinking?”
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◦ If participant writes without explaining, interviewer can ask for
explanation.
◦ Interviewers may ask clarifying questions
•

1st Task – Linear algebra
◦ Task: If two 3x3 matrices are similar, then they have the same
characteristic and same minimal polynomials.
◦ Provided definitions:
▪ Similar: Two n x n matrices A and B are similar if there exists a matrix
−1
P such that A= P BP

▪ Characteristic: The characteristic of an n x n matrix A is the
polynomial given by det(A-xI).
▪ Minimal Polynomial: The minimal polynomial of an n x n matrix A is
the polynomial p of the least degree such that p(A) = 0.
•

2nd Task – Analysis Task: Let f be a continuous function defined on I=[a,b], f
maps I onto I, f is one-to-one, and f is its own inverse. Show that except for
one possibility, f must be monotonically decreasing on I.

•

3rd Task – Abstract Algebra Task: Prove or disprove: 𝑆4 is isomorphic to 𝐷12 .

(Sn represents the set of permutations of n elements, and D12 the dihedral

group with order 24. Note: The members of Sn are bijective mappings from
the set {1, 2, . . . , n} onto itself. The group operation in Sn is composition.)
•

Follow-up Questions
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◦ Can you further explain the use of (picture, diagram, drawing., informal
reasoning..)?
◦ In what ways do your processes in constructing proof vary across content
area?, if at all?

APPENDIX D
EXPLORATORY STUDY CODING SCHEME

321
Coding Procedures
1. Go through and note major events. These may be individual actions or groups of
actions involving one purpose or one problem.
2. Code if the actions are in response to a problem or not. There are 4 recommended
codes here. More may be added.
3. Separate into “problem” episodes and periods of non-problems. Give a
description of each problem using the initial coding list and adding as needed. Or
you may note more specific problems and we may be able to generalize the code
from there.
o Here we will have sections of different inquiries, and non-inquiries
o We can describe the sequences of problems/non-problems
o Within each problem we can describe the inquiry involved
o Within each non-problem, maybe we can describe circumstances that lead
to a problem
4. Describe the actions performed utilizing verb and object
o Identify major tool and how it is applied


Note a single tool can be acted upon in a variety of ways



Note that other tools may supplement the actions

o Code the purpose of the action. Use the codes already provided, but you
will most likely add to the list or modify/combine codes.
o Code if evaluation appears to occur or not.


If evaluation occurs:
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•

Code as “planning” or “usefulness” or “both” evaluation

•

Code the decision of the evaluation

5. Code the actions (each tool application) as one of the four modes of thinking and
note places that are none of the above modes of thinking (we may make a 5th!).
Operating Definitions
Problem/Inquiry
A situation is a problem if it is (1) tense and unresolved for the individual, and (2) the
individual acknowledges the issue and begins to reflect on the situation and possible
solutions. Sections of transcript will be classified as inquiry, non-inquirential, problem
but no inquiry, or other.


“Inquiry” is happening if the following are occurring:
o There has been an issue that is deemed problematic
o

The individual has inspected the situation to discern qualities of the
situation and has reflected on a tool to apply to the situation with an
intended purpose

o The individual applies the tools chosen with an end-in-view
o The individual is evaluating (deciding if it’s useful, re-inspecting the
situation to see how it changed) during and after the application of the tool


The situation is “non-inquirential tool-use”; note both experts and novices may
have these types of experiences
o Actions are taken or tools are applied without the individual reflecting on
the tool to use
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o The individual indicates that the action taken is “second nature”, “what
you’re supposed to do”, “how I usually do it”, and so forth.
o The individual may look back at what the action did for him/her but
nothing has been deemed problematic prior to that evaluation


“Problem but no inquiry” is reserved for situations where:
o The individual acknowledges that there is something amiss with his/her
proof but does not enter into actions to try to solve it
o The individual may even reflect and describe the problem or the tool
he/she would use to resolve it but does not apply the tool and enter the
problem

6. We need to have an “other” code. Use it when the individual is not engaged in
proof construction
Possible problems. The following is a list of problems that an individual may
encounter when proving from the literature and informed from preliminary analyses.
•

Don’t understand what the statement means

•

Unfamiliarity with the mathematical objects

•

Unsure if the statement is true

•

Trying to find out why the statement is true (looking for a Conceptual Insight)

•

Must communicate the argument (looking for a Technical Handle)

•

I want to generalize (my arguments, my picture, my example, etc.) (data)

•

I want to translate to analytic language (data & lit) [translate back to the
representation system of proof

•

I want to check to see if what I’ve claimed (any conjecture) is true
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•

Problems with individual tools
o Trouble generating a helpful example
o Computation issues

Tools
A tool is a theory, proposal, heuristic, or knowledge chosen to be applied to a
situation for a specified purpose. To be considered a tool, an object must be used to do
some sort of work. Tools may be used in habitual or inquirential actions. A tool cannot
be separated with its end-in-view, so note the proposed (perhaps implied) purpose for
using each tool. A tool can be applied in different ways; note how the tool is applied. If
the subject is engaged in inquiry, make note of evaluating actions made before, during, or
after a tool is applied. The following is a list of possible tools we may see.
•

Examples
o Known functions
o Pictures of functions with specific properties

•

Instantiations of mathematical concepts

•

Heuristics, algorithms

•

Known theorem/property

•

Conceptual Knowledge- Knowledge of how things are connected, implications of
actions, etc.

•

Found theorem/property

•

Symbolizing

•

Symbol manipulation

•

Logical Structure
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o Break into cases
o WLOG argument
Purposes of Applied Tools
The purposes of applying tools are inseparable from the tools themselves. The
purposes are related to the problem to be solved but possible will be more specialized
than just “to solve this problem”. Note the purpose of using the tool is not necessarily the
actual outcome. For instance, one may apply and manipulate a counterexample with the
purpose of refuting a conjecture but as a result of the manipulation obtain an insight as to
how to communicate the proof. Because of this, unless the participant verbalizes the
purpose of using a certain tool, we may need to infer the intended purpose. I can give a
preliminary list of possible purposes.
Purposes of using examples. These purposes were specifically identified in the
literature and preliminary analyses:
o Understanding- a statement, definition, objects, etc.
o Indicate what is included and what is excluded by a condition in a
definition or theorem
o Build a sense of what’s going on
o Explore behavior and illustrate structure
o To indicate a dimension of variation implied by a generalization
o To indicate something that remains invariant while some other features
change
o Evaluate the truth of a statement or conjecture/checking inferences
o Generating arguments
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o “Directly” and “indirectly”


Directly: trying to show that a result is true in a specific case
hoping the same argument or manipulations will work in general



Indirectly: searching for a reason why one could not find a
counterexample to the statement

o To give insight into proving (looking for a TH)
o To understand why the assertion should be true (Looking for a CI)
o Use a specific object to indicate the significance of a particular condition
in a definition or theorem


Highlighting the condition’s role in the proof



Showing how the statement fails in the absence of that condition

o Generating counterexamples
o As an aid to explain an argument to another (interviewer, student, …)
Purposes of other tools. The following purposes may be observed for other tools.


Use aspects of mathematical structure (logic, theorems, definitions)
o To drive the steps of the proof
o To reduce the complexity
o To start or structure the argument
o To inform the manipulations



Look for a TH: if the individual is seeking a way to make their argument
communicable
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Look for a CI: Looking for a conceptual insight is performing actions to gain an
insight as to why the statement is true (why examples should work the way they
do, why it is not possible to find a counterexample)



Generalize an argument



To articulate or communicate an idea



Translate an idea from one representation to another

Application of Tools
The application of tools indicates the course of action or how the tool is used. One
tool can be applied in multiple ways. Choosing how to apply a tool occurs during periods
of reflection in a similar way to how a tool is chosen. The application is an experiment
that is evaluated and may be modified. When coding applications, most likely you will
note the action word associated with the tool or the specific way the tool is used. For
instance, an individual may use the tool of logic and formulate a contrapositive of the
statement. The tool was logic. The way it was applied or course of action was
formulating a contrapositive statement. For the application of examples the literature
suggests a pattern in the application.
Examples as tools. If the tool is an example, the hypothesis is that there is a sequence
of manipulating, getting a sense of a pattern, and articulating that pattern (MGA). The
“manipulating” indicates the various ways that the example is applied to the situation, or
the actions that are taken on the example. These are numerous but may include:
experimenting (testing against a conjecture), transforming (perhaps while imagining),
identifying properties, performing algorithms on, and so forth. Manipulations of these
objects may require the application of tools such as conceptual knowledge, structural
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knowledge, known mathematical properties, and other tools. When one encounters a
mathematical object and manipulates it, he or she continues the manipulation until he or
she gets a sense of a pattern from the manipulations carried out. Getting a sense is an
outcome of a manipulation. It may occur in an instant, but the sense may be vague and
require further manipulation in order for the sense to be articulated. An articulation is a
representation of the perceived pattern recognized from the manipulations. An
articulation may be verbal, diagrammatic, or symbolic. Articulation may occur instantly
once one gets a sense, or one may need to perform further manipulations to articulate. If
one attains a vague sense of a pattern from the manipulations performed, but is unable to
articulate it then “to articulate” becomes a purpose of the inquiry. According to the MGA
framework, the sense that is articulated then becomes a mathematical object which can be
manipulated in successive cycles since the MGA process is seen as helical. So an
articulation may be a tool in further inquiry.
Coding application of examples. We will assume applying the tool “using
examples” or “specializing” will involve a MGA cycle or cycles if the individual is
actually engaged in inquiry. We note how the individual is manipulating the object. We
note evaluations occurring during and after manipulating. The vague “getting-a-sense”
and articulations may be a subsets of the evaluations.
Evaluation
There are two types of evaluation: planning and usefulness. The evaluation for
usefulness is the posing of the questions: How well did the tool or plan of attack work to
resolve the initial problematic situation? or How well did this tool help me achieve my
intended purpose? Planning poses the question: what does the application of this tool tell
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me about how to proceed? Planning may entail a re-inspection of the situation to
determine how the problem has changed, if it is resolved, or if there is a new problem to
address. Instances of evaluation can occur before applying a tool, while the tool is being
applied, and after the tool has been applied. Before applying a tool, an inquirer
considers if applying a tool is feasible or will be useful; she thinks through possible plans
of attack. While the tool is being applied or after it is applied, “the worth of the
meanings, or cognitive ideas, is critically inspected in light of their fulfillment (Prawat &
Floden, 1994, p. 44).” It may be difficult to always observe this. Evaluation may be a
thought process occurring simultaneously with the actions performed. The following are
evidence of evaluation:


Verbalization- “that helps me.”; “that’s not working”; “that’s not the
problem”;etc.



Periods of quiet thought followed by a course of action or an observation about
the problem situation- evidence of planning



Periods of quiet thought followed by a CHANGE in tool or application- evidence
of usefulness evaluation



BUT evaluation may be a thought process that we don’t observe.

The following note possible decisions of usefulness evaluations:
•

Tool application is effective
o Problem is still unresolved, but I’ll keep applying the same tool in the
same way.
o Problem solved: The tool was applied with satisfaction and the problem is
no longer an issue. Remember there may be many “problems” within one
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proof task.” Also “solved” is a judgment made by the prover not the
observer or the mathematics community; it is possible that the solution is
mathematically incomplete or even incorrect. The prover moves on to the
next task which may or may not become a problematic situation. Dewey
indicates the resolving of a problem can be accompanied with a feeling of
satisfaction or enjoyment and an attainment of new knowledge.
•

Tool application is ineffective, Problem is unresolved: When the problem is
unresolved, the cycle starts again. The prover inspects the situation including the
original problem and the tool itself. She then makes a planning evaluation as to
the action to take next. Choices made could be:
o abandonment of the previous tool and choosing a new one
o choosing to apply the same tool in the same or a different way
o determining the tool is problematic and engaging in inquiry to resolve the
problem with the tool (this is most likely to happen if evaluation is an
interruption during the “fulfilling experience”)
o Exiting inquiry (giving up without satisfaction)

•

Problem changed: It may be that the application of the tool changed the nature of
the situation for the individual causing something else to be problematic or
interesting. In this case, the prover may not deem the situation as problematic and
therefore go back to “everyday” experience where the situation may become
problematic. The prover may be aware of the problem but choose not to enter
inquiry in the sense of a moral judgment (Dewey, 1938). The prover may enter
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the problem, beginning a new cycle of inquiry in which the tools, and the
knowledge constructed in previous inquiries are available if deemed useful.
Mode of Thinking
The modes are ways of doing tools, or subsets of tools used for specific purposes.
•

Instantiating is the attempt to meaningfully understand a mathematical object
by thinking about the objects to which it applies. It is using or generating
instantiations for the purpose of understanding.
o Code as instantiating if:


Purpose is to understand something (object, statement,
definition, etc.)



Tool used is an instantiation (example, alternative definition,
intuitive conception, etc.) of a mathematical object

•

Creative thinking entails examining instantiations to identify a property or set
of manipulations that can form the key idea of a proof. The purpose of the
creative thinking may be to gain a critical insight, to illustrate the structure of
the mathematical objects, to show that the result is true in a specific case, or to
search for a reason why one could not find a counterexample.
o Code as creative thinking if:


Purpose is to gain insight into the “crux” of the proof



Tools used are instantiations (alternative conceptions of the
mathematical objects, examples, etc.)

•

Structural thinking uses the form of the mathematics to deduce a proof.
Structural thinking employs syntactic reasoning. The tools used in structural
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thinking will most likely be known properties and theorems, algebraic
manipulations, and the logical structure of mathematics. Additionally, Alcock
notes how structural thinking may inform instantiating and creative and
critical thinking.
o Code as structural thinking if:


The tools used are related to the “representation system of
proof” in the sense of Weber & Alcock (2004)


•

Purposes will most likely vary

Critical thinking has the goal of checking the correctness of assertions made in
the proof. This may occur either syntactically or semantically.
o Code as critical thinking if the purpose is to check an assertion.
Various tools may be used.
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Definitions of Tools Used in Exploratory Study
Table 34
Codes Used for Type of Experience in Exploratory Study
Code/Category Description
Inquiry
There has been an issue that is deemed
problematic. The individual has inspected
the situation to discern qualities of the
situation and has reflected on a tool to
apply to the situation with an intended
purpose. The individual applies the tools
chosen with an end-in-view. The
individual is evaluating (deciding if it’s
useful, re-inspecting the situation to see
how it changed) during and after the
application of the tool

Example
“Why would that be true?
I can’t think of a property
of the determinants why
that would be true, so
maybe I’ll play with an
example to see if I can
discern what would make it
work that way.”

Noninquirential
Tool Use

Actions are taken or tools are applied
without the individual reflecting on the
tool to use. The individual indicates that
the action taken is “second nature”, “what
you’re supposed to do”, “how I usually do
it”, etc. The individual may look back at
what the action did for him/her but
nothing has been deemed problematic
prior to that evaluation.

Problematic
no Inquiry

The individual acknowledges that there is
something amiss with his/her proof but
does not enter into actions to try to solve
it. The individual may even reflect and
describe the problem or the tool he/she
would use to resolve it but does not apply
the tool and enter the problem.
Use this code when the individual is not
engaged in proof construction.

“Okay we’re moving
towards things that I can do
quicker than other things.
... Um, so it’s certainly not
true. And um D12 has a
non-trivial center and S4
doesn’t.” [The knowledge
of the group structure is a
tool used to give a
conceptual insight, but it
required no inquiry to be
found.]
“This proof isn’t finished
because there’s some
annoying little detail that I
don’t want to deal with.”

Other

Instances where they are
answering our questions,
making a demonstration for
our benefit, etc.
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Table 35
Codes Used for Problems Encountered in Exploratory Study
Code
Understanding the statement

Description
Example
Doesn’t understand what the
statement means, how the
objects in the statement relate,
etc.
Unfamiliar objects
Doesn’t understand a definition
or an object described in the
statement in the proof
Veracity of Statement
Unsure if the statement is true or
not
Why true
Trying to find out why the
statement is true (looking for a
conceptual insight)
Communicating/Articulating/ Attempting to
Generalizing
communicate/articulate an
argument, insight or thought; this
could be looking for a technical
handle if they are trying to
articulate/communicate the proof
Translating
Trying to translate back to the
representation system of proof
(formulate an argument in
analytic language)
Checking
Checking to see if an assertion is
true
Tool Problem
Problem with individual tools or
application of those tools, i.e.
trouble generating a helpful
example, computation issues,
etc.

335
Table 36
Codes Used for Tools Used in Exploratory Study
Code
Examples
(specializing)

Instantiations of
concepts

Description
Watson and Mason (2005) describe
an example as a particular case of
any larger class about which students
generalize and reason, and they
describe exemplification as using
something specific to represent a
general class with which the learner
is to become familiar.
Non-formal representations of
mathematical concepts

Heuristics/algorithms Rule of thumb, technique that comes
with experience
Symbolizing
Rewriting statements, definitions, or
representations in terms of symbols
Known
theorem/property
Conceptual
knowledge
Found property
(trick)
A
proposal/hypothesis
Logical structure

Knowledge of relationships among
mathematical objects, consequences
of actions on objects, or
mathematical structure
A property/insight/manipulation that
was proved or found by the prover
Dewey tells us an idea/hypothesis
that is tested is a tool
Knowledge of logical structure

Example
Specific numbers,
representations of
functions (graphical,
analytic, table), pictures
of objects.

Function as shooting
objects from one location
to another.
Computational shortcuts,
modeling
Rewriting “the
determinant of A equals
the determinant of B” as
det(A)=det(B)
MVT, monotonically
increasing functions are
one-to-one

Conceptual insight,
technical handle,
Proposed manipulation of
symbols
WLOG arguments,
formulation of a
statement, etc.
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Table 37
Codes Used for Purposes of Using Examples in Exploratory Study
Code
Understanding

Evaluate the
Truth
Generating
Arguments

Description
Understanding- a statement, definition,
objects, etc. Indicate what is included and
what is excluded by a condition in a
definition or theorem. Build a sense of
what’s going on. Explore behavior and
illustrate structure. To indicate a dimension
of variation implied by a generalization. To
indicate something that remains invariant
while some other features change.
Choosing specific objects to see whether the
assertion held for those objects.

Using examples to gain insight into building
the proof. Directly: trying to show that a
result is true in a specific case hoping the
same argument or manipulations will work in
general. Indirectly: searching for a reason
why one could not find a counterexample to
the statement. To give insight into proving
(looking for a TH). To understand why the
assertion should be true (Looking for a CI).
Use a specific object to indicate the
significance of a particular condition in a
definition or theorem. Showing how the
statement fails in the absence of that
condition.
Generating
Generating counterexamples to prove a
counterexamples statement (conjecture) is false
Explaining
The prover uses the example not as an aid to
explain an argument to another (the
interviewer, student, etc.)

Example
Start-up examples

Testing a small
number of examples.
Testing a “critical”
example.
Prover computes the
characteristic
polynomial of two
generated similar
matrices hoping the
computation will
illuminate why the
characteristic
polynomials must be
equal

“Let me show you
why this works”
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Table 38
Evaluation Codes Used in Pilot Study
Code
Evaluation

Description
There are two types of evaluation:
planning and usefulness. The evaluation
for usefulness is the posing of the
questions: How well did the tool or plan of
attack work to resolve the initial
problematic situation? or How well did
this tool help me achieve my intended
purpose? Planning poses the question:
what does the application of this tool tell
me about how to proceed? Planning may
entail a re-inspection of the situation to
determine how the problem has changed,
if it is resolved, or if there is a new
problem to address. Instances of
evaluation can occur before applying a
tool, while the tool is being applied, and
after the tool has been applied.

Example
Evidence of evaluation:
Verbalization- “that helps
me.”; “that’s not working”;
“that’s not the problem”;etc.
Periods of quiet thought
followed by a course of
action or an observation
about the problem situationevidence of planning
Periods of quiet thought
followed by a CHANGE in
tool or application- evidence
of usefulness evaluation
BUT evaluation may be a
thought process that we don’t
observe
Planning: “Is it easy from
here? From the definition?”

DecisionTool is
effective

Problem is still unresolved, but I’ll keep
applying the same tool in the same way.

“I think that helps me”

Problem solved: The tool was applied with
satisfaction and the problem is no longer an
issue. Remember there may be many
“problems” within one proof task.” Also
“solved” is a judgment made by the prover
not the observer or the mathematics
community; it is possible that the solution
is mathematically incomplete or even
incorrect. The prover moves on to the next
task which may or may not become a
problematic situation. Dewey indicates the
resolving of a problem can be accompanied
with a feeling of satisfaction or enjoyment
and an attainment of new knowledge
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Table 38
Code
DecisionTool is
ineffective

DecisionProblem
Changed

Description
Tool application is ineffective, Problem is
unresolved: When the problem is
unresolved, the cycle starts again. The
prover inspects the situation including the
original problem and the tool itself. She
then makes a planning evaluation as to the
action to take next. Choices made could
be:
abandonment of the previous tool and
choosing a new one
choosing to apply the same tool in the same
or a different way
determining the tool is problematic and
engaging in inquiry to resolve the problem
with the tool (this is most likely to happen
if evaluation is an interruption during the
“fulfilling experience”)
Exiting inquiry (giving up without
satisfaction)
Problem changed: It may be that the
application of the tool changed the nature
of the situation for the individual causing
something else to be problematic or
interesting. In this case, the prover may not
deem the situation as problematic and
therefore go back to “everyday” experience
where the situation may become
problematic. The prover may be aware of
the problem but choose not to enter inquiry
in the sense of a moral judgment (Dewey,
1938). The prover may enter the problem,
beginning a new cycle of inquiry in which
the tools, and the knowledge constructed in
previous inquiries are available if deemed
useful.

Example

“This is not helping, what
else can I try?”
“I can tell that’s not going to
work, what else can I try?”

“maybe I’ll move on to the
next problem”
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Table 39
Modes of Thinking Codes Used in Exploratory Study
Code
Instantiating

Creative
Thinking

Description
Instantiating is the attempt to meaningfully
understand a mathematical object by
thinking about the objects to which it
applies. It is using or generating
instantiations for the purpose of
understanding.
Code as instantiating if:
Purpose is to understand something
(object, statement, definition, etc.)
Tool used is an instantiation (example,
alternative definition, intuitive conception,
etc.) of a mathematical object
Creative thinking entails examining
instantiations to identify a property or set
of manipulations that can form the key idea
of a proof. The purpose of the creative
thinking may be to gain a critical insight, to
illustrate the structure of the mathematical
objects, to show that the result is true in a
specific case, or to search for a reason why
one could not find a counterexample.
Code as creative thinking if:
Purpose is to gain insight into the “crux” of
the proof
Tools used are instantiations (alternative
conceptions of the mathematical objects,
examples, etc.)

Example
Draws coordinate axes
and a function that is
decreasing and concave
down that is its own
inverse; adds y=x. Then
states “so there is such a
function”

“So I have, we’ll make
the interval zero to five.
I have f of 2 less than
[looks back at previous
writing] f of 3. Let’s say
this is, uh, one and four.
So one, and three, four.
But then, that says that f
of four is, f is its own
inverse so f of four is
three. And um, in this
case, we’re already done
because by the
intermediate value
theorem something
between hits this point
and something between
here hits that point.
[36:30] So the proof is
now a matter of
collecting the right places
for that to happen. So
the basic idea of the
proof is that if we are not
the identity, what
happened here is going to
happen.”
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Table 39 continued
Code
Description
Structural
Structural thinking uses the form of the
Thinking
mathematics to deduce a proof. Structural
thinking employs syntactic reasoning. The
tools used in structural thinking will most
likely be known properties and theorems,
algebraic manipulations, and the logical
structure of mathematics. Additionally,
Alcock notes how structural thinking may
inform instantiating and creative and
critical thinking.
Code as structural thinking if:
The tools used are related to the
“representation system of proof” in the
sense of Weber & Alcock (2004)
Purposes will most likely vary
Critical
Thinking

Critical thinking has the goal of checking
the correctness of assertions made in the
proof. This may occur either syntactically
or semantically.
Code as critical thinking if the purpose is
to check an assertion. Various tools may
be used.

Example
“Okay so there’s I can
probably do this without
a lot of cases, but um
looks like it might be
helpful to say case 1 is a
is less than…”
Is breaking into cases to
form the argument.

“I think that a one-to-one
function on an interval
attains its maximum and
minimum on the
endpoints. But I should
probably try to prove
that.”

APPENDIX E
INTERVIEW PROTOCOLS
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Interview One
“Thank you for agreeing to participate. The cameras here will record your writing
from above as well as you from the front. I will have you write in the Livescribe
notebook with the Livescribe pen.
“Our purpose here is to observe you solving mathematics challenging proving
tasks. I believe that only you can determine which tasks would be challenging or
genuinely problematic and which tasks are not. So you will choose the tasks you will
work on. [Researcher hands the professor the book or the professor takes out the book.]
Which book are you using? In what course did you use it? How long have you known
this book? Please take some time going through the book. Identify one task that you find
challenging and one task you believe other mathematicians in your field may find
challenging. By challenging, I mean that upon reading it, you do not recall a solution or
have an immediate sense of how the proof should go. This may be a theorem that needs
proving or a numbered exercise that you would reserve as a challenge problem for your
students. [Allow up to 15 minutes for the professor to choose a task. If they deem all the
tasks in their book as non-problematic, offer the token textbook.]
“When you identify a task, read it aloud and explain your initial perception of the
problem. [Possible follow-up questions: What is your initial inclination of how to solve
the problem? How does this problem differ from some of the other tasks surrounding it in
the book? Had you encountered this task in designing your course or assigning
homework to your students?]
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[Have participants choose one task and show it to us. Then have them find a
second task that he or she perceives as potentially problematic for a peer. Ask the
participants to choose from among the two tasks the one he or she finds challenging.]
“I ask that you think aloud so that I can observe as much as possible. Please
articulate what you are thinking including what you find challenging about the problem.
It is okay if you cannot articulate what exactly is the issue. If at any point during the
problem, you find the task is no longer problematic, please let me know when that
happens. Indicate points when you start seeing the situation differently, or any shifts in
your perspective of the problem. [Allow up to an additional 20 minutes for the participant
to solve. Explain to the participant the amount of time allotted.]
“It looks like we are out of time, but I will request that you continue to work on
the task on your own time in this week prior to our next meeting. As during the interview,
I ask that you write in this notebook, and think-aloud as you write. You may choose to
write out your thoughts in the notebook as well. I would like you to note either in speech
or in writing the moments where your perceptions of the situation shift. If you think about
the problem while you are away to the notebook, please take time to return to the
notebook and record what you thought about.” [Make copies of the work created in the
interview. Transfer the Livescribe files to personal computer. Send participant with
notebook and pen.]
Interviews Two and Three
Hello, again. This interview will consist of two parts. The first will be reviewing the task
you worked on previously; the second will consist of you working on a new task.
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Stimulated Recall
Use the laptop to play back chosen sections of the interview. Explain to the
participant that he/she can pause the video at any time.
I have chosen intervals of our last session that I would like us to watch together. I
will pause the tape at certain moments and ask you to explain your thinking and
the decisions you made. Describe your choices of action and why you chose it.
Please elaborate on any element of the situation. I would rather you were honest
and say little about a choice you made rather than create an explanation. During
playback, feel free to pause or rewind and replay the tape to explain the situation
as you see fit.
[Ask for questions. Play back chosen video. Ask questions that will be generated in
analyses. Include follow-up questions when appropriate of the form: “Say more about
that.” Record time stamps of when the participant stopped, paused, or rewound the
video.]
Review of the Participant’s Individual Work
The participant will bring his or her Livescribe pen and notebook to the interview
and describe his or her thought processes throughout solving the problem.“Thank you for
continuing to work on the task. Where did you work? For how long? Did you think about
the task outside of the time you were sitting down with the notebook?
Did you solve the task to your satisfaction? If so, describe the moments when you
realized what you were trying would work. If not, explain some things you tried and the
results of trying them.”
[If the participants describe moments of gaining new insights or ideas that they
viewed as moving their argument forward, ask them about the results of incorporating
this idea.]
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Work on Task Chosen by Another Participant
Provide the participant with the written proof task. Have available relevant
definitions and instantiations of definitions (Alcock, 2008). Provide context to the task
including the name and author of the book and the chapter from which the task was
derived.
“I ask that you think aloud so that I can observe as much as possible. Please
articulate what you are thinking including what you find challenging about the problem.
It is okay if you cannot articulate what exactly is the issue. If at any point during the
problem, you find the task is no longer problematic, please let me know when that
happens. Indicate points when you start seeing the situation differently, or any shifts in
your perspective of the problem.” [Allow up to an additional 20 minutes for the
participant to solve. Explain to the participant the amount of time allotted.]
“It looks like we are out of time, but I will request that you continue to work on
the task on your own time in this week prior to our next meeting. As during the interview,
I ask that you write in this notebook, and think-aloud as you write. You may choose to
write out your thoughts in the notebook as well. I would like you to note either in speech
or in writing the moments where your perceptions of the situation shift. If you think about
the problem while you are away to the notebook, please take time to return to the
notebook and record what you thought about.” [Make copies of the work created in the
interview. Transfer the Livescribe files to personal computer. Send participant with
notebook and pen.]

APPENDIX F
RESULTANT CODEBOOK UPON OPEN CODING

347
Table 40
Problem Types Encountered by Participants
Problem Code

Description
The participant does not understand what the statements mean
or the definition of a object described in the statement of the
Understanding
proof or how the objects in the statement relate and is entered
statements or objects
into working understand
Prover is engaged in determining the truth value of the
Determining truth
statement
Prover is looking for a means to connect the statement to the
claim that eventually can be rendered into a proof. I f
participants specifically are searching for conceptual reasons
why the statement is true or are seeking to connect statements
via a symbolic manipulation, then the next two codes were
Looking for warrant
used.
Looking for conceptual Prover endeavors to find why the statement is true based on
reason why true
conceptual or empirical understandings
Looking for way to
Prover endeavors to find means to directly connect symbolic
connect symbolically
instantiations of statements
Looking for way to
Prover is engaged in finding a way to communicate or
communicate/generalize generalize an argument, warrant, backing, or other idea
Looking for backing for Prover is engaged in finding general or generalizable support
previous idea
for a posed idea or claim
Prover applies tools or actions without needing to reflect on
choice. The individual indicates that the action taken is
“second nature”, “what you’re supposed to do”, “how I usually
do it”, etc. The individual may look back at what the action
did for him/her but nothing has been deemed problematic prior
No problem
to that evaluation.
There is an identification and entrance into solving a problem
with individual tools or application of these tools, i.e. trouble
Tool problem
generating a helpful example, computation issues, etc.
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Table 41
Classifications of Tools Utilized by the Participants That Contributed to Idea Generation
Conceptual knowledge
Known theorem
Connecting and
permuting
Instantiations and
equivalencies
Symbolizing
Symbolic manipulations
Example
Heuristics and
experiences
Logical structure
Other

Tool classifications
Knowledge of relationships among mathematical objects,
consequences of actions on objects, or mathematical structure
Specific use of a theorem known to be true
Attending to connecting and rearranging previously generated
ideas, definitions, and related concepts
Alternative or Non-formal representations of mathematical
concepts or definitions
Rewriting statements, definitions, or representations in terms
of symbols
Actions on symbolic representations
a particular case of any larger class about which students
generalize and reason, and they describe
Rule of thumb, technique that comes with experience
Knowledge of logical structure and the norms o behaving and
communicating in the mathematics community
Time, disturbances in the situation, outside resources, etc.
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Table 42
Purposes of Using Tools of Examples
Types of examples utilized
A specific example is used to understand a statement,
definition, objects, etc.; indicate what is included and what is
excluded by a condition in a definition or theorem; build a
sense of what’s going on; explore behavior and illustrate
structure; indicate a dimension of variation implied by a
generalization; indicate something that remains invariant
while some other features change.
Examples to test
Choosing specific objects to determine i f an assertion held for
those objects
Examples to generate a
Using examples to gain insight into building proof:
warrant
• Directly by trying to show that a result is true in a
specific case hoping the same argument or
manipulations will work in general, OR
• Indirectly by searching for a reason why one could not
find a counterexample to the statement, OR
• To understand why the assertion should be true, OR
• To indicate the significance o f a particular condition
in a definition or theorem OR
• To generate a counterexample
Examples to articulate or Using an example to more clearly articulate one’s own sense
explain
of an idea or to explain one’s own idea or argument to another
or oneself
Examples to understand

350
Table 43
Shifts in Toulmin Structure of Personal Arguments
Structural Shifts in the Personal Argument
The structure that the participant begins with when articulating
the first idea
Claim changed or
The claim of the argument is either changed to a new claim or
specified
delimited in some way
Sub-claim added
In addition to attending to justifying the central claim,
participants add new claims to proven
Data added, extended or New statements are incorporated into the set of statements that
specified
the participant deems as relevant or existing statements are
extended to new cases or existing statements are reformulated
Data statements
Given statements or previously generated ideas are purposed
repurposed
in the argument as claims, warrants, backing, or MQ/rebuttals
Data removed
Previously perceived relevant statements are removed
Warrant added, changed Warrant is added if none previously existed, replaced by a
or removed
new warrant, or eliminated as a potential link between
statements
Backing added,
Backing statements are incorporated if none previously
changed, or removed
existed, replaced, or eliminated
Qualifier or rebuttal
Qualifier or rebuttal is typically implicit or not present, this
changed
code notes when one is specified or removed
Order of presentation
The relevant statements are not changed or deleted but are
rearranged or combined with other claim structures
None
No changes
Opening structure

APPENDIX G
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